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ABSTRACT
Following o severe balance of payments crisis in m id- 1990, in July 1991 the G overnm ent of 
India embarked on a far-reaching stabilisation and structural adjustment program m e. To 
support this effort, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank subsequently 
provided financial assistance under a Stand-by arrangem ent of the former, and Structural 
Adjustment and Sectoral Adjustment Facilities of the latter.
The Indian adjustment rested on policies to restrain the growth of dom estic dem and 
and on structural reforms to augm ent supply through an improved a llocation of resources. 
The reforms, aimed a t opening up the econom y and promoting its reliance on market 
forces. These structural reforms were supported by mutually reinforcing m acroeconom ic 
stabilisation efforts comprising restrictive fiscal and m onetary policies. The structural reforms 
consisted primarily of the following: broad-based price liberalisation, including market 
determ ination of exchange and interest rates; trade liberalisation; liberalisation of the 
exchange and payments systems; financial sector reform; streamlining of non-financial 
public enterprises; and comprehensive tax reforms. Thus, besides moving tow ard  external 
and domestic stability, Indio has been undergoing a market-oriented transformation.
The objective of this dissertation is to analyse the im pact of this stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programme of the early 1990s.
The reform programme has been successful in quickly stabilising prices and restoring 
external sector balance. However, in line with the experiences of coventional adjustnm ent 
policies, a significant tradeoff could be observed in terms of decline in output growth and 
volume of investment. In part, this decline is the consequence of stabilisation measures. The 
decline  in output growth was subsequently arrested successfully. Simultaneously, 
considerable progress has been m ade in initiating structural reform measures, most notably 
trade, foreign investment, and industrial policy reforms^ although it will take some time 
before these reforms are fully implem enfed. However, fhe im pact of these structural 
changes has yet to be realised. The eventual growth of investment and real output is 
p red ica ted  on com pleting structural reforms, such as the developm ent of financia l markets 
and the safeguarding of their stability, streamlining of public sector enterprises, minimising 
governm ent interference with econom ic forces, and the imposition of a realistic budge t 
constraint.
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In troduction.
The deca de  of 1980s has witnessed an increasing reliance of countries, especially 
the developing countries of the world, on the adjustment packages supported by the 
International M onetary Fund and the World Bank. These countries im plem ented these 
packages wholly or partially, and with d ifferent degrees of intensify.
The above m entioned adjustment policies in the initial stages normally conta in a 
deflationary e lem ent which aims a t reducing budge t deficits and the overall dom estic 
absorption relative to the GDP. This is known as the stabilisation policy. Stabilisation policies 
are monetary and fiscal policies designed to m oderate  the fluctuations o f the econom y, in 
particular, fluctuations of the rates of growth, inflation, and unem ploym ent. ’ Governm ent 
expenditure cuts, cred it restrictions, and devaluation of the exchange rate have been the 
main policy tools for stabilisation.
When the adjustm ent problem is fundam enta lly one of fhe rate of dom estic 
absorption being high relative to the GDP, defla tionary policies m ay be the best recourse to 
achieve the resource ba lance  in the econom y. However, the experience of the developing 
countries in the 1980s reveal tha t the ba lance  o f payments and budge ta ry  imbalances are 
only symptoms of deeper structural problems in the concerned econom y. Given this, to rely 
only on defaltionory stabilisation policies will succeed to restore external ba lance  a t the 
cost of creating serious internal imbalances in the form of mass unem ploym ent and 
partia l/to ta l disruption of investment activ ity in the econom y. As a consequence, 
stabilisation measures are normally com bined with structural adjustment polices which aim  
a t the medium- and long-term  restructuring of the econom y.
The adjustment policies have traditionally conta ined strong privatisation and price 
liberalisation elements. The underlying reason being the Bretton Woods Institutions' belief 
tha t the main sources of structural imbalances in the developing econom ies are inward 
looking industrialisation policies, large price distortions in product and fa c to r markets, and 
the dom inance of public sector econom ic enterprises in industrial p roduction. Accordingly, 
these economies could not e ffectively cope  up with the external shocks during the 1980s. 
The above m entioned adjustment policies, are expected  to correct the inherent structural 
imbalances by changing the incentive structure in the econom y and creating the
See. Dornbusch and Fischer, 1990, p.27.
appropria te  supply stimuli, and lead to fuller utilisation of resources and better a llocative  
and productive eftic iency in the econom y.
The stabilisation and adjustment policies adop ted /im p lem en ted  across countries 
highlight a broad uniformity in po licy content. The latter aspect has been a subject m atter 
of controversy as each country has different m acroeconom ic conditions. Correspondingly, 
any stabilisation and adjustm ent effort is expected  to suit particular circumstances. It is 
expected  tha t the concerned governm ent would design stabilisation and structural 
adjustment program m e keeping in view  not only the econom ic conditions in the country 
bu t also the political and institutional conditions necessary to im plem ent it. As m entioned 
above, despite this, the adjustm ent packages have broadly been uniform across countries 
and through time. The relative succes^and failures of stabilisation and structural adjustment 
pogrammes are thus a subject m atter of acu te  controversy. It has been observed tha t in a 
successful stabilisation program m e, the growth rates ot real GDP and exports improve within 
a very short time lag. However, investment rate declines for a considerable period of time. 2 
It has also been observed tha t the program m e experiences vary across countries and 
through time.
Against this background, evaluation of program m e im pact and effectiveness have 
continued to remain a top ic  of major inferest both within the Fund and the Bank as well as 
in the outside acad em ic  circles. There have been a large number of literature on both 
experiences ot individual countries as well as on cross country experiences. The subject 
m atter of the present dissertation is to assess the im p ac t of the Bretton Woods institutions- 
supported adjustment programmes.
Our approach in the current context is to study a country which underwent a 
typ ical stabilisation and structural adjustment program m e in the very recent past - India.
The Indian econom y experienced steady deterioration in econom ic perform ance 
since mid-1980s. This steady deterioration cu lm inated in external econom ic crisis in early 
1990s following the outbreak of Gulf War and breakdown of trade with erstwhile east 
European Communist countries. However, it is now  generally a cce p te d  tha t underlying this 
were deficiencies in national policy-making and the consequent weaknesses in econom ic 
structure.
- See. Corbo and Fischer, 1992.
It is against this background tha t the Indian authorities initiated econom ic reform 
programmes, especially in the form of stabilisation and structural adjustm ent programmes in 
the early 1990s. This effort was subsequently a ided  by the IMF and the World Bonk through 
provision of financial assistance under, am ong others, Stand-By arrangem ent of the former 
and Structural Adjustment Loans and Sectoral Adjustment Loans of the latter.
The main objectives of the Indian stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes in the early 1990s were, (1) strengthening the ba lance of payments position; 
(2)reduction in internal imbalances, including less governm ent defic it financing; ensuring 
price stability; (3) raising econom ic growth; (4) elim ination of price distortions in various 
sectors of the econom y, especially the energy sector; (5) increasing trade liberalisation; and 
(6) prom oting institutional reforms with the aim of facilita ting e conom ic /ou tpu t growth.
As a part of the programmes, the governm ent substantially deregula ted private
investment, import, and foreign investment, divested a part of the shareholding in public
"Iho’enterprises, m oderated  customs and excise duties, deprecia ted  exchange rate of^rupee, 
ensured current accou n t convertib ility of fhe rupee exchange rate, and abolished export 
subsidy. The governm ent also announced its intention to consolidate its achievem ents in 
respect of deregulation of controls on imports, align customs duty rates to the international 
levels, close chronically sick public enterprises, deregulate financia l sector, particularly 
banking and insurance, and curtail unwarranted subsidies. ^
Objectives,
As m entioned above, the Fund and the Bank becam e major actors on the Indian 
econom ic scene during the early 1990s. Thus the analytical approaches and policies they 
a d vo ca te  had had significant influence in the changed  emphasis in the Indian econom ic 
policy making.
The consequent reorientation in econom ic policies, involving significant changes in 
the structure of production, trade, prices and resource allocation, as well as m acro 
aggregates emphasised an increased scope of the market and a reduced role of the 
governm ent in the early 1990s in the Indian context.
As discussed earlier, the general conclusion tha t can be derived from country 
experiences is tha t the stabilisation and adjustment programmes are not neutral: a given
See. Government of India: 1993.
m anipulation in econom ic policies can produce different econom ic outcomes. In ttiis 
context, an evaluation of program m e effectiveness m ay be useful exercise to stied light on 
the shape of changes tha t m ight have taken p lace  in the econom y. It is expected  tha t 
such an exercise would provide information regarding the sustainability of India ’s 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes in the early 1990s.
Against this background, our aim in this dissertation is to a tte m p t on evaluation of 
the im p ac t of the stabilisation and adjustment efforts in the early 1990s. Our m ethodology 
for the purpose would be to concentra te  on estimation of 'counterfactua ls '.
The organisation of the dissertation would be as under. C hapter 1 would be 
intended to review existing literature on experiences of individual countries who contracted  
Fund-supported stabilisation programmes in the d eca de  of the 1980s. C hapter 2 sets out the 
particular features of the Indian econom y, and the sources of its crisis. The aim  of the 
chap ter is to provide with a background to the empirical assessment tha t would be 
a ttem p ted  in the subsequent chapters. In chapter 3 we discuss the m ethodologies to 
empirically assess the im pact of the Indian stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes in the early 1990s. C hapter 4 would present results of our investigation on the 
extent of com p liance  with negotia ted  stabilisation proposals measures undertaken by the 
Indian authorities. As m entioned earlier, the objectives of this dissertation is to evaluate the 
im p ac t of the programmes pursued by the Indian authorities. Determination of the extent of 
com p liance  would be the first im portant step towards this effort; while chap ter 5 would be 
intended to evaluate the im pac t of the program m e in India. Given the status of 
ach ievem ent of the program m e proposals as would be examined in chap ter 4, our effort to 
evaluate  the program m e would involve a relative assessment of the actua l econom ic 
ach ievem ent during the stabilisation program m e period. The chapter would, therefore, aim  
a t determ ining whether the status of im plem entation of program m e policies has any 
significant or marginal contribution in m acroeconom ic pertorm ance vis-à-vis their 
respective trend behaviour. C hapter 6 summarises and concludes the dissertation.
C hapte r 1 : Stabilisation Experiences o f Individual Countries :
Survey o f Liferature on Case Studies.
Stabilisation program m e strategy has broadly been similar across countries and 
through time. However, stabilisation experiences are not unique. The direction and 
m agnitude of achievem ents differ considerably across countries. Heterogeneity in individual 
econom ic characteristics, time, and nature of shocks are considered to be a few  arnong 
the im portant factors underlying this diverse experience.
The objective  of this chap ter is to review existing literature on experiences of 
individual countries who contracted  Fund-supported stabilisation programmes. We, 
therefore, consider only literature concerning individual country experiences instead of 
studies on multi-country experiences. ’
There is a large body of literature on individual country experiences of stabilisation 
programmes. These are mainly outcomes of the efforts of researchers outside the Fund. The 
w idth of literature for this chapter, however, has been restricted to country experiences 
during the deca de  of 1980s. These countries entered into agreem ent under the Stand-By 
facility  of the Fund during 1980-81 through 1989-90. Moreover, some of them  simultaneously 
entered into another adjustment program m e supported either by the Fund and /o r projects 
under various deve lopm ent facilities provided by the World Bank. Accordingly, the follow ing 
discussion on individual country experiences has an obvious qualification. Wherever 
programmes overlapped, 2 jf would be difficult to  establish unique one-to-one 
correspondence betw een country experience and a particular programme.
The chapter has been arranged as under. Section one describes the population, 
chosen for review of literature. This would be fo llow ed by a discussion on im portant 
m acroeconom ic features of the former. Section two briefly outlines world econom ic 
developm ents during 1975-90. This would provide with a broad framework o f external 
environment for our population. Section three discusses the sources of crisis. Section four 
describes the policy responses and then analyses individual country experiences of Fund- 
supported stabilisation program m e. Finally, section five c oncludes the chapter.
' It may be mentioned that majority of studies on evaluation of the effectiveness of Fund-supported 
programmes has been based on cross country experiences regarding implementation of stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes.
- Programmes overlapped either because more than one Fund-supported programmes were in operation 
simultaneously, or there were programmes supported by the Fund as well as the World Bank.
Section One: An Econom ie O verv iew  of Sam ple Countries.
In this section w e describe the population, i.e., the countries, chosen for literature 
review. We also summarise main m acroeconom ic features of our population.
We begin our discussion by arranging country studies on the basis of approaches 
used. This will be fo llow ed by a review of the sample countries. In the latter, w e  would 
a ttem p t a classification of the chosen countries, and an analysis of econom ic 
characteristics of each class. The aim  here is to  prepare a background for understanding 
experiences of these countries within proper perspective.
The Sam ple,
As m entioned earlier, our sample has broadly been selected from a population 
which im plem ented a Stand-By program m e during the d ecade  of 1980s. There were, in 
total, 196 Stand-By programmes approved by the Fund during 1980-81 through 1989-90 
involving 77 countries fAppendix 1.1). Of these, a to ta l of 48 programmes involved multiple 
arrangements during the period under consideration. fAppendix 1.11). Twenty seven 
programmes were cance lled  before com pletion, while 9 were modified. (Appendix 1 .III). ^
For our present purpose, w e  have chosen 21 countries. fAppendix 1 .IV). These latter 
have been chosen based on following considerations. The first im portant consideration is 
availability of literature. Other im portant considerations are status on com p le tion  or 
abandonm ent of the program m e, geographica l dispersion representative o f regional 
distribution ot tinancia l assistance under Stand-By facility of the Fund, and last bu t not the 
least, know ledge on politica l features '• of these countries. It is expected  tha t such 
considerations would throw  light on fhe im portance of inter-country variations in influencing 
individual country performances when a uniform stabilisation policy, of the Fund-supported 
type, is app lied indiscriminately. ®
Our sample of countries had 73 Stand-By arrangements am ong themselves during 
the period under study. Besides, 18 of them  were also having structural adjustment 
programmes. Countries w hich did not have any structural adjustment programmes, under
Modification of either the date of expiration and/or the amount initially agreed upon.
In our analysis, we have not included erstwhile centrally planned economies which have been going 
through o transition process currently.
‘ "Programmes undertaken by the Bratton Woods agencies resemble one another. To the first approxim ation, they are
based upon "orthodox" ap p ro a c h  to m acroeconom ics in the third world Some Fund/Bank staff m em bers are open
to unconventional actions an d  thoughts. However, the central tendency of the agencies’ ap p ro a c h  to short-term policy  
is clear, and  clearly reflected  in p ra c tic e .’
See. Taylor, L. (1988): Varieties o f Stabilization Experience, p.2.
simultaneous im plem entation, comprised Argentina, Brazil, and Peru from Latin Am erican 
region; Egypt, Sudan, and Tanzania from African region; and the Philippines and  India from 
Asia. Of these 73 arrangements, 12 were cance led  * before  com ple tion of fhe program m e; 
while 5 were modified^ before expiration of the program m e. Thus, 16 per ce n t o f the tota l 
num ber of arrangements con tracted  by these countries were abandoned  before scheduled 
d a te  of their com pletion. The maximum and minimum durations for any arrangem ent in 
Latin Am erica were 2 years and 1 year, respectively. For African and Asian regions, 
corresponding durations w ere 2 years, and 9 months; and 3 years, and 5 months, 
respectively. Maximum inc idence of arrangements in respect of all three regions occurred 
for 1 year duration.-In our selected group of countries, there are 9 countries from Latin 
Am erica, 12 countries from Africa, and 5 countries from  Asia. ® Our cho ice  presents g lobal 
trend in country composition of Stand-By arrangements. Evidently, number o f countries 
choosing international financia l institutions-supported m acroeconom ic stabilisation has 
always been biased towards African region vis-à-vis others.
An observation of chosen literature reveals tha t all availab le approaches have 
been app lied  in evaluating the effects of Fund-supported Stand-By programmes. Following 
is a schem atic presentation of various selected country studies, based on their use of 
m ethodology.
■■ Countries involved were Argentina (Stand-By of 1983); Cote d'Ivoire (Stand-By of 1984); the Gambia (Stand- 
By of 1984); Jamaica (Stand-Bys of 1985 and 1988); Kenya (Stand-Bys of 1980 and 1988); Peru (Stand-By of 
1984); Philippines (Stand-By of 1984); and Turkey (Stand-By of 1983).
7 Comprising following countries, Argentina (Stand-Bys of 1984 and I989),;Cote d'Ivoire (Stand-By of 1984): 
and the Philippines (Stand-by of 1986).
• Of 5 countries for Asia, India is one. The latter, however, had a  Stand-By programme in 1991 -93. Despite this, 
we included the study on India in our survey mainly because of the approach used by the authors.
V-
1. Studies using 'be fore-and-a fte r' test include.
Countrv Period of Studv Stand-Bv of
(1 ) Ghana 1983-85 1983
(2) Kenya 1979-85 1983
(3) Tanzania 1978-85 1984
(4) Sudan 1972-85 1985
(5) Philippines 1983-85 1983 & 1984
(6) Chile 1973-87
(7) Turkey 1973-84 1980
(8) Argentina 1970-84 1985
(9) Peru 1980-85 1984
(10) Jamaica 1978-88 1984-88
(11) Brazil 1979-85
(12) Gambia 1980-87 1984
(13) Mexico 1977-85 1982
(14) Bolivia 1982-88 1986
(IS)Costa Rica 1980-87 1982
Country Period of Studv Stand-Bv of
(16) Cote d'Ivoire 1984-89 1984
(17) Egypt 1974-89 1987
(18) Malawi 1981-88
The most popular m ethod in literature is the 'before-and-a fte r' approach. Its 
popularity arises from flexibility in the use of reference parameters across countries. Under 
this m ethod, researchers have drawn conclusions by com paring behaviour of 
m acroeconom ic  variables before the program m e with tha t during or after the program m e 
period. Often these above  comparisons have been m ade either with reference to the 
conce rned  country's own historical record or w ith corresponding m acroeconom ic 
indicators of a control group. The latter generally comprises either a selective group of 
countries and /or developing countries as a whole.
II. In our selected list of country studies, there are two studies which have used the 'a c tu a l- 
versus-targef test. These are: a study on Peruvian experience during November 1977 to 
D ecem ber 1980 by Diz: ’  and a study on Bangladesh. Under this approach, the authors 
have obta ined conclusions through comparison o f actua l outcomes, for certain key 
m acroeconom ic variables, w ith corresponding targets. These latter are generally agreed 
upon during negotiation of the program m e with the Fund. The studies, therefore, provide 
w ith  an indication of the extent to  which the program m e achieved ta rge ted  results. 
However, the m ethod has not been used as frequently as the 'be fore-and-a fte r' test partly 
due to its reliance on confiden tia l information on targets that often only the country
'' See, A.C, Diz (1983): Economic Performance Under Three Stand-By Arrangements : Peru, 1977-80, in 
J. Williamson (ed.), IMF Conditionality, pp. 263-273.
See. K.A. Matin ( 1990).
A '^ t )  FvfRTLy
authorities and Fund staff have access to^'>^; - -- the m ethod
ca nn o t evaluate  the 'counterfactua ls '.
III. Studies using 'comparison-of-simulations' approach.
The last bu t not the least is a group of studies tha t have used the 'com parison-of- 
simulations' approach. Under this approach, counterfactuals are ob ta ined  through 
simulations of d ifferent policy scenarios for the same country. The uniqueness of the 
app roach  is its use of a m odel to simulate the counterfactuals. Such a m odel also provides 
w ith an ana lytica l tool to clearly quantify the costs and trade-offs of alternative packages 
on multiple policy objectives. Though the approach  has been used w ide ly in individual 
country studies, evidently, there is no uniformity in the nature of the m odel used to  simulate. 
While in some studies a m acroeconom etric  m odel for the econom y has been used, in 
others a com putab le  general equilibrium m odel has been used. An im portant difference 
be tw een the two is tha t in com putab le  general equilibrium models, authors resort to 
ca lib ra tion of the m odel, while in econom etric models authors estimate them  using time 
series da ta . For our present purpose, w e have chosen two country studies as listed below. 
The im portant consideration for our cho ice  has been the type of m odel used.
Countrv Period of Studv Stand-By of
(1) Morocco 1981-86 1983
(2) Indio 1991-94 1991
In these tw o studies, the authors have drawn conclusions based on simulations of 
several po licy scenarios. These simulations have been a ttem p ted  for coun terfactua l analysis 
of some retrospective policy measures.
C lassification o f the Sample,
We classify our sample into seven categories based on two ana lytica l criteria, 
p redom inant export category, and state of international indebtedness.
I. Severely indebted  agricultural products exporters. Countries falling under this ca tegory  are 
Argentina, Bolivia, C ote d ’ Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Peru, Sudan, Tanzania, and
" See. Khan (1990), p. 205.
Major exports are those that account for 50 % or more of total exports of goods and services from one 
category in the period 1988-92. If no single category accounts for 50 % or more of total exports, fhe economy 
is classified as diversified.
Source : World Development Report, 1995 pp. 250-251.
Standard World Bank definitions of severe and moderate indebtedness averaged over 3 years ( 1991-93 ). 
Economies are classified following two key ratios, viz., present value of debt service to GNP and present 
value of debt service to exports. Severely indebted means either of the above two key ratios is over critical 
levels 80 %, 220 %, respectively. Moderately indebted means either of the above two ratios exceeds 60 % of, 
but does not reach, the critical levels.
Source : World Development Report, 1995, pp. 250-251.
Zambia. O f them , Argentina, Bolivia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Peru are m arket borrowers, whiie 
the rest are o ffic ia l borrowers.
II. M odera te ly  indeb ted  diversified exporters. This is the second im portant ca tego ry  in our 
chosen list. This comprises Bangladesh, Brazil, Costa Rica, India, Mexico, M orocco, the 
Philippines, and  Turkey. Of them, Bangladesh and M orocco are o ffic ia l borrowers; while 
Brazil and  M exico are market borrowers. The rest are diversified borrowers.
III. M odera te ly  indeb ted  services exporters. The ca tegory  comprises Egypt, the G am bia, and 
Dom inican Republic. All of them are official borrowers.
IV. Severely indeb ted  services exporters. Of our chosen sample, only Jam aica falls in this 
ca tegory . This is an official borrower.
V. Severely indeb ted  diversified exporters. Only Kenya falls in this category, w hich is also a 
diversified borrower.
VI. M odera te ly  indebted  agricultural products exporters. This ca tegory  comprises Chile 
w hich  is a m arket borrower.
VII. M odera te ly  indebted  exporters of manufacturers. Korea is the only country chosen for 
our sample. The country is a market borrower.
M a jor Structural Features,
As the above  schem atic presentations show, w e have considered a large and diverse 
group of individual countries for reviewing their stabilisation program m e experiences. Table
1.1.1 provides some Information abou t the structural features of our chosen group of countries. 
Size and C om ponents of GDP,
The sample comprises six developing economies having largest value of GDP in 1993. 
(Tablel .1.1 (a)) These are Brazil, Mexico, the Republic o f Korea, Argentina, India, and Turkey. 
Four others, the Philippines, Chile, Peru, and Egypt, can also be described as large economies, 
for in 1993 their GDPs measured US$ 35 billion or more. It also includes Nigeria, which is 
inc identa lly  the largest econom y in sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, w e have also considered 
some relatively small econom ies: M orocco, Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Cote d ’ Ivoire,
I-* Sources of borrowing imply whether borrowed from official or market sources or the country Is a diversified 
borrower. Official borrowers are net debtor with more than two thirds of their total liabilities outstanding at 
the end of 1989 owed to the official creditors. Market borrowers are net debtor with more than two thirds of 
their total liabilities outstanding at the end of 1989 owed to the commercial creditors. While diversified 
borrowers consist of those net debtor developing countries that are classified neither as market nor as official 
borrowers.
Source : World Economic Outlook, October 1995,1.M.F, p. 87.
The value of Nigeria's GDP was marginally lower than US $ 35 billion in 1993.
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Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Kenya. Kenya’s econom ic experiences have been m uch analysed, 
but iterature on stabilisation and structural adjustm ent experience. While, there is some 
literature availab le  on the experiences of M orocco, Bangladesh, and Bolivia, literature on 
m acroeconom ics of the other smaller econom ies is p ractica lly  very few  or none.
No particular: ' econom ic activ ity has a dom inant share in GDP of majority of chosen 
countries. Within the latter, some countries, such as Bangladesh, India, Malawi, and Kenya, 
however, have a relatively high share of agricultural contribution. While, Brazil, Egypt, Jamaica, 
and Zambia have a relatively im portant industrial sector. Countries that are predominantly 
agricultural in our sample include Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Tanzania; while 
predom inantly Industrial countries are Argentina, and the Republic of Korea.
External Orientation and Structure of Trade,
Our sample demonstrate substantial diversity in extent of external orientation. On the one 
hand, w e  have countries comprising Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Jam aica, Nigeria, 
and the Philippines, who have a very high degree of external orientation. The relevant ratio for 
all o f them  was about 33 per cen t or more. While, for Jam aica, the corresponding ratio was 
a bo u t 66 per cent. On the other hand, we have countries with relatively lower ratio (10 per 
ce n t or less] of external orientation. The latter group comprises Bangladesh, Brazil, India, 
M exico, and Peru. Rest of the countries fall within the range of 11-29 per cent.
In our sample, two are oil exporters (Nigeria, and Mexico), while the rest are oil 
importers except for Argentina. The latter is almost self-sufficient in oil production. Structural 
diversity is also revealed by the composition of exporfs. Majority of countries, in our sample, are 
primary com m od ity  exporters. Of them, primary com m od ity  formed as high as 98 per cen t 
for Nigeria and 94 per cen t for M alawi in their m erchandise exports in 1993. However, while for 
Nigeria, the maximum contribution cam e from Fuels, for Malawi, the entire contribution cam e 
from 'o ther primary com m odity  exports'. Countries whose export basket was not dom inated 
by any particular type of goods are Turkey, the Philippines, Jamaica, and India. While, the 
Republic of Korea is the only m anufactured goods exporter in our sample.
There is, however, a noticeab le  structural similarity in our sample countries. Almost all 
of fhem  are dependent on import of critical fac to r inputs. Countries in whose merchandise
Economic activity means agricultural, industrial, and services sectors' activities.
•’ External orientation ratio is defined here as a ratio of exports to GDP (in per cent).
'• Primary commodities comprise Fuels, Minerals, and Metals; and Other Primary Commodities.
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imports, the share of manufactures ”  constituted a very large share (a share of 80 per cen t or 
more) comprised Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico with a share of 80 per cen t 
or more. Of them, only Costa Rica has a dom inant share of other manufactures, while the rest 
have a dom inant share of machinery and transport equipment. In our chosen group of 
countries, only Bangladesh imported less than 50 per cen t of the total merchandise imports 
with only 13 per cen t was for machinery and fransporf equipment. The rest of the countries 
have a share betw een 50-75 per cent of their to ta l merchandise imports.
Domestic Resource Structure,
Table 1.1.1 fb) provides information on country-wise diversity in public sector 
consumption, gross domestic investment, and gross dom estic savings.
We m ay also notice similarity in size of governm ent/public sector consumption as a 
ratio of the respective GDP in our sample. A sizeable majority hod a ratio of a bou t one-fifth or 
more of the size of the GDP in 1993. Approximately abou t one-fourth of our sample, Argentina, 
Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Mexico, Peru, and the Philippines, had the corresponding 
ratio lower than 10 per cent of the size of their respective GDP.
In our sample, the only country with a ratio of Gross domestic investment to GDP 
above  30 per cent is the Republic of Korea. The others are m oderate or poor investors. For the 
former, this ratio ranged betw een 20-23 per cent: while for the poor investors, the ratio ranged 
be tw een  10-19 per cent.
Op D o m e s t i c
Only three countries have a ra t ic ^ f as much as 30 per cent or more of their respective 
GDP. They are the Republic of Korea (36 per cent), Brazil (30 per cent), and M exico (30 per 
cent). Countries that saved very low  in 1993 (with a ratio of 9 per cent or less of their respective 
GDP), were Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Ghana, M alawi, and Mali. While, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Jam aica, and Nigeria had a saving ratio within the range of 20-24 per cen t of GDP. . îh e  
rest saved within the range of 10-19 per cen t of fheir GDP.
Status of External indebtedness.
In our sample, w e have five largest debtor countries, Brazil, Mexico, India, Argentina, 
and Turkey. (Table 1.1.1(C)). We have also considered other large borrowers, such as the 
Republic of Korea, Egypt, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Peru, who have an external deb t stock
Share of manufactured goods, comprising machinery, transport equipment, and other manufactures.
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of US$ 20 billion or more. Besides, some smaller debtor countries, with lower d e b t stock, have 
also been incorporated in our sample.
Expectedly, majority of the chosen countries have a very high deb t ratio. External deb t 
as a ratio of GDP ranged betw een 40-100 per cent of the GDP in 1993 of m ajority of these 
countries. However, there are countries for whom  the d eb t ratio am ounted to 200 per ce n t or 
more, such as Cote d'Ivoire, and Zambia. Countries with d e b t ratio betw een 100-200 per cen t 
were Egypt, the Gambia, Jam aica, Kenya, Mali, and Nigeria. the rest, deb t ratios^between 
20-40 per cen t of GDP in 1993. The only country who had a deb t ratio of less than 15 per cent, 
in our sample, is the Republic of Korea.
Eight of the countries in our sample resorted to rescheduling of their international d eb t 
obligations during the period 1983-88. They were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote 
d ’ Ivoire, Mexico, M orocco, and Nigeria. Subsequently, however, almost all o f our chosen 
countries, except for the Republic of Korea, and Turkey, had to undergo restructuring o f their 
international paym ent obligations on the afterm ath of the Gulf War and consequent oil price 
crisis. Repayment obligations were forgiven for Bangladesh, while India had to  access to 
rescheduling its obligations. Am ong the rest, some rescheduled and/or were forgiven, while 
some also resorted to d eb t stock reduction. Of the latter, Ghana, Jam aica, and Zambia 
undertook deb t stock reduction through means other than buy back options, while some 20 
reduced their deb t stock through buy back option. In our sample, Turkey had a quite high d e b t 
ratio of 55.3 per cent of its GDP in 1993. However, the country did not reschedule during 1982- 
93. Perhaps its econom ic perform ance was conducive to sustain its high d e b t burden.
Trends in Se lected M acroe con om ic  Indicators,
The foregone discussion. ' on ' major structural features of our sample is
based on relevant information for one year, i.e., 1993, only. In the subsequent discussion, we 
have a ttem p ted  to trace the trends in some im portant m acroeconom ic variables of our 
sample during 1970 through 1993. Our effort has been based on data  for three discrete time 
points during 1970-93.
Tables 1.1.2(a), 1.1.2(b), and 1.1.2(c) provide information on trends in certa in selected 
econom ic variables for our sample.
This group included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica. Mexico, and Nigeria.
structural diversity is confirmed by the trends witnessed in ratio of to ta l absorption^' to 
the relevant GDP of our sample. (Table 1.1.2(a)). The la tter comprises countries with increasing, 
declin ing, and more/less stable trends in the above  ratio over the three points of time. Of 
them, the countries with increasing and more/less stable trends are also the countries, with a 
fe w  exceptions, which had a ratio of public sector consumption to GDP of 10 per cen t or 
above. The exceptions are Costa Rica, Bangladesh, Chile, Jamaica, Malawi, and Nigeria 
w hich have witnessed a declining trend in their respective ratio. For majority of our sample, 
trend in the ratio of to ta l absorption was m atched by a corresponding m ovem ent in the ratio 
o f gross dom estic savings to respective GDP. The few  exceptions were Mali, Ghana, the 
Republic of Korea, and Peru, which witnessed an increase in gross domestic saving ratio along 
w ith an increase and/or stable trend in tota l absorption ratio; Argentina, Bangladesh, Jam aica, 
and M alawi, which witnessed a decline in ratio of gross domestic savings com b ined  with a 
dec line  in the ratio of tota l absorption; Kenya and the Philippines which witnessed a decline in 
gross dom estic savings even though there was a stable trend in total absorption^ - 
and India, Mexico, and M orocco, which witnessed an increase in the ratio of gross domestic 
savings accom pan ied  by a stable trend in the ratio of to ta l consumption.
Trends in External Orientation.
Table 1.1.2(b). shows observed trends in external orientation.
Countries which witnessed decline in external orientation were Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Peru, Tanzania, and Zambia. While, M alawi witnessed a stagnant orientation. The rest 
registered sharp or m oderate increase in their external orientation.
Trends In Budgetarv Operations,
Table 1.1.2(c) presents information on budgetary operations of our sample countries.
For majority of our sample, we m ay observe a declining trend in central governm ent 
b ud ge t deficit/surplus as a ratio of the respective GDP between 1980 sand 1993. This m ay 
perhaps be the outcom e following the im plem entation of the stabilisation and /or structural 
adjustm ent programmes in these economies during the 1980s.
Total absorption consists of Government consumption. Private consumption, and gross domestic 
investment.
However, the pattern of financing de fic it 22 or adjusting surplus reveals diversity am ong 
our sample countries. We have a group of countries w ho entirely finance their b udge t defic it 
out o f foreign borrowing, and their dependence  on this source has grown over 1980-93, This 
group comprises Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Gambia. 
While, on the other end, we have Egypt, M orocco, and Nigeria who have financed their de fic it 
out of dom estic borrowing in 1993. Rest depend on both the sources of borrowing. The latter 
group, however, witnessed two different trends, one sub-group witnessed a declin ing shore of 
foreign finance, while the other an increasing share of the foreign finance betw een 1980 and 
1993.
Given the above diversity, both in major features and in trends in certa in selected 
m acro variables, we would expect a diversity in individual country experiences following 
im plem entation of stabiliastion programme.
Section Two: M ajor Trends in World Econom ic Developm ents.
In this section w e review trends in international econom ic developm ents during 
1975-90. It has been observed tha t an econom y implements stabilisation programmes in 
response to deteriorated econom ic conditions. The latter are the outcomes of either 
external and /or internal econom ic developments. Besides, success or failure of stabilisation 
effort depends upon both dom estic po licy practices and external econom ic developments.
The latter being exogenous by nature are of considerable significance to any program m e 
im plem enting econom y. Accordingly, a discussion on major trends on international 
econom ic developments would provide us w ith an idea about external environments for 
our sample.
Major developm ents in international econom ic scenario during 1975-90 m ay be 
discussed under the following broad heads, (a) changes in growth and pattern of trade, (b) 
developm ents in payments, and (c) reorientation in multilateral agencies' role within the 
context of deve lopm ent finance.
D eve lopm ents in Trade,
“  Financing is net borrowing which covers the net change in government liabilities to all other sectors, 
representing either other sectors’ direct loans/advances to government or other sectors'  ^holding of 
government securities acquired from the government itself or in transactions with others.
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During the period 1975 through to 1990, world exports grew  a t a com pound  annual 
rate of 9.8 per cen t per annum in value terms. 23 This growth rate surpassed the growth rate 
in to ta l world output. Total exports from developing countries grew nearly as rapidly, 
because of a particularly strong increase in their exports of m anufactured goods. (Table 
below).
Table: World Exports and Output, selected Years.
(in per cent)
Recion
1975
2.95
6.64
Total 
Developed 
Countries
Developing -5.00
Countries
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (1989. 1991
World Exports 
1990 
14.50 
15.32
12.28
1975
1.34
-0.31
4.69
World Output
1290
2.67
2.04
3.52
However, this growth was not accom panied  by any change in the geograph ic 
composition of trade. Industrial countries as a group accounted  for approxim ate ly 73 per 
ce n t o f world exports in both 1975 and in 1990. Com parable share of fhe developing 
countries am ounted to 27 per cen t during both the years. Within the latter group, the share 
of non-oil exporters, except for the shore of African and Latin American countries, improved 
largely despite tem porary increase in the share of the oil exporters during the period of oil 
price increase.
Since 1975, even though nominal oil prices rose slowly, it declined m arginally in real 
terms from their 1974 level. However, following Iran-lraq War in early 1979, there was a sharp 
decline in oil production. Accordingly, world oil prices rose sharply during 1979-81. 
Subsequently, however, there was a reversal in oil price following the 1982 recession and the 
consequent slow growth in world economy. These latter developments reduced  the 
dem and for oil through 1985 which led to oil price decline gradually from their peaks in 1981 
in nominal terms. In real terms, the decline was steeper. A third oil price shock em erged 
again in early 1990s following the outbreak of the Gulf War subsequent to invasion o f Kuwait 
by Iraq. However, the im pact of this was not so far-reaching and w ide spread.
D evelopm ents in External Payments,
Composition of current accoun t deficits also underwent a change during 1975-90. 
With movements in oil prices, there were corresponding changes in com position of
■'ïVaiue in dollar terms.
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payments ba lance. While oil exporting countries witnessed a large payments surpluses in 
1979-81, there were corresponding matching deficits in the industriaiised countries' and the 
nonoil deve loping countries’ . Payments balances, especia lly of the nonoil deficits increased 
sharply in 1979, which, however, declined sharply after the 1982-83 d e b t crisis. By 1987, the 
nonoil deve loping countries had a current accoun t surplus of $12 billion, an increase of $111 
biliion from 1981. This, however, turned into deficits in 1989 and 1990. (Table below).
Table: Current Account Positions. 1975-90. 
(Billions of US $)
Year Developed
Countries
Developing
Countries
OPEC Nonoil
Total
1975 9.7 32.6 -39.8 2.5
1976 -10.5 37.9 -27.3 0.1
1977 -15.5 22.2 -23.0 -16.3
1978 14.7 -2.4 -32.6 -20.3
1979 -23.6 59.9 -48.6 -12.3
1980 -59.4 103.5 -76.1 -32.0
1981 -17.6 46.6 -99.3 -70.3
1982 -20.9 -9.3 -74.5 -104.7
1983 -21.7 -20.5 -38.1 -80.3
1984 -56.7 -5.9 -22.2 -84.8
1985 -48.9 4.0 -25.3 -70.2
1986 -16.3 -23.0 -12.1 -51.4
1987 -39.5 -4.2 11.6 -32.1
1988 -50.5 -13.0 5.4 -58.1
1989 -84.4 6.1 -17.7 -96.0
1990 -104.9 -4.2 -17.1 -126.2
Source: International Financial Statistics, various issues. IMF.
The second oil price shocks during 1979-81, gave  rise to serious m acroeconom ic 
m anagem ent problem  for both the industrialised and the oil importing countries. While, 
increase in oil prices acce le ra ted  the rate of inflation, this was accom pan ied  by decline in 
output and increase in unemployment. Countries were faced  with the problem  of fighting 
simultaneously inflation and unemployment. The industrialised countries, especia lly the UK, 
the USA, Germ any and Japan, resorted to econom ic adjustment through adoption of 
contractionary policies in order to solve the problem of stagflation. Consequently, short­
term interest rates rose sharply in 1980-81. These developm ents had a number of 
repercussions for oil importing developing economies. These economies faced  not only with 
the problem  of rising oil prices, and increased deb t service obligations, bu t also a declining 
dem and for primary products from induatrialised countries.
Given the above, some nonoil developing countries resorted to borrowing on a 
large scale as a m acroeconom ic policy stance. This resulted in sharp increase in external 
d eb t stock of the developing countries. This is evident from the trend in current accoun t 
deficits of the oil importing countries. However, borrowing declined sharply a fter August
i r
1982 follow ing M exico ’s declaration regarding its inability to service its debts. This resulted in 
G sharp decline in voluntary lending of com m ercia l resources in the deve loping economies. 
Net resource flows on deb t declined since 1984 afte r reaching a level of US $62 billion in 
1980. There was growth in multilateral and bilateral assistance during this period. However, it 
d id not grow adequate ly in order to com pensate for the loss in com m ercia l resource 
transfers in developing economies. (Table below).
Table: A ggregate  Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries.
($ billion)
Year Public & Publicly guaranteed Private non­ Net Flows
Concessional Non-Concessional guaranteed on Debt
1970 2.73 2.44 1.70 6.87
1980 10.90 41.57 9.91 62.37
1984 8.84 34.05 0.53 43.42
1985 11.03 26.27 -0.87 34.44
1986 11.93 20.71 -1.54 31.10
1987 15.68 9.97 -2.54 23.11
1988 13.53 19.03 -3.77 28.79
1989 15.07 11.46 1.85 23.38
1990 14.88 8.41 6.44 29.73
Source: World D eb t Tables 1991-92, Vol. I. Analysis and Summary Tables.
These developments during 1980s were, however, accom pan ied  by the provision of 
d e b t relief for indebted developing economies. The main features of these provisions were 
facilities to reschedule deb t obligations, rolling over of the existing debts, and 
accom m oda tion  of new lending facilities. Accordingly, US $29 billion were rescheduled in 
1985, which, however, increased to US $33 billion in 1987 and, thereafter, declined  to US $19 
billion in 1989.
Besides developing economies also fa ced  with resource scarcity with the 
disintegration of east European Communist countries and restructuring of their econom ies 
through the adoption of market orientation. This had a direct influence for developing 
econom ies as it resulted in scaling down supply of offic ia l funds available to these countries. 
Reorientation o f M ultila tera l Financial Institutions' Role in D eve lopm ent Finance,
Another noteworthy feature is the reorientation in multilateral financia l institutions’ 
com m itm ent to deve lopm ent finance follow ing fhe oil price increases and  world 
recessions. In fact, IMF and the World Bank increased their involvement in deve loping 
m em ber countries. The two im portant aspects of this involvement are the follow ing (a) 
reorientation in fheir lending policies. During 1980s, and especially in the latter half of it, both 
these institutions increased their commitments through ram ification of their lending facilities. 
The other aspect of these institutions' role is (b) their increased involvem ent in borrowing
■ u
members countries in terms of dispensing policy advise on how to adjust their econom ic  
imbalances.
Section Three: Sources of Crisis.
In this section, w e summarise the nature of shocks which prom pted our sample 
countries to initiate a stabilisation effort. As is evident from individual country studies, shocks 
m ay be an outcom e of external events, or internal mishaps, or both.
Externally, they include worsening of foreign trade  position, typically due to  adverse 
m ovem ent in prices of tradables or falling export volume; improvement in trade position; 
unfavourable shifts in service trade follow ing sudden increase in interest obligations or 
unantic ipa ted  decline in foreign remittances; and adverse movements in cap ita l a cco u n t 
of the ba lance of payments position when inflows of foreign resources decline or access to 
international cap ita l markets is denied through dow ngrad ing  in creditworthiness of the 
concerned country; Problems originating internally m ay include cap ita l flight; dom estic 
financia l crisis; unaccep tab ly  rapid inflation; and a ttem pts by the national authorities to 
change  notional/dom estic m acroeconom ic strategy. In some cases stabilisation is required 
to counter the errors of previous regimes, such as pursuance of expansionary fiscal policy, 
reckless exchange rate m anagem ent, and hasty liberalisation of trade regulations or 
exchange control regulations. Finally, natural or m an-m ade disasters, such as harvest 
failures, wars, etc. also underlie stabilisation efforts. M any countries adop ted  stabilisation 
measures subsequent to econom ic disruption fo llow ing these disasters.
I. Internal Shocks,
Underlying internal im balances within econom ies of our sample was ineffic ient 
dom estic econom ic m anagem ent. Various aspects of these imbalances are broad ly 
outlined below.
1. Unstable prices.
Acce lerated inflationary situation is the most important facto r underlying 
stabilisation efforts in our sample. Over expansion and excess dem and mainly by the public 
sector are the main factors underlying this manifestation. In our sample, Bolivia provides 
with a well-docum ented case. In 1985, Bolivia experienced a classic hyperinflationary 
situation. Main reasons underlying this were, (a) borrowing on a very large scale in 1970s, (b) 
decline  in international prices of its export, especially tin and (c) capita l flight subsequent to
po litica l instability. These three factors resulted in a vicious inflationary situation tha t led to 
increasing depreciation of the Bolivian currency and opened  an ever w idening gap  
be tw een  governm ent expenditures and revenues. In order to rectify this, the governm ent 
imposed a drastic stabilisation program m e in mid-1985.
2. Domestic Financial Crisis,
Next im portant facto r is domestic tinancia l crisis. In several countries within our 
sample, a financia l crisis fo llowed on unplanned liberalisation of banking and exchange 
contro l regulations. In majority of these countries prudent state intervention hod long been 
emphasised as essential to deve lop and stabilise financia l markets. Accordingly, when the 
state control was suddenly abolished, bubbles and Ponzi schemes appeared. 24 Three of our 
samples present the classic pattern. In Turkey, fo llow ing deregulation, small financiers took 
adva n ta g e  of an oligopolistic banking structure. In Chile cartels were form ed to take 
adva n ta g e  of deregulation of banking system to set up conglom erates of firms privatised by 
the governm ent after 1973. Those with political affinity, including foreign lenders in the 
liberalised cap ita l markets, received greatest p ro tection in both Turkey and Chile. Our third 
exam ple  is the Philippines during the Marcos regim e in 1983 when the authorities 
increasingly resorted to short-term, high-cost external d e b t to m eet the interest on prior 
borrowing that d id not pay off. 25
Experiences of our sample highlight association betw een internal financia l crisis and 
ca p ita l flight. Argentina is a classic case in this respect. Following adoption  of market- 
orientation, the authorities announced a low rate of depreciation of exchange rate. The 
aim  was to reduce inflationary expectations and conta in  price increases. Simultaneously, 
the governm ent deregula ted  cap ita l controls. This, however, was not fo llow ed by slowing 
dow n of Inflation as a result of increasing overvaluation. Instead the ou tcom e  was a 
deterioration in current a cco u n t of the ba lance o f payments. This led to an tic ipa tion  of 
exchange rate deprecia tion  on a very large scale. Consequently, assetholders transferred 
their assets abroad. Subsequently, there was a very large scale devaluation, which was 
fo llow ed by inflow of resources from abroad thus reversing the trend in ba lance  of
See. Taylor, L.: Varieties of Stabilization Experiences. 
"  ibid, Taylor, L.
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paym ents position. However, this only fo llow ed a large scale accum ula tion of public 
sector's external d e b t to finance both  the current a c c o u n t defic it and cap ita l flight. 26
3. M aintenance of an unsustainable level o f econom ic activity.
Political breakdown and m aintenance of the level of econom ic activ ity  by 
dem and creation follow ing external shocks are also im portant sources underlying adoption 
of stabilisation measures in our sample. Tanzania and Brazil in our sample present the latter 
cases. The Tanzanian authorities underestim ated the foreign exchange losses following 
adverse terms of trade m ovem ent and the costs of w ar against Uganda for several years in 
the early 1980s. The ou tcom e of this was a stagfla tionary situation in Janzanian econom y. 
Brazil fo llowed a similar course after interest rate and oil price increases in the late 1970s. 2?
4. Inefficient/unsustainable econom ic po licy practices,
Inetficient econom ic m anagem ent in response to political compulsions is another 
source initiating stabilisation efforts. Ghana provides an example in this respect. The 
reformist governm ent who assumed power after the military government in the mid-1970s 
had to pursue an expansionary fiscal po licy and strengthen distributive aspect of econom ic 
po licy  practices. The inevitable ou tcom e was pursuance of an unsustainable econom ic 
policy. Turkey in 1970s provides another example, as w eakened governm ent lost control of 
m uch of the econom y. The military regime in Argentina in 1983 allowed w ag e  increases 
relatively substantially higher than the m agnitude of price increases. This resulted in a triple­
d ig it annual inflation. Authorities tha t succeed under such circumstances must dea l with the 
p red ic tab le  consequences, inflation caused by w ag e  escalation or excess demands tor 
non tradab le  goods, as well as ever w idening foreign exchange gaps. Other examples are 
Sudan and the Philippines. 2s
5. Natural or m an-m ade disasters,
Finally, natural or man m ade disasters were also Important sources underlying 
adoption /im p lem enta tion  of stabilisation measures in some of our samples. A disaster m ay 
be im m ediate  or prolong over tim e causing inflation and output loss. Sub-Saharan Africa 
and  South Asia are examples of the latter variety. Wars were im portant in our sample of 
countries comprising Argentina, Bangladesh, and Tanzania.
-  ibid. Taylor, L.
ibid. Taylor, L. 
-• ibid. Taylor, L.
II. External Shocks,
External factors are also im portant, both  d irectly and indirectly, in causing 
econom ic  disturbances in our sample. Directly, they crea te  shortage of foreign exchange 
reserves, while indirectly they c rea te  dom estic targets unatta inable unless the ba lance  of 
paym ents permits these targets to be m et. External shocks in our chosen country studies 
were manifested either in reduced scale o f inflow of external resources; and glut in foreign 
resource inflows.
1. Decline in inflow of external resources.
The most im portant external problem  for majority of our sample was restricted 
access to  foreign, exchange. The lack of foreign exchange leads to ‘external 
strangulation'.^’  India, in our sample, is a classic exam ple in the very recent period. There 
were deterioration in econom ic perform ance of the Indian econom y mainly following 
m acroeconom ic  m ismanagement. However, the situation aggravated, far beyond the 
contro l of the authorities, when India's access to international cap ita l markets was 
tem porarily ceased. Simultaneously, there were fall in private remittances, adverse 
m ovem ent in terms of trade, and export earnings follow ing the Gulf War of 1990 and 
breakdow n of erstwhile east-European countries. The country was on the verge of 
defaulting its external deb t service obligations. In the circumstances, the only availab le 
external financing was that from multilateral sources of financing, especially the Bretton 
Woods Institutions subject to the fulfillment of certa in terms and conditions. Given this, the 
authorities did not have any option other than adop ting  a policy of stabilisation process. 
O ther examples in our sample are Brazil, Costa Rica, G am bia, Jamaica, and Mexico,
2. Foreign exchange excess.
However, our sample also showed tha t excessive foreign exchange availability can 
also crea te  problem. They can arise from unexpected favourable shifts in export prices, such 
as new  discovery of oil in Mexico in mid-1970s, and for M orocco temporary increase in the 
price  of its major export, phosphate. Part of the econom y's increased foreign exchange 
earnings were channeled towards purchases of dom estically produced goods, perhaps via 
increases in m oney supply as rising centra l bank reserves prom pt domestic cred it creation. A 
further problem  was that w ith easy access to foreign exchange, policy makers were in no
See. Taylor, L.: Varieties of Stabilization Experiences. 22_
hurry to devalue so tha t exchange rate app rec ia ted  in real terms. Traditional export 
industries were neg lected, imports were allowed, and simultaneously the authorities 
pursued an expansionary m onetary and fiscal policy. Correspondingly, internal dem and 
pressures were high while there was deterioration in external sector perform ance. With an 
a pp rec ia ted  currency, ca p ita l flight becam e appealing. The latter agg rava ted  a payments 
crisis thereby resulting in large scale borrowing in order to sustain econom ic activ ity. Major 
debtors in our sample, such as Mexico who benefited from favourable m ovem ent in terms 
of trade follow ing upward movements in its exportables, and beneficiaries o f private 
rem ittances and /o r substantial foreign aid flows, like the Philippines and Egypt are all 
examples of excessive availab ility of foreign exchange resources,
Based on the review  of availab le literature on our chosen sample, it m ay be 
observed tha t in almost all of our chosen countries, the circumstances leading to the 
adoption  of stabilisation programmes were an outcom e of a com bination of inefficient 
internal econom ic m anagem en t and sudden external econom ic shocks. The only variation 
could  be observed in respect of the nature of shocks and the extent of ine ffic iency in policy 
practices across countries and through time.
Section Four: Stabilisation Experiences.
We review ava ilab le  literature on stabilisation experiences of our sample in this 
section. It has broad ly been observed tha t Fund-supported stabilisation measures have 
rem ained invariant across countries and through time. However, as discussed in preceding 
section one, individual country characteristics within our sample are not similar. Besides, 
underlying sources of crisis also differ across countries and through time. Accordingly, 
stabilisation outcomes also differ. In this section, we would discuss policy actions by our 
sample in response to particular crisis as outlined in individual studies. This w ould  be 
fo llow ed by a discussion on country experience on individual stabilisation effort. The section 
would conclude  with a broad outline of factors underlying individual experiences.
A Review of Policv Response,
- ‘ ibid., Taylor, L. ^ 3
A ppend ix  l . V  presents policy measures ado p te d  by our sample, as outlined in 
individual studies.
Based on a survey of individual country studies, w e discuss various stabilisation 
measures resorted to under Fund-supported programmes in the decade  o f 1980s. It has 
been observed tha t these policy responses have concentra ted  on both external and 
dom estic monetary, and tiscal stabilisation efforts w hich are briefly discussed below .
(a) M oney and  c re d it polic ies.
Appropriate m oney and cred it policies are key elements of all Fund-supported 
stabilisation programmes. Accordingly, it m ay be observed tha t in ail the programmes, that 
have been considered for the purpose of iiterature review in this dissertation, there are 
provisions for m onetary and financial policies incorporated mainly in the form of limit on 
c red it expansion. In some programmes, forming as much as 30 per cen t of the cases, 
reduction in the rate of growth of liquidity has been incorporated as a po licy action to 
im plem ent stabilisation for restoration of econom ic balances. Within the overall limits of the 
former, constraints are normally p laced  on the public sector access to cred it to ensure that 
the private sector receives an adequate  share of to ta l credit. Most often this restriction 
takes the form of a subceiling on governm ent borrowing from the banking system, and less 
frequently a subceiling on public sector borrowing or borrowing by particular nonfinancial 
pub lic enterprises. Other approaches to the some ob jective  have been quantita tive  limits 
on the public sector and governm ent overall deficits and. less often, the use of special 
perform ance clauses which limit the growth of governm ent outlays or specify a specific 
increase In governm ent revenues.
The financia l measures undertaken as part of a Fund-supported stabilisation 
programmes encompass a w ide variety of measures. These inciude controls on cred it 
a llocation, and ensuring positive real interest rates in order to improve the a llocation  and 
supply of financia l resources to foster growth and to reduce domestic inflation.
(b) Exchange Rate and trad e  p o licy  actions.
In the simplest sense most stabilisation programmes are in response to a chronic 
im ba lance  in the external sector, for which the most obvious solution follow ing exhaustion 
o f external cap ita l sources is to reduce imports or stimulate exports. The most intuitively
information is exclusive of details on policy responses by Dominican Republic and Nigeria due to 
nonavailability of details on the relevant programmes.
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obvious solution to an im ba lance  of this type is to adjust relative prices so tha t imports are 
more dear or exports more profitable, or both. Thus, adjustment of the exchange rate is a 
measure which has favourable effects in both directions. A devaluation will increase the 
price in dom estic currency terms of traded goods and consequently d irect domestic 
resources to import substitution and export promotion.
Besides, an econom y which is chronically short of foreign exchange often develops 
a com plex system of exchange controls to a llocate  scarce resources in the absence ot a 
m arket mechanism, with im portation of some goods strictly controlled or the imposition of 
w aiting  periods betore they can be imported. Import licensing, exchange system 
characterised by special tax, and export bonus scheme, etc., are normal features of such 
system. Hence, trade liberalisation and reform becom e an essential a ppendage  to the 
stabilisation programmes.
Exchange and trade policy measures have been a comm on feature of Fund- 
supported stabilisation programmes and occurred in nearly 80 per cen t of the programmes. 
In most instances, measures focused on exchange rate action with more frequent 
adjustm ent of the exchange rate; where multiple exchange rates existed, 
reunifica tion/gradual merger of the exchange rate was an important objective. In some 
cases the appropriateness of the exchange rate was monitored by a target on net toreign 
assets. In respect of trade liberalisation and reform measures, in majority o f the cases, 
rationalisation of the im port system, as much as 70 per cent of the cases, have been the 
po licy  response. Occasionally, this has been supplem ented by export promotion measures 
(about 30 per cen t of the cases).
(c) Public Sector Policies.
A deta iled review of the stabilisation programmes supported by the Fund confirms 
the view  that they only make limited reference to specific functional expenditures. There 
were, however, a number of programmes which establish limits on general governm ent 
expenditures such as restraining current expenditures, public service wages and 
em ploym ent levels, etc. The stabilisation efforts incorporated in Fund-supported 
programmes often have significant implications for certain types of expenditures which are 
most easily identified by their econom ic function. In terms of operational im portance, the 
m ain econom ic categories are wages and salaries, other purchases of goods and services, 
interest payments, subsidies, transfers, cap ita l outlays, and net lending. The emphasis on
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governm ent current expenditure in the programmes surveyed was split more or less equally 
betw een  wages and salaries and goods and services; policies to limit cap ita l investment 
and net lending and reduction o f subsidies and transfers were also im portant. The most 
significant policy actions were restraint in the public sector w age bill, restraining food, petrol 
and fertilisers subsidies, and curta ilm ent of cap ita l outlays, a t least in real terms. In over four- 
fifth o f the programmes surveyed (16 out of 21) subsidy control was a policy measure. In 13 
cases the issue was one of reducing the subsidies of either one or all of three major items 
(food, petroleum, and fertilisers) and in another 9 cases other subsidies w ere m entioned. 
Curta ilm ent of current transfers to non-public enterprises and control of state enterprise 
operating expenditures were the other forms to control transfers.
Another aspect of m any of the programmes was o general sta tem ent about 
improvements in tax administration. In our sample of 21 Fund-supported program m es during 
1980-90, improvements in tax administration, including tightening of tax enfo rcem ent 
procedures, identifying and registering new  taxpayers, intensifying tax co llection  efforts, 
strengthening tax legislation, closing loopholes, and co llecting tax arrears, were m entioned 
in 16 cases. Changes in d irect taxation had not p layed as important a role in Fund- 
supported programmes as did revisions of indirect taxation. Altogether, 13 of the 
programmes proposed changes in the d irect taxation, while 19 proposed changes in 
ind irect taxes. The d irect tax po licy instrument of cho ice  is the personal incom e taxation, 
and as such was em ployed in 10 of the cases. Fund-supported programmes depended  
heavily on indirect taxes for generating revenues. In addition to 19 cases of changes in 
dom estic indirect taxes, there were changes amounting to 17 cases of customs tariffs.
Fund-supported programmes do not usually rely on export duties for qu ick revenue. 
Some programmes had provisions for increases in taxes on traditional exports; a fe w  others 
included incom e tax relief to exporters. A ltogether 9 cases included policies on export 
duties.
(d) External D ebt M anagem en t,
Almost all Fund-supported programmes (20 cases) resorted to a reduction of the 
b u d g e t defic it as a percen tage  of GDP. This in turn was associated with limits on raising of 
new  external public debt.
(e) O ther M acroe con om ic  Policies,
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Most Fund-supported progronrimes included ottier m acroeconom ic policies.
Increases in public sector wages and salaries were frequently lim ited. Ttie intention 
to establish a more flexible pricing system was present in majority of the programmes 
surveyed, but most generally this was to be achieved within the context of simplifying the 
existing price control system instead of relying exclusively on market forces. M uch of the 
interest in price flexibility focused on energy prices, which were adjusted upward.
C ountry Experiences,
Our ob jec tive  here is to delineate the state of the econom y of our chosen countries 
a t the end of program m e implementation. We approach this by briefly reviewing the 
econom ic perform ance of these countries.
As m entioned before, our sample comprises 21 countries. Unarguably, the 
experience of each  country differs from the other in details. However, a review of available 
literature highlights some broad similarities in individual country achievements/failures. 
Based on these similarities, our chosen countries m ay broadly be grouped under (I) those 
which were broadly successful; (11) those which experienced qualified/m ixed success; and 
(III) those whose perform ance was unambiguously a failure.
The first group was successful in terms of fulfilment of program m e targets and also 
the group em erged stronger in terms of overall econom ic perform ance, both dom estic and 
external. The group comprises Bolivia; Costa Rica; Cote d'Ivoire; G am bia, the; M orocco; 
Philippines, the; and Turkey. The second group experienced qualified success in the sense 
tha t some of the program m e targets were fulfilled, and the relevant econom y performed 
satisfactorily during the post-programme period. However, there were causes o f concern in 
the behaviour of certain m acroeconom ic variables underlying sustainability of econom ic 
growth. The group includes Argentina; Bangladesh; Egypt; Ghana; India; Jam aica; Kenya; 
M alaw i; Mexico; Peru; and Tanzania. The third group not only performed unsatisfactorily but 
also in some cases program m e broke down before com pletion. The group consists of Brazil; 
Chile; and Sudan.
In the follow ing, w e  would concentrate on the experiences of one specific 
econom y as representative of a group, as description of individual country experience 
would be repetitive. However, while concentrating on one country, w e would also highlight 
any particular aspect which appears specific to a country and not typ ica l to the relevant 
group.
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We have chosen Turkey as representative of group (I); for group (II), w e have chosen 
India; while, w e have chosen Sudan as typ ical of the group (III).
Turkey las a representative of successful countries) a ttem pted  a stabilisation along 
with a structural adjustment program m e under a Fund-supported arrangem ent negotia ted 
in 1983. The im portant com ponents of the programmes were, (1) m aintenance of a positive 
real interest rates; (2) an initial large-scale devaluation followed by com m itm ent to 
m aintain ta rgeted  exchange rate; (3) import liberalisation; (4) ba lance of payments 
adjustment; (5) freeze in real w age; and (6) w ithdrawal of agricultural support prices. These 
conventiona l measures were, however, accom pan ied  by certain unusual measures. The 
programmes implicitly assumed increase in rate of growth of m oney supply through 
a ccom m oda tion  of the same in growth of nominal output, and provision of export 
incentives in the form of export subsidies.
In his study, K. Boratav observed that most noticeab le  im provement in econom ic 
perform ance was achieved in increasing relative measure ^2 o f exports, especially 
m anufactured exports. Accord ing to the author, the important factors underlying this 
im proved export perform ance were, (a) already existing industrial base rather than e ffec t of 
the im plem entation of structural adjustment, (b) decline in domestic dem and follow ing cu t 
in a gg rega te  absorption, (c) provision of price incentives through devaluation and export 
subsidies, and (d) im provem ent in external dem and for Turkish exports. Besides, price 
situations also stabilised despite cost-push effects of exchange rate adjustment and 
adjustment in rate of interests. However, this improved perform ance was accom pan ied  by 
a steady decline in rate of real investment. Turkish experience also confirmed the crowding 
in e ffe c t of public sector investment when the econom y experienced a decline in private 
investment along with a decline in public investment.
In terms of judging the effectiveness of alternative programme policies, the author 
observed tha t better distribution and less consumer goods imports were feasible. These 
would  have led to the im provem ent in domestic production and accelera tion in the growth 
rate in real investment.
Boratav recom m ended the following. (I) increase in investment; (2) im provem ent in 
incom e distribution through measures, such as w age  indexation. (3) incentives for improving
Exports as a ratio of GDP.
dem and for investible credit; (4) provision of export incentives thirough mild exctiange rate 
apprecia tion  along w itti export subsidies; and (5) provision of exceptional financing over a 
long-term in thie absence of deb t rescheduling.
The similar stabilisation experience m ay be observed in respect of Costa Rica, 
G am bia, M orocco, Bolivia, and Cote d ’ Ivoire. However, in Bolivia's case, the success was 
mainly an outcom e of drastic fiscal austerity. Export prices for Bolivia d id not improve 
follow ing im plem entation of stabilisation program m e in mid-1980s. C ote d'Ivoire also 
deserves mention in one respect. It is a m em ber o f West African Monetary Union and its 
exchange rate is pegged  to French franc. Accordingly, devaluation could not be used as a 
policy instrument. Despite this, the similarity in experience may be observed. The author, J. 
Pegatienan Hiey, observed that the factors responsible for the success of 1984 stabilisation 
program m e were exogenous to the econom y, such as (a) favourable m ovem ent in export 
prices, and (b) better w eather condition.
Majority of our sample, however, experienced a mixed success in their stabilisation 
effort. India presents a classic example in this context. In their study on stabilisation 
experiences of India, Bhattacharya e t al. (1994) a ttem pted  an evaluation of the 
stabilisation program m e in India through a m acroeconom etric model. The authors observed 
that the major facto r underlying m acroeconom ic crisis in India in early 1990s was a 
stimulation of aggrega te  dem and, especially public sector dem and through fiscal deficit. 
Correspondingly, a demand-side m anagem ent through sharp reduction/restraint in fiscal 
and m onetary variables were required fo llow ed by a structural reforms in order to 
acce le ra te  the growth rate.
The authors, however, observed tha t the orthodox stabilisation policies that were 
im plem ented in the Indian context resulted in trade-o ff between inflation and growth on 
the one hand and inflation and balance of payments on the other hand. Stabilisation policy 
resulted in (1 ) lowering inflation rate, and gross tiscal defic it, and improving current accoun t 
de fic it as a ratio of GDP; but a t the same time (2) reduction in real public investment rather 
than cutting down consumption expenditure; and (3) reduction in private investment. 
Accord ing  to the authors the factors responsible for the improved performance in respect of 
certa in ta rgeted variables were (a) very favourable weather condition, and (b) 
com fortab le  foreign exchange reserves.
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The authors also a ttem p ted  a simulation exercise for the period 1994-95 through to 
1996-97 in order to forecast outcomes of stabilisation and structural reform programmes. 
Scenario f l l  If the governm ent implements program m e fa ith fu lly  and the econom y 
responds to these programmes positively, then the growth rate would also acce le ra te  
subject to {ij im provem ent in productivity of capita l, and (ii) better w ea ther condition. 
Under this scenario, gross fiscai de fic it deciines but agg rega te  real investment rate does not 
show any perceptib le  change. Scenario (2) With assumption in (1) above, if w ea ther turns 
unfavourable then the real growth rate would dece le rate  despite the fulfilm ent of condition 
in ( i)  above. Under this, inflation rate would acce le ra te  further but there w ould  be no 
perceptib le  change, in either aggregate  real investment rate or the rate of gross fiscal 
defic it. Scenario (3) With assumption (I) above growth rate of real GDP would  be be low  the 
potentia l level if condition ( | )  is not fulfilled and the inflation rate would a cce le ra te  beyond 
w ha t would have happened w ithout structural adjustment.
The following observations were m ade in respect of the effectiveness of the 
programmes. The adjustment programmes could have been better structured to prevent fall 
in public investment and real output growth rate had the burden of fiscal adjustm ent fallen 
more on governm ent consumption than on investment. Given this, inflation and ba lance  of 
payments objectives could have been achieved along with a higher real incom e growth, 
and perhaps employm ent.
Broadly a similar conclusion may be reached about the other country experiences 
within the group. In terms of smallest details, there were variations in policy instruments, 
such as a w age-cu tting  by incom plete indexation in case of Kenya; a w ag e  and exchange 
rate freeze, creation of a new  currency for de-indexing contracts in Argentina.
In our sample, a small number of countries experienced failures in their stabilisation 
effort. We elaborate the experience of Sudan as representative of the group.
Sudanese econom y is largely dependent on private rem ittances. Prior to the 
stabilisation efforts in mid-1980s, the econom y suffered a stagflationary situation following 
curta ilm ent of boom  in late 1970s. Economic deve lopm ent failed mainly due to  techn ica l 
difficulties and inefficient m anagem ent of agricultural products. This was fo llow ed by a 
cap ita l flight in response to absence of local investment opportunities and stagnant 
dom estic econom y. Besides, the military government was also responsible for cap ita l flight. 
This prom pted stabilisation efforts under a Fund-supported stabilisation program m e.
3 0
However, the austerity of the programme was not politically feasible and the country 
experienced one of the worst food riots in 1985. 3^
The author, J Harris, observed that purely market-oriented incentives such as a 
deva lued  exchange rate and raising of deposit interest rates would not likely to solve the 
problem  of Sudanese econom y. Instead, accelera ting econom ic growth would  be the only 
solution which would ultimately lead to deve lopm ent of productive investment 
opportunities. However, the author suggested that this could  only be ach ieved  through 
rad ica l non-conventional policies instead of conventional Fund-supported policies.
Broadly, the above review highlights tha t in majority of the cases w ith successful 
experiences, both external and internal factors p layed their respective roles leading to the 
outcom e. While, in case of m ixed/qualified success, factors exogenous to the econom y 
were dom inant. For countries with unsuccessful experience, the underlying factors were 
m isspecification of solutions given the situation.
Section Five: Conclusion.
In this chapter, we reviewed available literature on stabilisation experiences of 
chosen countries comprising our sample. One im portant ca ve a t of this effort is tha t some of 
our chosen samples were simultaneously undergoing more than one program m e as is 
evident from appendix 1. II. Accordingly, the outcomes/experiences cannot be attributed 
to stabilisation programme implementation alone. Besides, our findings are based on 
experiences of our chosen sample. Thus, even though w e canno t generalise our findings, the 
latter m ay broadly be regarded as suggestive of experiences of Fund-supported 
programmes across countries during the deca de  of 1980s.
Our chosen country studies suggest tha t in almost all the cases under consideration, 
both external shocks and inefficiency in dom estic po licy practices were im portant in 
prom pting response for stabilisation. Another interesting aspect is the sequence of 
developm ents. In most of the cases under consideration, external shocks further aggrava ted  
a lready deteriorated internal econom ic situation thereby signalling the urgent need for 
stabilisation effort. Exceptions to this are countries like Bangladesh.
op.cih Taylor. L.
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In terms of im pact of Fund-supported programmes, our evidence suggests qualified 
success in majority of tlie  cases. The most im portant favourab le  im pact m ay be noticed In 
terms of external sector perform ance. Balance of payments perform ance, especially trade 
ba lance  improved decisively in majority of the cases. Simultaneous im provem ent m ight be 
no ticed  in export perform ance. Besides, in some cases, w e could notice that the authorities 
could  reduce the volume of imports.
However, most disquieting aspect of the im p ac t of these programmes was 
unsatisfactory domestic econom ic perform ance. In almost all the cases, there were 
lowered volume of investments. Performance in respect of inflation was a qualified one, 
while in majority of. cases, output growth could  be restored only after first year since 
initiation of the programme, i.e., during the second year and thereafter. Performance in 
reduction in relative estimate of fiscal defic it was broad ly a satisfactory one in the sense 
tha t majority of our chosen countries could satisfy this m acroeconom ic ta rge t during the 
program m e period. However, this was also an area where sustainability in perform ance 
could  not be m aintained, in the sense tha t the relative perform ance deteriorated 
subsequent to program m e com petition. Thus, w e  cou ld  observe (i) broadly successful 
external econom ic/sector perform ance; and (ii) qualified success in dom estic econom ic 
perform ance.
On the basis of our evidence, we conc lude  by making the following observations. 
Fund programmes exert considerable influence on a program m e implem enting econom y. 
However, our evidence could not establish the sustainability of the program m e influence in 
m ajority of the cases. Our country studies also suggest tha t in favourable circumstances 
with no political resistance, the benefits are more discernible than in other cases.
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Table Structural Data for the Sample Countries: 1993.
1.1.1(c): Major External Debt Indicators.
Total External Share of Debts
Debt Official Reschedu
Countries (millions US$) Borrowing 1982-9:
Argentina 74473 36.14
Bangladesh 13879 98.38 *
Bolivia 4213 99.35
Brazil 132749 5.72
Chile 20637 12.37
Costa Rica 3872 85.35
Cote d'Ivoire 19146 70.68 @
Dominican Republic 4633 94.44 @Egypt 40626 66.96 @
Gambia, the 386 100.00 @Ghana 4590 94.72 £
India 91781 48.02 #
Jamaica 4279 96.10 £
Kenya 6994 68.54 @
Korea 47203 10.39
Malawi 1821 99.47 @
Mali 2650 100.00 @
Mexico 118028 17.02
Morocco 21430 57.38 @
Nigeria 32531 100.00
Peru 20328 94.13 @
Philippines, the 35269 57.84 @
Tanzania 7522 86.75 @
Turkey 67862 11.62
Zambia 6788 96.10 £
Source: World Debt Tables, vol.II, 1994-95.
Notes: **: Rescheduled, forgiven, and debt stock reduction through buy back.
*: Only forgiven.
@: Rescheduled and forgiven.
£: Rescheduled, forgiven, and debt stock reduction but not through buy back. 
#: Only rescheduled.
Table 1.1.2: Macroeconomic Performance of the Sample Countries: 1970-93.
1.1.2(a): Real Economic Performance Data.
Gross Domestic Product Agricultural Production
Countries 1970-80 1980-93 1970-80 1980-9
Argentina 2.5 0.8 2.5 1.5
Bangladesh 2.3 4.2 0.6 2.7
Bolivia 4.5 1.1 3.9 1.8
Brazil 8.1 2.1 4.2 2.6
Chile 1.8 5.1 3.1 4.1
Costa Rica 5.7 3.6 2.5 3.3
Cote d'Ivoire 6.8 0.1 2.7 -1.2
Dominican Republic 6.5 2.8 3.1 0.3
Egypt 9.5 4.3 2.8 2.4
Gambia, the 4.5 2.4
Ghana -0.1 3.5 -0.3 1.2
India 3.4 5.2 1.8 3.2
Jamaica -1.3 2.3 0.3 1.0
Kenya 6.4 3.8 4.8 3.2
Korea 10.1 9.1 2.7 2.1
Malawi 5.8 3.0 4.4 2.4
Mali 4.7 1.9 4.2 2.4
Mexico 6.3 1.6 3.2 0.5
Morocco 5.6 3.7 1.1 6.8
Nigeria 4.6 2.7 -0.1 3.5
Peru 3.5 -0.5 0.0 2.2
Philippines, the 6.0 1.4 4.0 1.1
Tanzania 3.0 3.6 0.7 4.4
Turkey 5.7 4.6 3.4 3.0
Zambia 1.4 0.9 2.1 3.3
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Table 1.1.2.: Macroeconomic Performance of the Sample Countries: 
1970-93.
1.1.2(b): External Economic Performance Data.
Countries Merchandise
Exports
Merchandise
Imports
1970-80 1980-93 1970-80 1980-9:
Argentina 7.1 2.1 2.3 -5.5
Bangladesh 3.8 7.2 -2.4 4.3
Bolivia -0.8 4.5 7.3 0.2
Brazil 8.5 4.3 4.0 0.8
Chile 10.4 5.2 2.2 1.9
Costa Rica 5.2 4.6 4.2 3.4
Cote d'Ivoire 4.8 4.5 9.1 -2.3
Dominican Republic -2.7 -1.5 2.0 1.4
Egypt
Gambia, the
-2.6 2.8 7.8 -2.3
Ghana -6.3 5.2 -2.2 1.8
India 4.3 7.4 3.0 4.2
Jamaica -1.7 0.8 -6.8 2.0
Kenya 2.9 2.9 1.9 1.0
Korea 23.5 12.2 11.6 11.1
Malawi 5.4 5.6 1.0 2.2
Mali 8.3 6.7 5.2 3.5
Mexico 13.5 3.5 5.5 2.2
Morocco 3.9 5.9 6.6 3.8
Nigeria 0.4 1.2 19.4 -14.3
Peru 3.3 1.1 -1.7 -4.7
Philippines, the 6.0 3.3 3.3 3.0
Tanzania -7.5 -1.9 -0.6 2.8
T urkey 4.3 7.2 5.7 7.4
Zambia -0.2 -3.2 -9.2 -1.8
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Table 1.1.2.: Macroeconomic Performance of the Sample Countries: 1970-93.
1.1.2(c): Data on Consumption and Financial Variables.
Government Con- Private Con-
Countries -sumption -sumption
1970-80 1980-93 1970-80 1980-93
Argentina 3.8 -9.3 2.4 0.0
Bangladesh n.a. n.a. 2.3 3.6
Bolivia 7.9 -1.2 4.5 2.2
Brazil 6.0 8.7 8.0 1.6
Chile 2.4 0.2 -0.5 2.2
Costa Rica 6.6 1.2 4.8 3.4
Cote d'Ivoire 12.1 -4.0 6.9 -1.7
Dominican Republic 2.7 0.2 5.8 1.7
Egypt n.a. 3.3 7.4 3.3
Gambia, the
Ghana 5.1 0.5 1.7 2.6
India 4.1 7.5 2.9 5.3
Jamaica 6.5 -0.2 1.4 1.8
Kenya 9.2 3.4 6.4 5.1
Korea 7.4 6.6 7.4 8.3
Malawi 7.9 5.8 3.5 2.7
Mali 1.9 4.1 6.2 1.7
Mexico 8.3 1.8 5.9 1.8
Morocco 14.0 5.1 5.5 4.0
Nigeria 11.4 -2.1 7.8 -1.9
Peru 4.0 -0.7 2.2 0.5
Philippines, the 6.8 0.9 4.3 2.4
Tanzania n.a. 4.4 • •
Turkey 6.3 3.5 4.8 6.1
Zambia 1.4 -3.2 0.2 3.7
A p p e n d ix  1.1 : S ta n d  By A r ra n g e m e n ts  in th e  IM F
d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  1980-81  to  1 9 8 9 -9 0 .
Years a n d N um ber o f A m ou n t A g re e d
Reaion A rrangem en ts f in SDR m illion 1
1980-81
(1) Latin A m erica 3 161.25
(2) A frica 10 741.13
(3) Asia 5 2694.50
(4) Europe 1 1662.00
(5) Australasia 0 0.00
Total 19 5258.00
1981-82
(1) Latin A m erica 4 83.73
(2) A frica 11 1044.58
(3) Asia 2 841.50
(4) Europe 1 1102.50
(5) Australasia 1 1.60
Total 19 3073.91
1982-83
(1) Latin Am erica 8 2656.13
(2) A frica 15 1663.95
(3) Asia 3 655.00
(4) Europe 1 475.00
(5) Australasia 0 0.00
Total 27 5450.08
1983-84
(1) Latin Am erica 5 732.25
(2) A frica 12 1183.53
(3) Asia 4 1125.77
(4) Europe 3 1240.00
(5) Australasia 2 5.78
Total 26 4287.33
1984-85
( 1 ) Latin Am erica 6 1 722.40
(2) A frica 16 1114.06
(3) Asia 1 615.00
(4) Europe 0 0.00
(5) Australasia 1 3.37
Total 24 3454.83
1985-86
(1) Latin Am erica 4 507.85
(2) A frica 10 616.90
(3) Asia 3 698.65
(4) Europe 1 300.00
(5) Australasia 0 0.00
Total 18 2123.40
Years a n d N um ber o f A m o u n t A g re e d
Reaion A rrangem en ts ( in SDR m illion )
1986-87
( 1 ) Latin Am erica 3 1535.00
(2) A frica 16 1572.47
(3) Asia 2 795.73
(4) Europe 0 0.00
(5) Australasia 0 0.00
Total 21 3903.20
1987-88
(1) Latin Am erica 3 1062.85
(2) A frica 11 639.05
(3) Asia 0 0.00
(4) Europe 0 0.00
(5) Australasia 0 0.00
Total 14 1701.90
1988-89
(1) Latin Am erica 4 1331.00
(2) A frica 5 780.53
(3) Asia 1 273.15
(4) Europe 2 571.35
(5) Australasia 0 0.00
Total 12 2956.03
1989-90
( 1 ) Latin Am erica 6 1398.00
(2) A frica 5 600.80
(3) Asia 1 1164.21
(4) Europe 3 26.36
(5) Australasia 1 3248.97
Total 16
Source
Total N um ber o f A rrangem ents : 196. 
Total num ber o f Conutries : 77. 
Num ber of Countries having 
Program m e only o n ce  : 29.
IMF Annua!Report various issues.
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A p p e n d ix  1.11 : C ountries hav ing  m u ltip le  Stand-Bv Program m es 
w ith  th e  IMF during  th e  p e rio d  1980-81 to  1989-90.
N um ber o f A rrangem en ts
Region
2 3_ 4 5 a n d  a b o v e Total
IjLa tinA m eric 5 2 1 4 12
a
2) A frica 7 6 7 7 27
3) Asia 2 2 1 0 5
4) Europe 0 0 1 1 2
5) Australasia 2 0 0 0 2
Total 16 10 10 12 48
4 )
A p p e n d ix  1 .III: N u m b e r  o f  P ro g ra m m e s  C a n c e l le d /M o d i f ie d
d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  1980 -81  to  1 9 8 9 -9 0 .
Years Latin Austra­
lasia- A m erica A frica Asia Europe
1980-81 0 4* 0 0 0
1981-82 0 0 0 1* 0
1982-83 2* 3=. 0 0 0
1983-84 r r r 0 0
1984-85 r 2* r 0 0
1985-86 r 2* 1* 0 0
1986-87 r 4** r 0 0
1987-88 0 1* 0 0 0
1988-89 r 3** 1 ** 1 ** 0
1989-90 1 ** 1 ** 0 0 0
Notes : Indicates p rogram m e cance lla tion .
: In 1984-85, Entry under Latin A m erica involves only m od ifica tion  o f a m o u n t agreed.
1986-87, Entry under Asia involves m od ifica tion  o f expiration da te , while entries 
under A frica involve 3 cance lla tio n  a n d  1 m od ifica tion  o f expiration ate.
1988-89, Entries under Asia an d  Europe involve m od ifica tion  o f expiration date , 
while entries under A frica Involve 1 cance lla tion , 1 m o d ifica tion  of 
expiration d a te  a nd  1 m od ifica tion  o f bo th  expiration d a te  a n d  am oun t 
agreed.
1989-90, Both the entries under Latin Am erica  a nd  Africa involve m od ifica tion  of 
the am o u n t agreed.
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R eaions/C ountries
A p p e n d ix  i .IV : List o f C ountries se lec ted  fo r 
th e  Survey o f L iterature on S tabilisation 
experiences.
Tota l No. o f A rrangem en ts No, o f A rrangem en ts 
co n s id e re d /s tu d ie d
1. Latin A m erica
(1) A rgentine 5 1
(2) Bolivia 1 1
(3) Chile 2 I
(4) Costa Rica 5 1
(5) D om inican Republic 1 1
(6) Jam a ica 4 4
(7) M exico 1 1
(8) Peru 1 1
II. A frica
(1) Egypt
(2) G a m b ia
(3) G h an a
(4) Kenya
(5) M a law i
(6) M o ro cco
(7) Sudan
(8) Tanzania
I. Asia
(1) Korea
(2) Philippines
(3) Turkey
3
4 
3
2
2
1
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A p p e n d ix ,.: Policv Response under Fund-supported Stabilisation 
^  Programmes: 1980-90. *
Policv Actions Num ber of Countries
I. Monetary and Financial Policies
1. Limit on credit expansion ceilings on 24
a. Net domestic assets/total bank credit 23
b. Bank credit to central government 13
c. Bank credit to public sector 11
d. Separate ceiling on bank credit to 0 
parastatals
2. Reduction in the rate of growth of 7 
liquidity
3. interest rate reform 9
4. Measures to mobilise domestic savings 20
5. Target on net foreign reserves 9
II. Public sector Policies
1. Restraint on central govt, current expd 22
a. Wages and salaries 21
b. Goods and services 16
c. Transfers and subsidies 20
d. Capital expd. & net lending 19
e. Expenditure administration 5
2. Improvement in central govt, tax 
revenues
a. Income tax 12
b. Corporate tax 2
c. Tax on Property 1
d. Domestic taxes on goods & services 22
e. Import duties 20
f. Export duties 11
g. Other taxes & nontaxes 18
h. Improve/reform tax administration 19
3. Public enterprises
a. Improvement in performance 19
b. Improve overall management & 15 
control
4. Overall budget
a. Reduction of deficit as a % of GDP 23
b. Reduction in domestic arrears 3
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A ppend ix  . con tinued .
Policy Actions Num ber of Countries
III. Exchange & Trade Policies
1. Exchange rate reform 19
a. Frequently adjusted rates 20
b. Gradual merging/unification of rate 11
c. Others 3
2. Trade liberalisation & reform 19
a. Rationalisation of import system 17
b. Export promotion measures 7
IV. External Debt Policies
1. Control of level & maturity of debt 24
a. Public/publicly guaranteed debt 23
b. Private sector debt 8
2. Other debt management policies 16
V. Wages and Prices 24
VI. Other
1. Standard trade & exchange rate clauses 24
2. Objection to a policy 1
*: Excluding information on Dominican Republic and Nigeria,
Sources: (1) Different country studies,
(2) Fund-Supported Programs, Fiscal Policy, and Income Distribution, 
IMF Occasional Paper No. 46, 1986.
C ha p te r 2; Recent Econom ic Crisis in India:
A Review o f M acroe con om ic  Aspects.
A Fund-supported m acroeconom ic stabilisation program m e had been 
im plem ented by the Governm ent of India during November 1991 through June 1993. This 
was a ccom pa n ie d  by a structural adjustment programme. Though the latter was mainly 
supported by the World Bank, Fund support also included conditionalities for restructuring. 
These reform programmes were, however, not random  attempts a t correction of econom ic 
im balances in India. Throughout the 1980s there were growing concern, both among 
professionals as well as regulatory authorities, about structural imbalances within the Indian 
econom y. Correspondingly, there were attem pts a t adopting some occasional but 
consistent ' corrective measures for remedying these imbalances.  ^ The utility ot these 
a ttem pts was also acknow ledged  by multilateral organisations, especially the Fund. The 
latter sanctioned, in November 1981, financial assistance under its Extended Fund Facility 
program m e in favour of the Governm ent of India.  ^ In response to the provision, the Indian 
authority em barked on a range of adjustment measures, such as enhancing capac ity  
creation in critical inputs, alleviation of infrastructural constraints, etc.
The nature and process of econom ic reform programmes of 1990s was, to some 
extent, d ifferent from tha t in 1980s. In the eighties, there was no visible econom ic crisis. 
Instead a deteriorated ba lance  of payments position was antic ipated to persist. This was 
perceived to fo llow  from structural imbalances within the Indian economy. Hence, dem and 
m anagem ent was not viewed as of primary concern, nor was there anym eed for correction 
of India's exchange rate.  ^ While in 1990s, there was actually a crisis. The latter was 
considered to be the ou tcom e of both dem and- and supply-side factors. The process of
' These corrective measures were discontinuous in the sense that sometimes the same government did not 
maintain continuity in terms of pace and scale. Besides, change in authority within the same government 
sometimes resulted in discontinuity in the process. Despite the above, these measures were apparently from 
a same policy package as they had similar end objective and base of economic ideology.
- A process of deregulation and restructuring was visible in the eighties. There exists some debate regarding 
the exact time of initiation of this process. According to some Indian authors, the process began around end 
1970s. This essentially marked a phase of deregulation and relaxation of the regulatory framework that has 
been zealously woven over the past four decades.
•' India was granted an amount of SDR 5 billion under the facility.
•* Also, the Fund was partly responsible for the nature of the porgramme that was implemented. Especially, 
regarding domestic resource mobilisation and external sector regulations, the Fund advised the Government 
of India to come up with time-bound firm commitments. Ultimately, though the latter did not submit to the 
Fund's insistence, its subsequent corresponding activities were distinctly influenced by advice usually 
dispensed by the Fund.
corrections of econom ic im balances was, therefore, in itia ted through a change  in policy 
focus leading to stabilisation followed by restructuring of the econom y. ^
This chap te r is an assessment of econom ic dimension of developm ents in India in 
1980s tha t had an e ffe c t on its stabilisation and growth in early 1990s. The lim itation of the 
a tte m p t is tha t here w e do not discuss social and politica l aspects of these developm ents. 
Econom ic developm ents are outcomes o f interactions am ong different social, econom ic, 
and politica l factors. Hence, follow ing review would not be a comprehensive one.
The ob jective  of this chapter is to provide with a background to the empirical 
evaluation of Bretton Woods Institutions-supported program m e in the Indian context that 
have been a ttem p ted  in the subsequent chapters. It, therefore, sets out regulatory and 
institutional features of the Indian econom y and the sources of its most recent crisis. 
Subsequently, the chap ter describes particular m acroeconom ic m anagem ent issues that 
the Indian authority faces. This would be followed by an analysis of po licy response. The 
chap te r is not intended to be a comprehensive coverage  o f all the latter issues. Rather, it 
aims to focus on key m acroeconom ic aspects.
The chap ter has been organised along the follow ing lines. Section one outlines 
institutional and regulatory framework of the Indian econom y. The section opens up with a 
review of institutional developm ents during 1960 through to 1990. Subsequently, w e would 
describe major regulatory features of the Indian econom y. Section two analvses dimensions 
of the recent crisis. Section three analyses the measures already adopted  in response to the 
crisis. Section four concludes the chapter.
Section One: Regulatory Framework o f the  Indian Economy.
In this section, we would outline major features o f the regulatory framework of post­
independen t Indian econom y. The aim is to briefly discuss the nature of the econom y 
underlying recent econom ic crisis and initiation of stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes in India in early 1990s.
Main objectives of Indian developm ent policy have been (i) realisation of sustained 
econom ic growth: and (ii) a tta inm ent of (a) self-reliance, and (b) distributive justice. Given
' The conditions responsible for undertaking reform programmes during the 1990s were (i) emergence of a 
crisis; ( ii ) the presence of a coalition government at the centre, which could not effectively control further 
accentuation of deteriorated economic performance; and ( iii ) terms and conditions of the financial 
assistance from international community whose support was an indispensable complement to the 
Government of India's effort for reform and restructuring.
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this, a broad consensus * m ay be noticed, since pre-Independence period, abou t the 
nature of Indian deve lopm ent policy. The first concre te  move towards this consensus was 
m ade  when a National Planning Com m ittee of the Congress Party was appo in ted  in 1938. 
The C om m ittee recognised state intervention as the viable path for econom ic 
deve lopm ent of India. There were following three choices for state intervention available; 
state ownership, state control, and state m anagem ent. The representatives o f the 
C om m ittee favoured state ownership and state control.
An outgrowth of this pre-independence consensus is evolution of an inwardly 
oriented deve lopm ent strategy during post-Independence period. Major features of this 
strategy are the following, (a) Industry, especially basic and heavy industries (cap ita l goods 
industries), as main vehicle of deve lopm ent and growth; (b) directed use of foreign 
exchange resources;  ^ and (c) a dom inant public sector to promote deve lopm ent strategy. 
The strategy has been mainly supported through deve lopm ent of an e laborate regulatory 
fram ework for econom ic developm ent.
The three basic mainstays of this framework are (a) industrial targeting and 
licensing, (b) control of foreign resource inflow, and (c) foreign exchange regulation over all 
external transactions by any entity.
The first important mainstay is industrial regulatory framework. The main objective  of 
this framework has been to expand public ownership and control of critical sectors of the 
econom y. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 laid down relevant basic framework. It 
emphasised a progressively active  role of the state in developm ent of industries through 
classification of industries into (a) those exclusive m onopoly of the public sector, (b) those in 
w hich the state would be exclusively responsible for the establishment of new undertakings, 
either by itself or with the active  cooperation of the private sector, and (c) the remaining to 
be left open to private initiatives. Over the years, public sector’s control has w idened 
through m odification of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948.
‘The consensus was on agreement on broad framework of independent India's economic policy. This 
agreement was among politicians, who were confronting with the colonial rule to acquire freedom for India, 
and the Indian economists. The consensus was also endorsed by indigenous capitalist class. This latter 
endorsement was evident in the publication of 'A Plan of Development for India', by a group of top 
industrialists, in 1943-44. This document is also known as 'Bombay Plan’. There was, however, disagreement 
between the document and the recommendation of the Planning Committee regarding the form of state 
intervention.
'This aspect mainly followed a balance of payments crisis in 1957-58, when India had to seek help from the 
IMF under the latter's Stand-By arrangements. India borrowed, on this occasion, an amount of US $72.5 
million under the above facility, and an amount of US $117.5 million under other facilities.
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The two major features of the industrial regulatory framework are (a) contro l of 
private productive initiatives, and (b) restrictions on growth and direction o f c a p a c ity  
creation. The former has been exercised through control of entry ot the private corporate  
sector in productive activities and control on concentra tion  of econom ic powers. The latter 
has been im plem ented through the principle of m arket segmentation based on directives 
o f the Industries (Developm ent and Regulation^ A c t of 1951»The A ct laid down the follow ing 
norms, requirement of licences for firms w ith fixed investment or import co n te n t of fixed 
investment above certain limit; reservation of products for small scale industries; and 
specification of industries for restriction of business houses and foreign companies.
Control o f entry is instituted through (a) restrictions on vertical and horizontal 
expansion, and on locational choice; (b) control of investment financing; and (c) price 
fixation. The Industries (Developm ent and Regulation) A c t of 1951 provides the regulatory 
framework for the purpose.
Control of concentra tion of econom ic powers has been another fa c e t of control of 
private productive initiatives since the initiation of Second Five-year plan. Initially, this 
control was exercised through the Companies A c t of 1956. This was subsequently rep laced 
by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) A c t of 1969. » The A c t significantly 
reduced the autonom y of large private corporate  initiatives.
Industrial licensing is the major po licy instrument to control growth and direction of 
c a p a c ity  creation. Besides, the regulatory framework also contains provisions for controlling 
supply, fix prices, ’  regulate channels of distribution, prohibit production o f certain 
com m odities and prescribe volum e of production.
Control of investment is exercised through (a) control over sale of equities and 
debentures in domestic cap ita l m arket by firms and on foreign equity partic ipation in jo in t 
ventures. The Capital Issue (Control) A ct of 1947 provided the regulatory fram ework for the 
purpose. Within the latter framework, it is obligatory to acquire a c learance from the 
C ap ita l Issue com m ittee to set up a new  industry besides obligatory requirem ent of
-Since the enactment of MRTP Act, oil firms with assets above a certain size have been classified as MRTP 
firms. Such firms have been (i) subjected to pre-entry scrutiny for obtaining a licence for certain selected 
industries; (ii) restrained from entering into some industrial activities; and (iii) required separate approvals for 
any investment proposals.
The regulatory framework for price control comprises (i) the Essential Commodities Act of 1955, and (ii) 
Bureau of Industries Costs and Prices (B.I.C.P.). The former empowered the government to fix prices on aimost 
all products, while the latter helped in regulating prices of most industrial goods since its inception in 1970, 
Price controls could also be imposed under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. The price, sale 
and distribution of motor cars were controlled under this act since May 1959.
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permission from the governm ent for the issue of the same. The above is a ided  by (b) control 
of investible resources since 1969 through the nationalisation of fourteen major banks.
Inflow of foreign technology and investment has been a crucial asset facilita ting  
pursuance of overall deve lopm ent strategy, and more particularly industrial strategy. The 
former provides with techn ica l know-how, and critical imported inputs for Indian industries. 
Despite this significance, these inflows are allowed subject to the fulfillment of follow ing 
objectives, (a) major interest in ownership and e ffective  control should always be in^lndian 
hands, and (b) foreign investments would be allowed when obtaining techno logy from 
abroad is either d ifficult or restricted.
Regulation of interest in ownership and e ffective control has mainly been e ffected  
through dilution of existing foreign holdings through (a) the use of fiscal measures; (b) 
bureaucratic intervention of the Controller of Capital Issues as an administrative machinery;
(c) use of licensing mechanism; and (d) im plem entation of the provisions of Foreign 
Exchange Regulation A c t (FERA) of 1973. Of these, fiscal measures comprise imposition of 
discriminatory taxes depending  upon residence of registration of the industrial unit, 
composition of shareholding and the tradability of a com pany's share, and nature of 
industrial activity. Fiscal discrimination has been resorted to persuade foreign (and Indian) 
companies to keep their stake in subsidiaries below  a certain level. Licensing mechanism 
enables the governm ent to com pel foreign companies for dilution of its stake in a com pany 
when the latter seeks m odification of its licence beyond its sanctioned ou tpu t capac ity . 
The Controller o f C apita l Issues, as an administrative machinery, facilitates government's 
control over issuance and type of shares. While, enactm ent of FERA introduced m andatory 
conversion of all foreign com panies' business registered in India, and reduce their share in 
the equity cap ita l of their Indian companies to 40 per cen t or below.
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 laid down main directives on basic 
objectives for inflow of foreign resources and the framework within w hich they are to
The following exceptions were allowed within the Act or by the guidelines later formulated to implement it.
(i) Branches of foreign airlines and shipping lines would be allowed on o reciprocal basis, (ii) equity over 40 
per cent and up to 74 per cent could be retained by foreign investors whose subsidiaries (a) were engaged 
in core (i.e.. Appendix lot Industrial Policy) industries, (b) were using sophisticated technology, (c) were 
exporting 60 per cent or more of their output, or (d) were growing tea. (iii) They could retain 51 per cent 
equity if (a)at least 60 per cent of their business was in core activities and atleast 10 per cent of their output 
was being exported, or (b) they had no output In the core sector but were exporting 40 per cent of their 
output or more.
50
opera te . ”  Major features o f this regulatory framework are, (i) obligatory approval for inflow 
of technology, especially techn ica l co llaboration agreements, by the concerned regulatory 
authorities; (ii) screening and sanctions of royalty terms; and (iii) m andatory c lea rance  for all 
equ ity  participations. The underlying idea is to  restrict ca pa c ity  creation based on the 
principle of market segm entation, as under industrial strategy. The main policy instruments 
have been, industrial licensing and bureaucratic intervention.
Industrial licensing provides with the scope to delineate areas or industries or 
products where new foreign cap ita l and technology participation would be allowed 
subject to fulfillment of the conditions of (i) indigenous clearance for non-availability, and 
(ii) elim ination of m onopoly power, especially that exercised by a foreign com pany in any 
particular activity. While, bureaucratic intervention deals with feasibility to import capita l 
and technology in identified activities. ’ 2 since early 1970s, bureaucratic intervention has 
becom e  increasingly com plex through ram ification of regulatory authorities involved in 
decision making.
The third im portant mainstay at the regulatory framework has been trade regulation 
provisions. These latter provisions comprise comprehensive and direct control over external 
transaction/foreign exchange utilisation. The underlying objective has been to ensure a 
contro lled growth of imports as a solution to foreign exchange constraints. Jndian authorities 
did not visualise export expansion as possible solution for the latter problem. 
Correspondingly, the authority did not pursue an active  exchange rate policy to exercise 
e ffic ien t control over econom ic resources. Major aspects of this regulatory framework are, (i) 
d irect physical control of im port transactions; and (ii) indirect control through conform ing 
foreign exchange regulations. The main policy Instruments are licensing, fiscal measures, 
and bilateral arrangements to exercise control over imports.
The Resolution emphasised that each individual case of foreign capital participation would be scrutinised 
and approved by the central government. The directive of the Resolution was subsequently supported by 
the Prime Minister’s statement in the Constituent Assembly.
'2 The government set up a foreign promotion board in 1968 which has been responsible for dealing with 
coses involving sums not more than Rs. 20 million and foreign equity under 40 per cent.
'2 Under the changed situation, the Secretariat for industrial Approvals, in the Department of Industrial 
Development, scrutinises proposals for foreign collaboration and subsequently grants approvals. While the 
Reserve Bank of India, under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (which came into force on January 
1, 1974 ), has been empowered to exercise control over the activities of all non-banking companies witti 
more than 40 per cent of non-resident interest cT^ell as the branches of foreign companies. The areas with 
which the latter has been entrusted with relate to (a) the carrying on business in India of a trading or 
industrial nature, (b) establishing branches in India, or (c) purchasing shares of Indian companies.
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Within the trade regulation provisions, importables are divided betw een permissible 
imports, and com m odities whose imports are partially or fully prohibited based on the set of 
principles and criteria defined by the licensing procedures. The two major criteria in this 
context are, (a) the principle of essentiality, and (b) the principle of indigenous non­
availability. Permissible im port transactions are directly controlled through a llocation  of the 
former based on licensing through the use of quotas, fiscal measures, such as the use of 
d ifferentia ted tariffs, and bilateral arrangements. '** A llocation is m ade by (a) administrative 
categories; and (b) operational classification of importables. Allocation by administrative 
categories involves distribution of import right broadly between public and private sectors. 
'■5 Allocation by operational distinction involves distinction between imports of raw  material, 
spares and components, as against imports of cap ita l goods and equipment.
Within this d irect control framework, foreign exchange allocation am ong alternative 
claimants is autom atica lly  linked to permission to import. Accordingly, 
application/perm ission for foreign exchange release would follow the fulfillment of above 
two major criteria concern ing permission to import.
As m entioned earlier, trade regulation provisions are also characterised by the 
absence of any active  policy providing encouragem ent to export activities. Exporters are 
indirectly provided with incentives through subsidisation schemes for export promotion. The 
latter comprise (i) fiscal measures consisting of tax exemptions, refund ot taxes, tax 
concessions, outright subsidies, and transport concessions; and (2) import entitlem ent 
scheme, subsequently rep laced by import replenishment schemes. These a llow  registered 
exporters more liberal access to import some of their inputs duty-free vis-à-vis dom estic 
producers.
In order to strengthen public sector’s control over econom ic resources, the 
governm ent has been regulating research and deve lopm ent activities either d irectly or 
indirectly. The former involves d irect partic ipation of the government in promotion of 
research and deve lopm ent activities through the establishment of national research 
centers. While the latter is an outcom e of practising strict industrial licensing policy. Initially,
'■> Imports through bilateral arrangements is based on agreements with the erstwhile socialist block of 
countries of the Eastern Europe and also with other developing countries.
Public sector enterprises, besides participating in direct export, also conducts substantial volume of trading 
activities through government-owned agencies for channeling scarce imports and also for subsidising 
exports of some other commodities through their absorption of losses on export sales.
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the industrial licensing po licy laid great stress on foreign collaboration under w hich  foreign 
cap ita l along w ith techn ica l know-how were expected  to flow in India thus depressing 
dom estic entrepreneurial initiatives for innovations. However, since early 1970s, the 
governm ent has been providing with liberal incentives for research and deve lopm ent 
activities.
A process of phased dismantling of the regulatory framework began  in eighties 
a long with the announcem ent of the Industrial Policy statement of 1980. These changes 
were aim ed through (a) gradual dismantling of controls of industrial activity, and import 
procedures; and (b) further impetus to inflow of foreign resources into the Indian 
economy/industry.
The former was a ttem p ted  through easing of industrial and trade  regulatory 
practices; while the latter was e ffected  through accom m odation  of changes in foreign 
investment partic ipation procedures within the Indian industrial sector.
Easing of industrial regulatory practices fo llowed (i) reduction of barriers to entry into 
and expansion of industrial activities by the private corporate sector; (ii) increased scope for 
partic ipation by large business houses in industrial activities; (iii) relaxation of licensing 
bottlenecks through easy/simplified administration of the licensing practices; and (iv) 
selective w ithdrawal of restriction on production capacities by large manufacturers. 
Besides, industrial regulatory structure was also reorganised/adjusted through gradual 
substitution of physical controls w ith indirect financial controls. ”
During 1980s, im port policy was increasingly being used to a cco m m o d a te  access 
to imported inputs required by domestic/indigenous industrial units and for the fulfillment of 
technologica l upgradation requirement ot export-oriented industries. This was fac ilita ted
There exists some debate regarding exact time of initiation of this process of adaptation. According to 
some Indian authors, the process began around end 1970s.
Scope was also enlarged through easing of restrictions on concentration of economic power through 
major amendments to MRTP Act facilitating increase of threshold limit of assets as a means to limit 
monopolistic tendencies. Industrial enterprises with assets of Rs. 200 million ( $ 15.2 million ) and more were 
previously subject to provisions of the anti-monopoly and restrictive trade practices law. This limit had been 
raised in 1985 to Rs. 1 billion ( $ 75. 8 million ) enabling the industrial enterprises, up to this size, to expand 
without having to seek special permission. For the small-scale sector the ceiling on investment in plant and 
machinery has been raised to Rs. 3.5 million ($ 0.3 million ) as against Rs. 2 million ( $ 0.2 million ) in 1980.
Licensing bottlenecks were considerably reduced by the decision to transfer the Companies Affairs 
Department to the Ministry of Industries.
Financial controls were exercised through provision of incentives/disincentives for industrial investment and 
production. This move from physical to financial controls was made following the suggestions of the 
Narasimham Committee Reoort in 1985.
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through (i) procedural simplification, mainly simplification o f im port p roduct c!assification;2o 
(iv) reducing uncertainties relating to import po licy announcements; 21 and (v) liberal 
access to im ported inputs through easing of relevant quantita tive  restrictions, 22
Comprehensive changes were introduced to accom m o da te  non-Resident Indians' 
investment into d irect and portfolio investment opportunities during eighties. Some changes 
were also introduced for other non-resident investment procedures.
Despite the above, the regulatory framework has remained broadly the same. 
Especially, procedures relating to banned and restricted lists of im portable have continued 
to remain the same. The main objective of inflow of foreign cap ita l and technology did not 
undergo any fundam enta l change. The above changes were, in a way, adap ta tion  in 
practices a im ed to farther the objective of an import-substitution policy.
The preceding discussion highlights two im portant facets of^lndian deve lopm ent 
strategy; (a) productive environment in post-Independence period has been a convoluted 
one w ith various prohibitive legislations and regulations under which private initiatives have 
been systematically discouraged; and (b) public sector has played a dom inant role in the 
deve lopm ent process of the Indian economy. Public sector not only undertook the major 
responsibility of initiating productive activities in most of the econom y but also it had to 
undertake the major responsibility of providing with financia l resources. These are not unique 
to the Indian situation given the post-colonial developing country experiences.
These, however, have their implications for corporate  productive initiatives and 
nature o f^ndian fiscal policy. This is evident from^ndian econom ic developments. Industrial 
ou tpu t registered a significant deceleration in growth in the period 1966-67 to 1981-82. 
Bedsides, fiscal situation also deteriorated resulting in deve lopm ent of significant resource 
gaps. Accordingly, there was significant reduction in public investment and fixed cap ita l 
form ation in the public sector a t 1970-71 prices declined. Since public investment accounts 
for significant share of to ta l gross fixed capita l formation relative to the private corporate
Import policy was simplified through ciassificotion of importables into three principal groups, banned 
goods (in early 1980, the group was renamed as restricted goods group), restricted goods or those whose 
imports were allowed only if they were domestically unavailable (the group, in early 1980 was renamed as 
limited permissible goods group), and Open General Licence (OGL) consisting of goods which could be 
imported without a licence and only by actual users.
Uncertainty was reduced due to change in import policy announcement practice. Following 
reclassification of importables, the Government of India initiated a practice of Import policy announcements 
concerning the three lists instead of separate announcements for individual products as practiced earlier.
“  Easing of quantitative restrictions mainly followed (a) transfer of certain importables in OGL, under which 
an actual user would be able to import inputs without a licence, and (b) easy access to import of goods not 
classified as banned or restricted goods.
sector, this decline had a considerable e ffec t on overall econom ic growth. In the follow ing 
sections we would discuss, in detail, nature of these implications for the Indian econom y 
during the d eca de  of 1980s.
Section Two: Dimensions o f the  Indian Econom ic Crisis in early 1990s.
In this section w e discuss about dimensions of the econom ic crisis underlying 
decisions of the Indian authorities to im plem ent stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes in early 1990s. Decisions to Im plem ent these latter programmes were in 
response to the m acroeconom ic imbalances that surfaced on an unm anageab le  scale in 
early 1990s. These imbalances were manifested through acce le ra ted  rate of inflation, large 
fiscal deficits, deteriorating current accoun t balances, and a large and growing burden of 
dom estic and foreign debt. Overall output level, as measured by the rate of growth of GDP, 
did not decline. GDP was growing a t a satisfactory rate, especially during the la tter half of 
1980s. However, there was growing concern tha t this econom ic growth w ou ld  not be 
sustainable in near future."^ This perception of an unsustainable growth was strengthened by 
the probability of default, for the first time in independent India's history, of external d eb t 
service obligations in June 1991. Official international reserves reached a precarious level 
accom pan ied  by continuous cap ita l flight, a sharp downgrading of India's cred it rating, 
and a suspension of external com m ercia l lending. These were, however, only a 
manifestation of long-term deterioration of econom ic perform ance tha t had becom e 
apparent to the close observers of the Indian econom y in 1980s. In the following, w e  would 
a ttem p t a discussion on major aspects of this crisis. As discussed earlier, we concen tra te  
only on econom ic aspects and thus ignore social and political aspects of the problem.
The roots of the crisis can be traced back in developm ents in the Indian econom y 
subsequent to the second oil shock in 1979-81. The m acroeconom ic strategy after the 
second oil shock emphasised (a) continuation of the relatively liberalised im port regime 
Initiated since late 1970s; and (b) increase in ca p a c ity  creation and production of critica l 
sectors in order to remove supply bottlenecks in the econom y.
-^By sustainability of the GDP growth rate we mean a growth rate which could be maintained without any 
trade off in respect of other macroeconomic objectives.
" Especially, net accretion to foreign currency non-resident deposits turned negative,
‘ ■^Petroleum, coal, power, and fertilisers.
Following extensive liberalisation measures ado p te d  during the d e ca d e  of 1980s, 
there were favourable developments, both internal and external, such as easing of 
international oil prices, and increased dom estic production of oil. Prices of oil started easing 
since 1982-83. Barring fluctuations during 1987-89, oil prices fell continuously (Table 2.2.11. 
Simultaneously, there was im provem ent in oil im port growth when the volume of the latter 
grew  a t a dece le rated  rate, a com pound rate of 9.9 per ce n t per annum, during 1978-79 
through to 1986-87. This reduction in the volume of Imports reflected success in one of the 
long-planned policies of the government. The governm ent succeeded in raising the crude 
production from 11.3 million tonnes in 1978 to 31.2 million tonnes in 1986 (Tab le  2.2.2). 
Domestic crude production as a proportion of dom estic consumption of petroleum  
products increased from 44 per cen t in 1978 to over 69 per cent In 1986. Despite these 
favourable conditions, the current accoun t position did not register any improvement. 
Sluggish export perform ance relative to the import perform ance was underlying this latter 
feature. Later on, there was an increase in oil import vo lum e"^ reflecting an increase in the 
'o il intensity' of the econom y (Table 2.2.3). Correspondingly, even a fter a llow ing for 
potentia l import savings from higher oil production, the situation implied a current accou n t 
de fic it of substantial size over a long term. Continued deterioration in econom ic 
perform ance could be witnessed since 1983-84, and especially during the second half of 
the d eca de . This deteriorated perform ance could be  discussed under internal and external 
imbalances.
Internal Im balances,
1. Deterioration in Fiscal Practices,
Deterioration in internal econom ic perform ance was manifested in steady increase 
in relative estimate of gross fiscal deficits of the centra l governm ent (which measures the 
to ta l resource gap) and accelera tion in the rate of inflation. The former, w hich  had 
averaged  around 4.5 per cen t of GDP in the late 1970s, almost doubled when it reached  8.3 
per ce n t of GDP by mid-1980 and remained on an average a t that level during the rest of 
the decade . (Table below).
■^’Except for the year 1988, when if actually declined.
Table: Relative Estimates of Fiscal Deficits of the Central Government
Year Gross Fiscal Deficit
(As % of GDP) 
Monetised Deficit Revenue Deficit Net Primary
1980-85 6.3 2.2 1.1 2.99
1985-86 8.3 2.4 2.2 4.05
1986-87 9.0 2.4 2.7 4.49
1987-88 8.1 2.0 2.7 3.88
1988-89 7.8 1.6 2.7 3.40
1989-90 7.8 3.0 2.6 3.18
Source: Economie Survey 1993-94, p. 15. and  RBI Annual Report 1992-93, p. 183.
Major aspects of this tota l resource gap are (a) persistently high revenue deficits; (b) 
decline in public sector savings; and (c) steady qua lita tive  deterioration in financing 
budge ta ry  transactions of the centre.
(a) High Revenue Deficits,
Steady acce lera tion  in relative measure of gross fiscal deficits in 1980s was 
associated with a persistently high revenue deficits of the centre. (Table above).
Relative Estim ates of Fiscal Deficits of tfie Central Governm ent
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1988-891985-86 1986-87 1937-83 1989-901980-85
- # — Gross Fiscal Deficits :
■ »  - Revenue Deficits i
Source: Economic Survey, 1993-94, p. 15.
This latter aspect implies that there was a steady acce lera tion  in central 
governm ent's current expenditure, especially non-developm ental expenditure in 1980s. The 
fiscal po licy cho ice  in 1980s, resulted in steady increase in governm ent's ' to ta l expenditure 
but with a stagnation in growth in real expenditure. Total deve lopm enta l outlay did 
increase in nominal terms, but as a proportion of GDP its share rem ained constant a t about 
18 per ce n t barring 1989-90, when it reached a peak of 21.7 per cent. On the other hand, 
non-deve lopm enta l outlay, as a proportion of GDP. registered an almost six-fold increase 
during 1980s. Government's consumption expenditure increased from 23 per ce n t to 36.0 per 
ce n t during the same period. (Table 2. 2.4). A larger proportion of this increase was used for 
making transfer payments comprising interest payments, subsidies, grants to states and
■ Some authors ore of the opinion that aggregate real government expenditure rose sharply since 1983.
See, Mundle & Rao (1992); ‘Issues in Fiscal Policy’ in B. Jalan (ed.) The Indian Economy. Penguine, New Delhi, 
pp. 231-232.
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other items. Subsidies out of the governm ent b udge t had grown a t 24 per ce n t per annum 
in nom inal terms during 1981-89. Thus, the most im portan t source of fiscal deviations was not 
an ou tcom e  of the functioning of the central governm ent itself, but of operations of the 
parastatals as well as provision of other elements of subsidies out of budgetary resources.
This growth in governm ent expenditure was a ccom pan ied  by stagnation in 
governm ent revenue. Revenues, both tax and non-tax, fa iled to keep p ace  with the rate of 
growth of expenditure in 1980s. {Table below).
T a b le : R eve n u e  R ece ip ts  o f th e  C e n tra l G o v e rn m e n t  
(As % of G DP)
Y ear Tax Revenue Non-Tax Revenue Total Revenue
1980-85 9.99 2.20 12.19
1985-86 10.93 2.66 13.59
1986-87 11.33 2.86 14.19
1987-88 11.30 2.89 14.19
1988-89 11.24 2.70 13.94
1989-90 11.30 3.32 14.62
Source: Governm ent Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues, IMF.
This resulted in large budgetary gaps particularly on revenue account. An outgrowth 
of fiscal practices by the central governm ent was a cu t in capita l outlay in 1 980s. Gross 
ca p ita l formation out of budgetary resources fell from 40.1 per cent in 1980-81 to 15.7 per 
ce n t in 1989-90. Relative to GDP it broadly rem ained stagnant or fell during the 1980s.
(b) Decline In Public Sector Savings,
Another aspect of this deterioration in fiscal d e fic it was fall in public sector savings 
fo llow ing a steady and rapid growth in current expenditure. Such a fall in public savings 
becom es com patib le  with an im provem ent in current a ccou n t position provided voluntary 
private savings increase significantly. However, this d id no t happen throughout 1980s. (Table 
2.2.5).
(c) Financing Pattern,
The w idening gap  betw een incom e and expenditure, especially revenue income 
and revenue expenditure, of the governm ent was m et (a) by borrowing a t home and (b) 
borrowing from abroad. The former comprised tw o sources, (i) domestic market borrowing 
and (ii) borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India. O u tcom e of domestic market borrowing 
was a rapid accum ulation of internal liabilities of the government, rising from 35 per cen t of 
GDP a t the end o f 1980-81 to 53 per cen t a t the end of 1989-90. This accum ulation
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com prised (I) o m oderate  accum ula tion of internal deb t, and (ii) a rapid accum ulation of 
other liabilities. (Table below).
T a b le : To ta l In tern a l Liabilities o f th e  C en tre  
(As % of G D P)
Year Internal Debt Other Liabilities Total Internal Liabilities
1980-81 22.7 12.9 35.6
1984-85 25.3 16.5 41.8
1985-86 27.1 18.4 45.5
1986-87 29.5 20.4 49.9
1987-88 29.6 22.1 51.7
1988-89 28.9 22.5 51.4
1989-90 29.3 23.5 52.8
Source: Budget Documents of Governm ent of India,
There were thus concerns about the unsustainability of this deb t accum ula tion 
am ong professionals and academ icians. In 1980s, the government bond market was on 
the w hole a cap tive  market as governm ent securities were held by financial institutions as 
a part of their Statutory Liquidity Ratio requirement. The rates of interest on government 
bonds were nominally very low. However, the im plic it d e b t burden was high as these bonds 
carried com m itm ent by the governm ent to a llow  tax concessions on purchase. Besides, the 
interest rates for other liabilities part were much higher than that for Internal debt. It is not 
surprising, therefore, tha t the burden of d irect and im plic it servicing of d e b t becam e 
arduous. Interest payments increased from 2 per ce n t of GDP and 10 per cen t of total 
centra l governm ent expenditure in 1980-81 to 4 per cen t and 20 per cent, respectively, in 
1990-91.
Another reason underlying concerns a bo u t the unsustainability of this deb t 
accum ula tion  was the following. In a developing econom y with large public sector, deb t 
financing of public expenditure m ay be justified on ground of seigniorage. Besides, a 
governm ent m ay also borrow for remunerative ca p ita l formation by itself and for lending 
and equ ity investments. In the Indian context, a good  part of the deb t incurred had been 
used to provide budgetary support to pub lic enterprises. Budgetary support to public 
enterprises rose to  nearly 25 per cen t in 1989-90. While some of the enterprises performed 
satisfactorily and earned sufficient profits, m ajority o f them  either earned low  returns or 
incurred losses. The latter were supported by subsidies as well as by non-plan loans out of 
the budge t. Thus, sizeable presence of pub lic sector in production frequently gave  rise to
^infernal debt comprises market loans; treasury bills; special securities issued to the RBI; special bearer 
^onds; prize bonds; premium prize bonds; etc.
“ Other liabilities comprise small savings; provident fund and other accounts; and reserve fund and deposits. 
Seshan (1987); Buiter and Patel (1990).
fiscal disequilibrium as the centra l governm ent in India absorbed, from the outset, all 
parastatals' cap ita l losses.
Unsustainability of pub lic  d e b t accum ulation was simultaneously associated with 
increasing resort to de fic it financing by the central government. In the Indian context, if 
pub lic  deb t is larger than the am oun t the financia l institutions would have to hold, then the 
surplus would be monetised as the RBI, as the apex monetary institution, would 
autom atica lly  a ccom m o da te  the budge t deficits. Monetised defic it increased on an 
increasing scale during 1980s. (Table below).
Table; Trend in Monetised deficit during 1980s 
Year Growth in Monetised Deficit fin %) Monetised Deficits as % of GDP
1980-85 16.48 2.21
1985-86 2.23 2.36
1986-87 14.56 2.42
1987-88 -7.50 1.97
1988-89 -0.85 1.64
1989-90 112.41 3.04
Average for 1985-90 24.17 2.29
Source: RBI Annual Report. 1992-93. p. 183.
2. Deterioration in M oney Supply and Inflationary Situations,
Fiscal deterioration had considerable im pac t on both increasing m oney supply and 
fuelling inflationary situation. The main operative facto r was the persistent resort to defic it 
financing by the government, especially the central government.
As discussed before, throughout 1980s, the centra l government increasingly resorted 
to d e fic it financing of its expansionary fiscal policy. It was also mentioned earlier tha t this 
d e fic it financing was being monetised on an increasing scale during 1980s as the RBI was 
autom atica lly  financing the centra l government. Thus, there was a systematic link 
be tw een  m onetary policy and the budget. Table be low  shows relationship be tw een the 
change  in the growth rate of the m onetary base, i.e., the creation ot h igh-powered money 
and the change in the unadjusted budge t deficits (expressed as a per ce n t o f GDP in 
1980s).
'^fhis involves monetory accommodation or monetising the budget deficit. This means that the central bank 
prints money to buy the bonds with which the government pays for its deficit. However, in the Indian context, 
the RBI is not constitutionally obliged to lend to the government.
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Table: Growth in Budget Deficits and High-powered Money.
(in %)
Year Growth in Monetary Base Growth in Budget Deficits
1980-81 15.21 40.72
1981-82 10.54 -1.48
1982-83 18.04 22.93
1983-84 12.98 24.19
1934-85 16.79 31.87
1985-86 23.49 26.59
1986-87 16.31 22.23
1987-88 18.21 25.00
1988-89 16.26 14.99
1989-90 18.70 12.85
Source: Governm ent Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues, IMF.
The clear pattern of association as reveaied by the above tobie, highlights two 
im portant features, (a) the RBI on its own cannot d ec ide  about the size of fiscal deficits, and 
(b) the m onetary policy practice has been an accom m odating  one. In the Indian context, 
the RBI on its own cannot determ ine the m agnitude of deficit financing/high-powered  
money. As a resuit, there is more or iess autom atic association between the RBi iending and 
the central governm ent borrowing. This link is more direct when the RBi is com m itted to 
maintain a target nominal interest rate on governm ent bonds. Throughout the post­
independence period, official interest rate have been kept at a very low level or a t a 
negative real rate. This foiiowed the objective of providing investibie funds to the priority 
sector a t a  cheaper rate. Since 1985, there has been some attempts a t freeing interest 
rates. But the latter continued to remain administered and a t a very low level. Thus, the 
m onetary policy aim ed at targeting a nominal interest rate. Given this, deficit financing 
would involve an accom m odating monetary policy practice. An increase in government 
deficit tends to increase the nominal interest rate. If the RBI is committed to maintaining a 
target nominal interest rate, an increase in the deficit would force the RBI to acco m m o d ate  
governm ent borrowing through creation of additional money supply. During 1980s, 
especially during the latter half of it, the RBI mainly foiiowed an accom m odating monetary 
policy.
Creation of high-powered or reserve money was reflected in growth in broad 
money. (Table below).
Table: Reserve Money, Brood Money and Incremental Broad Money Multiplier.
(in %)
Year Broad Money Reserve Money Incremental Broad
Monev Multiplier
1980-85 17.09 14.71 3.05
1985-86 16.88 23.49 3.00
1986-87 17.92 16.30 3.04
1987-88 16.29 18.21 2.99
1988-89 18.29 16.26 3.04
1989-90 15.73 18.70 2.97
Source: international Financial Statistics Yearbook, various issues, IMF.
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As m ay be seen, increm ental broad m oney multiplier was high during 1980s.
Fiscal policy p ractice  can a ffe c t prices both d irectly and indirectly. Directly, indirect 
taxes and subsidies have a d irect im pac t on com m od ity  prices. The former^on interm ediate 
and cap ita l goodSjIncrease prices more than proportionately through cascad ing effects. 
While, the indirect price effects of fiscal po licy practices through expenditure multiplier and 
m oney supply are also very important. The systematic association between m oney supply 
and budge t deficits fuelled inflationary situation in 1980s. As discussed above, m onetary 
expansion was high during the entire decade . There is no consensus on the causes o f 
inflation in Indio. However, a monetarist v iew  m ay be formed based on the recent 
econom ic  developments. The argum ent runs as under. Even though short-term variations in 
m oney supply m ay have little e ffect, there is a stable long-run relationship betw een the 
overall price level and the ratio of m oney supply to real GDP. If money supply increases 
excessively through defic it financing, m oney balances are built up which becom e 
inflationary, a la the quantity theory e ffect, a t times of real output lags, when the ve locity  of 
c irculation increases in antic ipa tion  of future inflation. (Table below).
Table: Money Supply, Real GDP and Inflation.
(in %)
Period WPI Real GDP Broad Money MoneySuppIy/Rea 
1 GDP
1980-81 14.97 6.46 15.92 0.167
1981-82 10.93 6.53 17.44 0.184
1982-83 7.00 3.78 17.20 0.208
1983-84 10.28 7.43 16.90 0.227
1984-85 6.78 3.68 17.99 0.258
1980-85 9.99 5 ^ 17.09 0.209
1985-86 0.00 5.47 16.88 0.286
1986-87 8.73 4.87 17.92 0.321
1987-88 11.68 4.77 16.29 0.357
1988-89 7.46 9.92 18.29 0.384
1989-90 7.46 6.57 15.73 0.417
1985-90 Z M 6.32 1LQ2 0.353
The monetised de fic it of the central government shows a fair degree of 
correspondence with the rate of inflation, in the Indian context, even within a year. Besides, 
monetisation of the de fic it builds up a liquidity overhang which fuels a general increase in 
dem and in succeeding years. During the first half of the decade, inflation was under control 
despite fiscal deterioration. The high expansion initially was kept in control by raising reserve 
ratios and meeting the pressure of dem and by running balance of payments deficits. 
However, the price situation cam e under mounting pressure during the second half of the 
d eca de . During this period, the average rate of inflation was 6.7 per cent per annum in
terms of Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and 8 per cen t per annum in terms of Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). These indices rose to 10.3 per cen t and 11.2 p e rcen t, respectively, in 1990-91. 
External Im balances,
The public sector's contribution to exports is not significant, but its share in imports is 
being generally more than half the to ta l imports. Correspondingly, fluctuations in the 
b a lance  of trade depend significantly on public sector behaviour. Besides, the cap ita l 
a cco u n t transactions of the pub lic sector form an even greater proportion of the to ta l. The 
overall im pac t of public sector transactions on the trade and balance of payments is thus 
greater than that of the private sector In India. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the steady 
increase in difference betw een incom e and expenditure of the economy, as a whole, was 
also financed by borrowing from abroad. Main features of external imbalances w ere (a) 
deterio ra ted  current a ccou n t balances; and (b) increase in external d e b t service 
obligations.
(a) Deteriorated Current A ccoun t Balances,
Current accoun t de fic it nearly becam e two fold during the latter half of 1980s, rising 
from an average of 1.3 per ce n t of GDP during the first half of the decade , to an annual 
average of 2.2 per cen t of GDP. The underlying factors were, (i) volume growth o f imports; 
and (ii) relatively slower growth in exports.
An im portant reason for lower current accoun t adjustment after 1980-81 was the 
volum e growth in imports. Imports grew  during the d eca de  of 1980s, i.e., 1979-80 to 1989-90, 
a t an average of 7.6 per cen t per annum relative to 4.9 per cent in the previous d e ca d e  
(1969-70 to 1979-80). This acce lera tion  in import growth in volume terms in 1980s reflects 
econom ic policy choice by the government. On the one hand, liberalisation of im port 
po licy in 1980s provided easier access to imports required either as inputs into production  or 
as cap ita l goods. The rapid growth of non-oil imports reflected growth in imports of tw o sub­
sectors, m anufactured products (especially, products for reexport); and cap ita l goods. Of 
these, the latter variety of imports reflects import-intensity of the econom ic policy pursued. 
On the other hand, sectoral composition of public investment after 1980-81 also increased 
import-intensity of the econom y. Total fixed investment a t constant prices did not rise faster 
a fter the second oil shock, and also overall public investment rose, on an average, very 
slowly. But the sectors which received priority in public investment were energy, transport, 
com m unication, and fertilisers. These were seen as critical sectors in which c a p a c ity  and
production had to be Increased In order to remove key supply bottlenecks In the econom y. 
They were also the sectors which were relatively Import-Intensive In terms of their cap ita l 
goods requirements.
The next Im portant facto r was relatively slow growth In exports. Export promotion 
policy hod been broadly supportive since 1980-81. The policy strengthened export 
promotion through provisions, for exporters, of favourable access fo Imports of raw  materials, 
cap ita l goods, and technology; Introduction of special schemes, such as the scheme of 
100% Export Oriented Units (ECUs). Accordingly, export performance Im proved relatively 
during the latter half of the decade . This was reflected In the growth of exports In physical 
terms, as also In terms of unit value realisation, especially since 1985-86. (Tab le  2.2.6). 
However, the m agnitude of Improvement could not sustain the pace  of growth In Import 
volume.
One Im portant facto r underlying this sluggish export perform ance was relatively 
unfavourable exchange rate movements In 1980s, especially In the latter half of the 
decade . (Table 2.2.7). There was an appreciation In the nominal e ffective  exchange rate 
(NEER) In 1982, which was reversed In 1983 and continued to decline thereafter. As the 
domestic rate of Inflaflon In India exceeded Inflaflon rates In India's trading partners In 1982, 
the real e ffective  exchange rate (REER) registered an appreciation In 1982. Thereafter, 
however, there was continued depreciation.
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The absolute decline In REER was more precipitous during latter half of 1980s (which 
fell by 42.4 per cen t over the period relative to 20.1 per cent In first half). However, the 
relative decline In REER was significantly lower than that In NEER (It fell by 49.2 per ce n t and
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56.9 per cent, respectively). The reason could be persistently higher inflation rate in India vis- 
à-vis its main trading partners.
(b) Increase in external deb t service obligations.
During 1980s, external d e b t accum ulation was rapid. Both the econom ic policy 
cho ice  and external borrowing strategy played their respective role in this. As discussed 
above, the former resulted in persistent current a ccou n t deficits which were financed by 
borrowing from abroad. Correspondingly, there was a continued growth in external deb t 
including non-resident Indians’ deposits. Besides, follow ing the second oil crisis, India started 
borrowing from international cap ita l ,markets on a large scale. The probable reasons could 
be (i) non-availability of required am ount of o fficial resources, mostly concessional loans;
(ii) stringent conditions a tta che d  to the resources provided by the Fund which, it was felt, 
would  make a country subservient to the regulations of the Fund in so far as the freedom  in 
pursuing econom ic policies is concerned; and (iii) country's improved cred it worthiness 
during most of 1980s and insistence by leading official donors that India ought to resort to 
com m ercia l borrowing on an increasing scale. Correspondingly, India faced  w ith a situation 
of increasing reliance on com m ercia l borrowing in the latter half of 1980s in order to sustain 
the current accoun t defic it. The relative growth in the share of non-concessional deb t 
(those raised from the international cap ita l markets and other short-term com m ercia l loans) 
in India's tota l deb t was higher vis-à-vis that from concessional sources, loans ob ta ined  from 
offic ia l multinational as will as bilateral aid donors. Outgrowth of this change in composition 
of external deb t was an escalation in external d e b t service burden since 1985.
Correspondingly, d e b t service burden rose from 10 per cent of current accoun t 
receipts and 15 per cen t of export earnings in 1980-81 to 22 per cent and 30 per cent, 
respectively, in 1990-91. (Table 2.2.8).
As a consequence of the above developments, significant resource gaps 
deve loped. Even though gross domestic savings and gross domestic cap ita l formation 
continued to grow  relative to GDP, the econom y witnessed a large and growing burden of 
dom estic and foreign d e b t which implied unsustainability of past investment and
"The international Development Association (IDA), which was India’s major source of concessional 
assistance, had run into difficulties. The term of the Sixth replenishment of IDA [IDA VI), originally envisaged as 
three years, had to be stretched to 4 years ending in 1983-84. New commitments from IDA declined after
1981-82. The new funds for IDA VII had been settled at uS $ 9 billion, and as India's share had been reduced 
consequent to China’s entry as an eligible borrower, the new commitments from IDA declined. Aid 
commitments from bilateral sources had been more or less stagnant in 1980s.
65"
consum ption levels. As m entioned earlier, in the second half of 1990-91, foreign exchange 
reserves reached a precarious level. By the beginning of 1991-92, foreign exchange 
shortage was further exacerbated through longer leads in the payments for imports and 
logs in the realisation of export proceeds mainly due to an expectation of de fau lt and, 
therefore, devaluations.
The rapid loss of reserves had prom pted the government to take a number of 
counter-measures in the second half of 1990-91 {i.e., October-March). The instinctive 
response to this m acroeconom ic crisis was to increase protection and exchange controls on 
the external sector, and tighten m onetary and cred it policy on the domestic sector to 
conta in  overall dem and and in particular the dem and for imports. The major preoccupation  
had necessarily been on short-term m anagem enf, which necessitated a considerable 
tightening of m onetary policy.
By June 1991, however, it becom e clear tha t import compression was proving 
counterproductive  as an instrument for m anagem ent of ba lance of payments. There was 
visible im provem ent in trade de fic it which registered a sharp fall. However, this was also 
associated with fall in output growth and in the index of industrial production during 1991- 
92. It was realised that the payments crisis was not primarily due to the trade defic it, which 
had com e down from US $ 781 million per month in October-Decem ber 1990 to US $ 382 
million per month in January-March 1991 and further to US $ 172 million per month in April- 
June 1991. Instead it was evident that the econom y needed substantial adjustments. Initial 
priority in this context was to balance the budge t and strengthen the econom y financially. 
Across-the-board cuts in the budge t was diagnosed to be an efficient w ay to  contain 
pub lic sector dem and. Subsequently, the need for structural changes, such as a redefinition 
of the role of the state, extensive deregulation of markets, etc., were emphasised.
Section Three: Policy Responses.
Given the scenario, as discussed in previous sections, India sought help from the
Fund under the Compensatory and C ontingency Financing Facility (CCFF) and subsequently 
under Stand-By arrangement, and from the World Bank under its Structural Adjustment and 
Sectoral Adjustment Facilities. The country resorted to borrowing from the Bretton Woods
^^ See. Economic Survey, 1991-92, Part I, General Review, p. 8.
addition to drawing under Reserve Tranche and purchases under the First Credit Tranche. Besides, India 
also borrowed from the Asian Development Bank, and from multilateral donors, especially Japan.
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Institutions os these were the only availab le source of exceptional external finance required 
to avoid a possible defau lt in deb t servicing.
Borrowing from these institutions is normally conditional upon im plem entation 
and /or proposal to im plem ent stabilisation and adjustment measures. Indian experience 
was no different from this. The Governm ent of India submitted a Policy Framework Paper 
(PFP) in the form of a M em orandum  on Economic Policies to the Fund on August 27, 1991. 
The M em orandum set out the econom ic program m e of the Government of India for 1991-92 
through to 1992-93.
In this section we discuss the measures im plem ented by the Indian authority, before 
approaching the Fund and the Bank, and also those proposed by the former in the 
Memorandum. This would be followed by a discussion on m acroeconom ic developm ents 
following initiation of the programmes.
The PFP consisted of measures aim ed a t both stabilisation and structural adjustment 
of the Indian econom y. The underlying key objectives were, (a) restoration of econom ic 
growth; (b) ensuring price stability; and (c) easing of critical balance of payments situation. 
Accordingly, certain measures were adop ted  beforehand, while certa in others were 
proposed in the PFP. In the following, w e discuss these measures under prior action, and 
proposals. (Appendix 2.1.1.
I. Stabilisation Measures,
Prior Actions,
The Indian authorities adop ted  a number of stabilisation measures before 
approach ing the Bretton Woods Institutions for financia l assistance. The most im portant 
com ponen t was fiscal policy measures. The latter included measures a im ed a t expenditure 
reduction and increase in revenue of the central government.
Major thrust of the expenditure reduction system was expenditure control system. 
The latter was aim ed through savings from (i) cuts in current government expenditures, and
(ii) restraints on other cap ita l spending. The former included reduction in non-plan 
expenditures, such as (1) lower provision for subsidies, (2) moderation in de fence  spending, 
(3) reduction in transfers to public enterprises, and (4) restraint on other current spending, 
e.g., no budgetary provision for cost-of-living increase, etc. While, the latter included 
measures such as no net provisions through supplementary appropriations other than those
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supported by m atching savings or add itiona l reserves for public sector units a nd /o r any 
ministry.
Measures undertaken to increase revenue incorporated f i)  intensification of existing 
taxes: and (21 rationalisation and broadening the base of customs tariffs.
The next im portant com ponen t was exchange rate adjustments. As a step towards 
fulfillment of pre-condition and also as step towards correction of exchange rate 
misalignment. The RBI adjusted the Rupee exchange rate vis-à-vis leading international 
currencies in two-stages.
The laxity in monetary policy had been rectified through tightening it considerably 
during 1991. The measures adop ted  included (1) upward adjustment in administered interest 
rates, both deposit and lending; (2) restraint on banking liquidity through imposition of 
add itiona l cash reserve requirement; and (3) reduction in credit availability to the private 
sector.
The last im portant com ponen t was m odifica tion/adjustm ent in price structure. The 
governm ent announced increases in a number of administered prices encompassing (1) 
im portant inputs; (2) services; and (3) agricultural commodities.
Measures Proposed,
The PFP also conta ined proposals for consolidating achievements follow ing prior 
actions. Accordingly, it was proposed to halve progressively the relative m easurement of
overall public sector defic it by mid-1990s. The proposal incorporated (1) consolidation of 
expenditure control system, and (2) initiation of a process of comprehensive tax reforms.
Regarding monetary policy, the underlying idea was to pursue a restrictive 
m onetary policy in order to reduce inflationary pressures and support the ta rge ted  ba lance  
of payments improvements.
In implementing its m onetary and cred it policies, the RBI proposed to rely on 
indirect, market-oriented mechanisms tha t operate  through their e ffec t on reserve m oney 
growth and com m ercial bank liquidity. This would enable the governm ent to use interest 
rate policy flexibly.
^^Deflned to include the Union Government, the Oil Coordination Committee (O.C.C.), States, Union 
Territories and internal and extrabudgetary resources of Central and State enterprises for financing their 
capital expenditure.
The PFP did not conta in  explicitly any com m itm ent/proposal regarding future action 
on exchange rate policy. Flowever, explicit mention abou t official international reserve 
build-up, adjustment of any deviations in pub lic d eb t from desired pa th  through 
corresponding absorption In offic ia l international reserves build-up implied com m itm en t to 
maintain an agreed/desired level of exchange rate. The underlying ob jective  was to ensure 
im proved international competitiveness.
II. Structural Ad justm ent measures.
As m entioned earlier, the World Bank was also involved in this stabilisation and 
adjustment efforts through its provision of Structural Adjustment (SAL) and tw o  Sectoral 
Adjustment Loans(SECAL). The m acroeconom ic objective  of the SALs and SECALs was one 
of an adjustment strategy in order to fac ilita te  econom ic growth. While, the 
m icroeconom ic objective  was to in itia te/im plem ent sector specific po licy and institutional 
reforms. In the Indian context, the latter aspect covered trade, foreign investment, industry, 
public sector, financial sector, and energy sector.
The PFP described a set of specific actions, tha t had been a dop ted  by the Indian 
government, before approval of the SAL operation by the Bank. These are de lineated  
below.
Prior Actions,
The most comprehensive changes were introduced in industrial po licy  regulations 
thus ind icating major changes in governm ent policy focus.
A major deregulation of the dom estic industrial sector was in troduced in the 
Industrial Policy Statement of July 24, 1991. Salient features of the deregulation process 
were, (1) easing of restrictions on private corporate  Initiatives in industrial activities, such as 
relaxation in licensing requirement, and entry/partic ipation of private co rpora te  sector in 
areas reserved for/considered exclusive responsibility of the public sector; (2) relaxation in 
industrial location strategy; (3) easing of stringent conditions pertaining to tim e-bound 
a tta inm ent of import-substitution; and (4) restriction of the scope of the MRTP A c t to  only in 
case of large companies seeking am algam ation, merger, takeover, and establishment of 
new  undertakings.
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In order to fac ilita te  the process of industrial deregulation, major changes w ere also 
in troduced in foreign investment policy. The underlying objectives were (a) to  provide 
greatly increased opportunities for foreign investmenf, and (b) to ease restrictions on 
techno logy agreements. These changes incorporated (i) easing of restrictions in foreign 
equ ity holdings; (ii) abolition of preferential trea tm ent for domestic trading and export 
houses; (iii) provision of au tom atic  approval for d irect foreign invesfment in high priority 
industries and de-linking of foreign equity proposals from foreign technology agreements; 
(iv) provision of au tom atic  approval for foreign technology agreements in high priority 
industries subject to the fulfillment of upper limit on payments, upward limit on dom estic 
sales and on exports; and (v) provision o f au tom atic  approval to industries, e xcep t those 
considered high priority, with no requirement of free foreign exchange for m aking any 
payments and subject to the fulfillment o f condition as in (iv) above.
The next im portant step was rationalisation of trade policy. The po licy  changes 
incorporated (a) abolition of export subsidies; (b) a substantial reduction in the extent of 
licensing, such as linking of im port entitlements to export earnings in p lace  of a large part o f 
the administered licensing of imports; (c) substantial reduction in variety of licences; (d) 
simplification of the procedure for Import of cap ita l goods, following the announcem ent of 
the Industrial Policy Statement o f 1991, subject to the fulfillment of full coverage  of import 
requirem ent through foreign equ ity or maximum value of import requirem ent as a 
proportion of the value of p lant and machinery; and (e) customs tariffs reforms.
Prior actions also conta ined reform of the public sector policy. Changes were 
introduced through (a) introduction of market-orientation; (b) rationalisation of chronica lly 
sick public enterprises; and (c) tightening of accountab ility  with emphasis on profitability 
and the rate of return on cap ita l. The underlying ob jective  was to remove ine ffic iency o f the 
pub lic  sector enterprises. As a part of rationalisation of chronically sick pub lic  sector 
enterprises, efforts were d irected  towards creation of a safety net, in the form of a National 
Renewal Fund, in the 1991-92 budge t. The ob jective  was to pro tect the interest of the 
workers from adverse consequences of adjustm ent and technical transformation.
70
In the context of financia l sector reforms, measures had been a d o p te d  concern ing
(a) liberalisation of hitherto administered interest rate; and (b) reduction in 
adm in istered/d irected a llocation  of credit.
Measures Proposed to be A dopted,
While negotia ting a SAL and SECAL programmes with the Bank, the concerned 
governm ent usually reaches a firm understanding on the monitorable action  programmes, 
specifying both the steps to  be taken and the studies required as a basis for further progress. 
Correspondingly, the PFP conta ined  measures intended to be adop ted  in respect of above 
m entioned various sectors over a medium-term period.
The most comprehensive changes were proposed in respect of financia l sector 
reform . The proposal focused on, (a) promoting a more market-oriented a llocation  of credit;
(b) further deve lopm ent o f cap ita l markets; and (c) enhancem ent of soundness of the 
banking system. M arket-orientation of the banking system was proposed to be achieved 
through (i) deposit interest rates liberalisation, (ii) phased reduction in Statutory Liquidity 
Ratio requirem ent thus limiting cap tive  governm ent bond market. Soundness of the banking 
system was proposed to be ach ieved through (i) reform of the organisational structure, (ii) 
reform of cap ita l structure of banks, and (iii) changes in supervisory structure of banks and 
te rm  -lending financia l institutions. While the PFP conta ined proposals to prom ote  further 
deve lopm ent of cap ita l markets through (i) installation of comprehensive set of policies and 
guidelines tha t would app ly  equally to public and private sector mutual funds; (ii) institution 
of full statutory powers to Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to function as an 
autonomous body of the stock exchange; and (iii) introduction of trading reforms and 
institutional improvements of the stock exchange.
The next im portant com ponen t was public sector reform. Im portant aspects were 
(a) restrictions of public sector operation under certain circumstances; and (b) 
im provem ent in opera tional e ffic iency of public secfor enterprises. The former comprised (i) 
right to the private sector to  opera te  if public sector investment is ineffic ient in terms of rate 
of return on cap ita l; (ii) decision to disinvest a portion ot equity in selected pub lic  sector 
enterprises; and (iii) restricting the chronically sick public sector to operate. While the latter
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com prised (i) phased reduction in budgetary provisions for public sector enterprises; and (ii) 
provision of greater degree o f m anagerial autonom y of the profit-making units.
The third im portant com ponen t was tax policy reform. The underlying ob jective  of 
the proposal had been im plem entation of a major tax reform over a medium-term. Major 
emphases were on (1) increasing the share of revenue from d irect taxes through (a) 
broadening the base, and (b) administrative improvement; (2) rationalising domestic 
ind irect taxes including further expansion in the existing MODVAT system; and (3) reducing 
the level and dispersion of customs tariffs.
The PFP conta ined proposals for further consolidation of reforms initia ted through 
prior actions in industrial policy, foreign exchange control, and trade policy.
in respect of industrial po licy and foreign exchange control policy, the governm ent 
proposed to take actions facilita ting deregulation in industrial and foreign investment 
policy.
Regarding trade policy, proposals for consolidation comprised the follow ing, (1) 
phased elim ination of licences and quantita tive restrictions over medium-term; (2) 
introduction of greater transparency in trade practices through adoption of harmonised 
system of customs classification; and (3) reduction in public sector m onopoly in foreign 
trade  transactions through phased/progressively decanalising foreign trade transactions by
the designated agencies.
C om m itm ent by G overnm ent o f India,
The PFP also conta ined standard com m itm ent by the Indian authorities. These 
included, (1) adoption/im plem entation  of any additional measures appropriate to achieve 
the objectives of the program m e in consultation w ith the Bretton Woods Institutions; (2) 
adoption /im p lem enta tion  of any measures, in consultation with the Fund, tha t m ay be 
appropria te  in acco rdance  w ith the policies of the Fund; and (3) other standard clauses, 
such as restriction on adoption  of any prohibitory exchange rate, or trade, or payments 
arrangements. (4) There were no com m itm ent regarding incomes policies in the 
programmes. However, the programmes contem p la ted  gradual abolition o f price control 
and subsidies.
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M acroeconom ic  Overview,
The Stand-By Arrangement negotia ted  with the IMF in O ctober 1991 was com ple ted  
in June 1993. There were satisfactory developm ents in India's econom ic perform ance 
fo llow ing im plem entation of these stabilisation and adjustment measures. These 
developm ents could be observed in both dom estic and external sectors. (Table below).
Table: Kev Econom ic Indicators  
1% change over previous year, unless otherwise indicatedl
Item?
1. Gross Domestic 
Product a t factor 
cost (a t constant 
prices)
2. index of 
Agricultural 
Production (1969- 
70=100)
3. Index of 
Industrial
Production (1980- 
81 = 100)
4. WPI (1981- 
82=100)
5. M oney Supply 
(M3)
6. Gross Fiscal 
Deficit(as % of 
GDP)
7. Gross Domestic 
C ap ita l 
Formation
(a) Public
(b) Private
8. Imports (a t Us $ 
prices)
9. Exports (a t US $ 
prices)
10. Trade 
Balance(as % of 
GDP)
11. Current 
A ccount Balance  
(as % of GDP)
12. Foreign 
Currency Assets 
(a t US $ Mio  
value)
13. Exchange  
Rate(Rs/Us $) +
1994-95
5.3(E)
2.2(A)
8.0(April-Oct/94)
11,5(As on Feb.
18/95)
18,6(April/94-
Jon/95)
6.0(BE)
n.a
n.a
n.a
23.6(April- 
Jan /1994-95) 
!7.3(Aptil- 
J o n /1994-95) 
n.a
30.4(as on Feb. 
13/1995)
0.1 (April- 
Jan/a994-95)
1993-94
4.3(G)
2.2
4.1
10.8
18.2
7.3(RE)
24.4
n.a
n.a
6.I(P)
19,6(P)
-0.5
-0.1
134.2
7.7(P)
1993-92
4.3
4.1
2.3
7.0
15.7
5.7
16.7
26.4
15.1
12.7
3.8
- 2.2
- 2.2
14.3
14.9
1991-92
0.9
- 2.0
0.6
13.6
19.4
5.9
-15.8
-7.1
-18.4
-19.4
-1.5
-.09(Provisional
Est)
-0.9(Prov. Est) 
151.8
27.2
1990-91
4.9
3.0
8.3
12.1
15.1
8.4
11.2 
6.1 
17.3
13.5
9.2 
-3.2(Prel)
-3.3(Prel.)
-33.6
7.2
A; Anticipated; Q: Quick estimate; E: A dvan ce  estimates; + per cen t ch an g e  indicates the rate of depreciation of the  
Rupee.
Source; Economic Survey, various issues.
(a) External Sector Performance,
The most significant Im provem ent was noticed  In the external sector perform ance. 
Exports, In value terms, recovered In 1992-93 and, thereafter. Improved appreciab ly. Imports, 
on the other hand, deteriorated in 1992-93. The relevant value growth was 12.7 relative to a 
dec line  by 19.4 per ce n t in 1991-92 mainly follow ing w ide-ranging liberalisation o f import 
policy. The trend, however, took a reverse turn and grew  only by 6.1 per cen t in 1993-94, 
partly because of price-rationing e ffec t of the unified, market-determ ined exchange rate
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system and also because of slow growth of production In organised m anufacturing sector. 
Correspondingly, relative estimate of trade deficits 6^ declined to 0.5 per ce n t in 1993-94 
a fter a deterioration to 2.2 per cen t in 1992-93. Com parab le  figure for 1991-92 was 0.9 per 
cent. Relative estimate of current accoun t deficits also fo llowed the same trend during the 
period under consideration. These favourable developm ents In the external sector helped to 
Increase the level of foreign currency reserves.
Domestic Economic Performance,
The stabilisation and adjustment measures tha t were put In p lace  In 1991-92 also 
helped to restore econ om ic /ou tp u t (real) growth to 4 per cent In 1992-93. This growth in 
(real) output, though.stagnated  In 1993-94, Improved, thereafter, to over 5 per ce n t In 1994- 
95. The im provem ent in (real) econom ic growth mainly followed recovery in industrial 
ac tiv ity  which after a drastic decline in 1991-92, was almost restored to the 1990-91 level. 
Agricultural production, on the other hand, declined considerably subsequent to improved 
perform ance in 1992-93.
Stabilisation experiences across countries highlight one im portant aspect. Successful 
Im plementation of stabilisation program m e is almost universally associated w ith a decline 
in (real) gross cap ita l form ation. Indian experience was not qualitatively d ifferent. Gross 
cap ita l formation (real) declined significantly to 15.8 per cent in 1991-92. However, this 
decline was recovered sharply to a growth of 16.7 per cen t in 1992-93. 7^ Most importantly, 
this turnaround in (real) gross cap ita l formation was a ided by recovery of private investment 
subsequent to change  in econom ic policy focus under the Stand-By and Structural 
Adjustment Programmes. Gross private cap ita l formation (real) increased by 15.1 per cent In 
1992-93 after a decline by 18.4 per cen t In the previous year; while (real) pub lic  cap ita l 
form ation increased by 26.4 per cent vis-à-vis a decline by 7.1 per ce n t during the 
com parab le  period.
However, econom ic perform ance was not an unmixed outcom e. There were set 
backs in terms of lapse In the realisation of targets for certain m acroeconom ic variables. 
The principal cause of m acroeconom ic concern In the period follow ing com ple tion  of 
stabilisation program m e has been the deterioration in the fiscal situation. Following 
Initiation of stabilisation effort, relative estimate of central government gross fiscal deficits
Relative estimate denotes trade deficits as a percentage of GDP. 
'*■ Data based on quick estimate of CSO.
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was brought down from 8.4 per cen t of GDP in 1990-91 to 5.9 per cen t in 1991-92 and even 
lower in 1992-93. The perform ance was s ign ifican t especially in 1992-93 following 
considerable revenue shortfalls In the year concerned. Subsequently, thereafter, fiscal 
perform ance deteriorated when relative estimate of gross fiscal deficits increased to 7.3 per 
ce n t (RE) in 1993-94. Moreover, continued deterioration was antic ipa ted  in 1994-95. 
outgrow th of this deterioration In fiscal perform ance by the central governm ent was large 
scale borrowing by the latter from (a) market sources, and (b) the central bank, I.e., the RBI.
The central governm ent borrowed from the open market through auctions of 
governm ent securities and treasury bills. This p re-em pted investible resources from the non­
governm ent sector.^’  This, In turn, exerted pressures on interest rotes as the cu t o ff rate on 
governm ent bonds set the trend In other open m arket rates thereby curbing investment 
dem and. Thus even though an expansionary fiscal po licy provided expansionary impetus to 
econom ic  growth, this was outweighed by negative  e ffe c t on recovery of industrial 
investm ent through pre-em ption of resources fo llow ing large-scale governm ent market 
borrowing.
While central governm ent borrowing from the RBI accen tua ted  the acce lera tion  of 
reserve m oney growth. The latter was, however, growing consequent upon increase in (net) 
foreign assets. Reserve m oney increased by 16.9 per ce n t during 1993-94. Broad m oney (M3) 
supply, however, grew a t a relatively slower p ace  by 14.1 per cent in 1993-94 vis-à-vis 
growth in reserve money. This slower pace  in the former fo llowed (i) unusually large increase 
in currency held by the public, and (ii) lower rate of bank lending subsequent to 
im position/im plem entation of restrictive prudential norms and cautious app roach  in the 
post-securities Irregularities period.
Increases in reserve m oney and broad m oney (M3) growth had implications for 
inflationary situations. Despite relatively slower growth in brood m oney supply, rate of 
inflaflon acce le ra ted  since August 1993. The po lnt-to-po in t rate of Increase in the WPI, 
w hich had fallen to 7 per ce n t by March, rose to 8 per ce n t in August and equalled 10.8 per
The relative measure of gross fiscal deficits was estimated to be 6.0 per cent according to budget 
estimate. An observation of the relationship between budget estimate and actual estimate indicates that the 
latter normally far exceeds the former.
See. Economic Survey, 1993-94, p. 4.
■"1 Basle norms.
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ce n t during 1993-94 and further deteriorated to 11.5 per cent in 1994-95. Furthermore, 
inflationary pressures were also accen tua ted  by increases in administered prices.
Another area of concern from the perspective of overall production and investment 
is investment and cap ita l goods segment of the m anufacturing sector. This was the 
segm ent which supported strong industrial activ ity  in 1980s. Initially, the segm ent recovered 
strongly. Subsequently, growth in the former was slower. Accordingly, overall industrial 
perform ance was slower. The annual growth rate of index for capita l goods production, 
w hich was 8.5 per ce n t for the first three quarters of 1992-93, fell to -8.8 per ce n t In the first 
seven months of 1993-94 (com pared to the corresponding period in the previous year).
The above  highlights the mixed outcom e of stabilisation efforts in early 1990s. Given 
this, our ob jective  would be to evaluate the underlying nature of India's stabilisation 
program m e. This is the subject m atter of subsequent chapters.
Section Four: Conclusion.
The stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes were im plem ented in 
response to  the external econom ic crisis that surfaced on an unm anageable  scale during 
early 1990s. The crisis em erged subsequent to  (i) outbreak of Gulf War, and (ii) sharp 
reduction in India's foreign trade transactions following disintegration of the erstwhile east 
European Communist Bloc.
The roots of the crisis can be traced back in developm ents In the Indian econom y 
subsequent to the second oil shocks In 1979-81. The m acroeconom ic strategy subsequent to 
the second oil shock emphasised a relatively liberalised import regime and deve lopm ent of 
infrastructural and other critical sectors of the econom y. This emphasised pursuance of 
highly import-intensive regime. Besides, the fiscal po licy  practices were expansionary 
especially since 1985. However, expansion in governm ent expenditure was not 
a ccom pa n ie d  by similar growth In revenues. Correspondingly, the governm ent had to resort 
to borrowing from the market and defic it financing. While the former resulted in 
accum ula tion  of very large scale Internal debt, the latter facilita ted  acce lera tion  of 
inflationary pressures through excessive creation of reserve money. Simultaneously, the 
im port liberalisation policy and investment in Infrastructure exerted pressures on the external 
sector. As export growth was sluggish, the governm ent resorted to com m ercia l borrowings 
to m ee t its w idening import dem and. This resulted in accum ula tion of large external debt.
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Thus, deterioration in econom ic perform ance was manifested through (a) 
a cce le ra ted  rate of inflation; (b) large fiscal deficits: and (c) deterioration in current 
a cco u n t balances. Even though econom ic growth did not slow down till 1990-91, there 
were concerns about the sustainability of this growth rate. The situation was sharply 
deteriora ted when the Governm ent of Indio fa ce d  with the probability of defaulting Its 
d e b t service obligations In early 1990s thus signalling the urgent need for econom ic reforms.
Throughout the 1980s, the Indian authorities a tte m p ted  occasionally but consistently 
to co rrect these econom ic imbalances. These efforts were acknow ledged by the 
multilateral organisations as early as 1981 when the Fund provided financial assistance to 
the G overnm ent of India under its Extended Fund Facility for restructuring and adjustment. 
However, more structured effort ensued only in early 1990s when the Governm ent of India 
in itia ted stabilisation and adjustment programmes which were subsequently supported by 
the Fund under its Stand-By arrangement, and the Bank under its Structural Adjustment and 
Sectoral Adjustment Loans.
It may, however, be observed that the nature and process of stabilisation and 
adjustm ent programmes in early 1990s were, to some extent, different from previous 
attem pts. This highlights the underlying causes of econom ic crisis as perceived by the 
negotiators in the Indian context.
The government resorted to both dem and- and supply-side measures. Measures 
w ere a do p te d  initially for stabilisation to be followed by structural adjustment. However, the 
perform ance of the Indian econom y during the im plem entation of the programmes as well 
as subsequent to the com ple tion of the stabilisation programme appeared defic ien t 
relative to the requirement. The perform ance broadly improved during the program m e 
period but there are causes for concern. This raises doubt about the e fficacy  of the 
measures adop ted . Besides, majority o f adjustm ent efforts are ye t to be 
adopted /im p lem ented /fina lised .
The above are evident in (a) continuing deterioration In m acroeconom ic 
perform ance subsequent to program m e com ple tion; and (b) slack In program m e 
im plem entation os discussed under m acroeconom ic overview.
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Table 2.2.2(b). : India : Petroleum Consumotion.
(Quantities in 000 m. tonnes and in kg. per capita)
Years Consumotion Consumotion
Total Per caoita
1975 21835 36
1976 22762 37
1977 24430 39
1978 25626 40
1979 28240 43
1980 25074 36
1981 29504 42
1982 32107 45
1983 34534 47
1984 35235 47
1985 41226 54
1986 44940 57
1987 47440 59
1988 47084 58
1989 51704 62
1990 51839 61
1991 53294 62
Source : Energy Slolistics Yearbook, United Nations, various Issues.
T a b le  2 .2 .3 . : n d ia  -  M a c ro e c o n o m ic  Ind icators
Years Industri Oil Intensitv Net oil
alisation ( toe 1 imoort
Ratio (%1 dependency
1973 14.1 0.189 22.9
1974 15.6 0.185 19.6
1975 15.6 0.172 17.4
1976 16.1 0.185 17.6
1977 15.9 0.179 17.3
1978 16.9 0.185 17.9
1979 17.8 0.203 19.3
1980 16.7 0.198 21.3
1981 1 6.6 0.205 15.9
1982 16.7 0.202 13.7
1983 15.9 0.199 10.4
1984 16.3 0.206 9.2
1985 17.2 0.213 11.6
Note ; ( 1 ) Industrialisation ratio refers to the share
of value added of manufacturing sector to GDP at current factor cost.
(2) Oil intensity is measured by primary oil consumption
per thousand US dollars of real GDP at 1980 constant market prices.
Table 2.2.4 : Consumption Expenditure of the Central Government : In 
( Percentage distribution )
Period Defence Other Govt. Total
1985-86 71.0
Administration
29.0 100.0
1986-87 71.2 28.8 100.0
1987-88 71.7 28.3 100.0
1988-89 70.5 29.5 100.0
1989-90 68.8 31.2 100.0
1990-91 68.5 31.5 100.0
1991-92 66.4 33.6 100.0
1992-93 63.9 36.1 100.0
Table 2.2.5. India - Gross Domestic C ap ita l Formation,
Gorss Domestic Savinas a n d  Gross Private Sovinas
Gross Dom estic  
C ap ita l Formation
Gross Dom estic  
Savinas
Gross Priva 
te  Savinas
P ercentaaE  
G row tti in
ColMI
as a  per 
c en t o f col. 131
iU 12) (3) (4) (5) |6|
1975-76 1 6406.0 14928.0 11589.0 77.6
1976-77 1 7776.0 18030.0 13845.0 19.5 76.8
1977-78 19017.0 20230.0 1 6062.0 16.0 79.4
1973-79 23218.0 24138.0 19358.0 20.5 80.2
1979-80 26145.0 24698.0 19731.0 1.9 79.9
1980-81 28453.0 28786.0 24132.0 22.3 83.8
1981-82 40013.0 33478.0 26224.0 8.7 78.3
1982-83 40784,0 34068.0 26246.0 0.1 77.0
1983-84 43061.0 38971.0 32190.0 22.6 82.6
1934-85 48788.0 42114.0 35588.0 10.6 84.5
1985-86 62621.0 49655.0 41198.0 15.8 83.0
1936-37 71443.0 57048.0 49046.0 19.0 86.0
1987-88 79025.0 71712.0 64489.0 31.5 89.9
1988-39 101328.0 86665.0 78564.0 21.8 90.7
1989-90 1 19081.0 111525.0 104178.0 32.6 93.4
1990-91 1 4051 6.0 125109.0 119518.0 14.7 95.5
1991-92 146420.0 148039.0 137863.0 15.3 93.1
Source : N ational Acoounts Statistics : tvlain Aggregates  a n d  d e ta iled  tables, Parti
United Nations, various issues.
25
Table 2.2.6. : India's Exports : V a lue a n d  Volum e.
Years Value of Rate of Volume
ExDorts cFianae in index of
1 in US$ value 1%) Exports
million 1
1974-75 4174 30.1 73.7
1975-76 4665 11.8 81.7
1976-77 5753 23.3 96.8
1977-78 6316 9.8 93.2
1978-79 6978 10.5 100.0
1979-80 7947 13.9 106.2
1980-81 8486 6.8 108.1
1981-82 8704 2.6 110.1
1982-83 9107 4.6 116.7
1983-84 9449 3.8 113.0
1984-85 9878 4.5 120.8
1985-86 8904 -9.9 111.3
1986-87 9745 9.4 121.3
1987-88 12089 24.1 140.0
1988-89 13970 15.6 152.1
1989-90 16626 19.0
1990-91 18142 9.1 194.1
1991-92 17866 -1.5 208.1
1992-93 18421 3.1
Note : .. denotes that information is not available.
Source; 1 ) DGCI&S, various issues.
2) RBI, Report on Currency and Finance, various issues.
3) Government of India : Economic Survey, various issues.
M
Year
T a b le  2 .2 .7 . : In d ia  - N o m in a l a n d  R eal E ffec tive  E xc h an g e  Rates
{ 1985= 100.0) 
Nominal Real
Effective Effective
Exchange Exchange
Rates Rotes
1980 149.2 120.1
1981 131.9 113.7
1982 136.6 117.4
1983 121.9 10.8
1984 108.5 104.0
1985 100.0 100.0
1986 69.6 72.4
1987 58.2 64.5
1988 48.1 57.5
1989 44.4 57.3
1990 43.1
Not : The indices are based on exchange rate movements 
vis-a-vis the US dollar, the pound sterling, deutsche mark 
and yen using export weights. The exchange rate is defined as 
foreign currencies per rupee, hence a downward movement 
in the index implies a depreciation.
Source : international Financial statistics, various issues.
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Appendix 2.1: Policy Response under Bretton Woods Institutions-supported Programmes. 
Policy Actions
I. Monetary and Financial Policies
i. Restriction on Rate of Growth of Liquidity
ii. Target on Net Official International Reserves
iii. Interest Rate Adjustment
II. Public Sector Policies
i. Restraint on Central Government Current 
Expenditure
a. Wages and Salaries
(i) Freezing or Reduction of government employee 
numbers
(ii) Limit on salary indexation
b. Goods and Services
(i) Improvement in overall expenditure controls
(ii) Reduction in appropriation for specific 
expenditures
c. Transfers and Subsidies
(i) reduction in subsidies
(a) Petroleum
(b) Fertilisers
(c) Export subsidy
(ii) Reduction in other subsidies
(iii) Curtailment of current transfers to NPEs
(iv) Control of state enterprises operating 
expenditures
d. Expenditure Administration
(i) Improve expenditure control mechanism
(ii) Others (restraint on defence expenditure)
ii. Improvement in central govt, tax revenues
a. Income taxes
Reduction in Personal income taxes
b. Corporate tax
c. Tax on Property
e. import duties
f. Export duties
g. Other taxes & nontaxes
h. Improve/reform tax administration
i. restructure and rationalise tax system
3. Public enterprises
a. Improvement in performance
b. Improve overall management & control
c. Provision of Economic Pricing
4. Overall budget
a. Reduction of deficit as a % of GDP
III. Exchange & Trade Policies
1. Exchange rate reform
a. Two-stage exchange rate adjustment
b. Gradual merging/unification of rate
2. Trade liberalisation & reform
a. Rationalisation of import system
b. Intensification of the process of shift from 
physical to market control
c. Modification/adjustment of Export promotion 
measures /schemes/incentives
IV. External Debt Policies
1. Control of level & maturity of debt
a. Public/publicly guaranteed debt
b. Private sector debt
2. Other debt management policies
V. Wages and Prices
VI. Other
1. Standard trade, payments & exchange rate 
clauses
2. Objection to a policy
Sources: Government of India, Memorandum of Economic Policies for 1991-92 and Revised Memorandum  
of Economic Policies, 1992-93.
C hapter 3 : M e thodo logy .
The objective  of this chapter is to discuss the m ethodology chosen for the 
Indian case study. This discussion will be p receded  by an outline of the broad 
m ethodologica l framework tha t has been used for the assessment of the im p ac t of 
various stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes. The chap te r will be 
organised in the following way. Section one the outline of the m ethodo log ica l 
framework will be discussed. The ch ioce  of m ethodo logy for the Indian case study 
will be discussed in section two. In section three da ta  sources for evaluation of the 
im pact of the progrmme implem ented in India in the 1990s will be discussed; while the 
limitations em anating from the choice of . m ethodology, as In section tw o above, 
will be discussed in Section four. And finally, the justification for the cho ice  of period for 
the Indian case study will be briefly discussed in section five.
Section One: M e th o d o lo g ica l Framework.
The theoretical framework for different methodologies that have been used in 
evaluating the Bretton Woods Institutions-supported programmes em ana ted  from a 
pioneering a ttem pt by M. Guitian (1981). ' He proposed the follow ing three criteria 
guiding how the effects of the above programmes ought to be measured.
(i) Positive Criterion,
A 'positive or p ractica l standard would measure perform ance under adjustment 
programs by com paring their results to the situation tha t prevailed in the econom y prior 
to the introduction of po licy measures; this standard amounts to a measure of w ha t is 
relative to w hat was'. ^
(ii) Normative Criterion,
This is a 'norm ative standard that would measure perform ance by com paring 
actua l results under programs to the targets specified in those programs; this second 
standard compares, in a sense, w hat isW\W\ w hat should be.' ^
(iii) Conjectural Criterion,
It is a 'standard tha t m ight be called conjectural or judgm enta l and which 
would com pare actua l perform ance to the outcom e that would have taken p lace  in
' See. Guitian, M. (1981): Fund Conditionality: Evolution of Principles and Practices. Washington: IMF, 
1981.
•- ib id . p . 37. 
ib id .. p . 37.
the absence of a policy program; this third standard focuses on a comparison of w ha f is 
versus w ha t would  have been.'
The ideas underlying the three criteria, as proposed by Guitian, suggest three 
relative measures of program m e effectiveness based on (a) actua l outcom e, and
(b)com parative  static approach. These are,
(1) A factua l standard, based on the positive criterion, under which the observed trend 
of a ta rgeted macro variable, before and after the initiation of programmes by a 
country, are com pared. This is known as the 'be fore-and-a fte r' criterion.
(2) The conjectural standard suggests a judgm enta l or conjectural criterion in which a 
relative evaluation is a ttem p ted  between the observed m acroeconom ic perform ance 
consequent upon the im plem entation of the BWIs-supported programmes and 
perform ance tha t would have taken p lace in the absence of such programmes. This is 
known as the 'w ith-versus-withouf criterion,
(3) The normative criterion, on the other hand, suggests a normative measure of 
comparison of the observed m acroeconom ic perform ance following im plem entation 
of the program m e and the corresponding desired perform ance, agreed upon as targets 
during negotiation. This is known as the 'actual-versus-target' criterion.
The first two criteria yield estimates of the 'counterfactua ls '. While the 
normative criterion yields only a measure of the degree of im p lem enta tion /adherence 
to the program m e policies. However, these three criteria are not mutually exclusive. In 
an outcom e-based evaluation approach, it is im portant that the actua l im p ac t of a 
program m e is separated from the extent of the program m e im plem entation. Thus, the 
'actual-versus-target' criterion is com plem entary to the 'be fore-and-a fte r' and the 
'w ith-versus-withouf criteria.
Simplicity and objectiv ity are the main advantages of the 'be fo re-and-a fte r' 
criterion. However, the criterion is based on the assumption of ceteris paribus or 
stationarity in non-programm e determinants. This assumption Is implausible as these 
non-programm e determinants change over time and also the random  elements m ight 
render specificity to such chnage/variation in any time period. Accordingly, the 
'be fore-and-a fte r' estimator of the independent e ffect of the programmes on
ibid.. p. 37.
m acroeconom ic outcomes. Besides, the criterion is an inadequate  measure of the 
'counterfactua ls ' as it compares the m acroeconom ic perform ance with the situation 
prevailing before the initiation of the program m e. Given tha t deterioration in 
m acroeconom ic perform ance induces a governm ent to pursue a program m e, 
m ain tenance of status quo in policy cho ice  would n o t b e ^  a case/consideration 
in anyw ay.
The alternative to the 'before-and-a fte r' criterion for the evaluation of the 
'counterfactua ls ' is the 'w ith-versus-withouf criterion. The latter is an im provem ent over 
the former as it can  distinguish betw een the program m e and non-program m e 
determ inants of ta rgeted  variables. However, there are several difficulties associated 
w ith this criterion. Most importantly, it does not accom m o da te  for the differences in 
situations within the definition of 'counterfactua ls ', resulting either from the e ffe c t o f no 
initiative to change policy or from the e ffec t o f changes in a policy w ithout any 
influence from external multilateral organisations. Besides, there is the problem  of 
adverse selection in respect of the selection of program m e countries. The latter group 
differs from the non-programm e countries in terms of their econom ic perform ance. The 
criterion does not a ccom m oda te  for the implications of the initial differences betw een 
the performances of program m e countries from tha t o f the non-program m e countries 
within the analytica l framework. This gives a biased estimate of the independen t effects 
of the programmes on m acroeconom ic outcomes. Moreover, the direction of the bias 
ca nn o t be antic ipa ted  beforehand as it depends on interactions betw een the past 
econom ic difficulties in a program m e country and the subsequent effectiveness of a 
program m e. ^
The 'actual-versus-target' criterion does no t give an assessment o f the relative 
perform ance of the measures adop ted . Rather, it is a measure of the im plem entation of 
the program m e policies. Hence, the criterion is inadequate  as it canno t conc lude  
a bou t the im pact of the programmes on m acroeconom ic outcomes simply on the 
basis of the divergence betw een the targets and the actua l outcomes. The latter m ay 
be the result of the inadequacy of the models used for setting the targets, or unrealistic 
targeting. However, the criterion cannot throw any light on this. Also, the targets are
op.cit. Khan, M.S. (1990), pp. 203-4.
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highly subjective as these are influenced by the negotiators' perception  a b o u t the 
partic ipating/ad justing econom y.
As a reaction to the apparen t shortcomings of Guitian's proposition. J. 
Williamson (1983) suggested m odification to the existing standard of measurement.  ^ He 
favoured tha t conceptua lly  a more relevant criterion would be to  com pare  observed 
trends with the potentia lly  best possible ou tcom e given the circumstances. 
Accordingly, he recom m ended for further expansion within Guitian's 'con jec tu ra l or 
judgm enta l' criterion along the follow ing lines: (a) 'w h a f would have been ' had there 
been no policy changes, and (b) w ha t w ould have happened had the governm ent 
changed  its policies w ithout any influence from international financial institutions, and 
especially from the Fund. Williamson defined effectiveness of the reform programmes as 
an im provem ent in actua l econom ic perform ance, resulting from adoption  of 
stabilisation programmes, as a ratio of the potentia l im provement from a situation that 
would  have occurred w ithout Fund involvem ent  ^ to the best potentia lly  feasible 
outcom e. ® He, however, sounded a word of caution  about the context of evaluation of 
any Fund policy advice, based on the above principle. He m aintained tha t any Fund 
involvement, which leads to an im provem ent in perform ance, would not suffice to 
justify endorsement of the involvem ent of the Fund and vice-versa. In either of the 
situations, one would also require to  consider (i) w hether the im provem ent had com e 
close to that potentia lly possible in the circumstances (if im provem ent is noticed); or
(ii)whether the Fund involvem ent had led to a deterioration in perform ance as 
com pared  with w ha t would otherwise have occurred (if failure was noticed).
Despite the intellectual a ttraction of Williamson’s approach, it is Guitian's 
framework which has been used w ide ly in actua l practice.
 ^See, Williamson, J. (1983): IMF Conditionality, pp. 129-44.
’ Such a state may mean either of the following two situations. (1) The state of the economy in period 
(t+1) under the conjecture that there were no policy changes. (2) The state of the economy in (t+1) 
under the conjecture that the economy had changed its policies without any influence from the 
international financial institutions. 
ibid.. p. 131.
" This is a normative standard. This implies the state of the economy that would have been in period 
(t+1 ), had an ideal set of policies been implemented. 
ibid.. p. 131.
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We can  form ulate analytical framework ’  for ttie  above m entioned outcom e- 
based approaches for estimation of the independent im p ac t of Fund-supported 
programmes on m acroeconom ic outcomes.
Let us suppose tha t a particular country has been undergoing Fund-supported 
program m e for a specified period aim ing a t restoration of balances and sustained 
growth in a num ber of m acroeconom ic variables, identified as ta rge t variables. These 
latter variables are assumed to be a function of the following four types of factors: 
(i)changes in m acroeconom ic policy instruments tha t would have occurred  in the 
absence of a program m e; (ii) changes in external econom ic conditions; (iii) e ffe c t of 
Fund-supported programmes during the program m e period; and (iv) unobservable 
shocks that are specific to a programme country. Given the above, any change  in the 
variable ytj a t time i m ay be expressed as
Ayij = A x i (3 i j +A WiWi + Pij'WF di + A s ij. (1) i= ).........n, 1 r^j.
Equation (1) m ay be interpreted as the change in the m acroeconom ic 
outcom e, x \ are the policy instruments, w  i represent random external econom ic 
variables, d ; s a dum m y variable which takes on a value of 1 if there is a program m e in 
e ffe c t during the period under consideration and 0  otherwise; s g is the unobservable 
error term (with zero m ean and constant standard deviation) which is serially and 
mutually uncorrelated, f. 5 also representjthe unobservable shocks tha t are specific to the 
program m e country, p 5, a 5 and p 1 ; are conform able consfants; and A is the first 
d ifference operator, p 1;"^  ^ measures the e ffe c t of a programme on the m acroeconom ic 
ou tcom e variables. Given p x; implies the policies that would be a do p te d  in the 
absence of a program m e. Hence, the values for Xi will have to be estim ated for the 
country w hich is im plem enting the Fund-supported programme. This could  be 
a ttem p ted  using the follow ing equation.
Axi= [ y M - y r i  ] + n ! (2) 1=1..........n
Equation (2) expresses the change in the program m e country's m acroeconom ic 
policy instruments be tw een the current and the preceding periods as a function of the 
difference be tw een desired value of a ta rge t variable and its actua l value. Y are
'' This analytical formulation is partial adoption from Goldstein, M. and P. Montiel.
See, Goldstein, M. and P. Montiel (1986): 'Evaluation of Fund Stabilization Programs with Multicountry 
Data: Some Methodological Pitfalls', IMF Staff Papers, vol. 33, pp. 309-12.
%
desired values of the ta rge t variable, y n are ac tua l values of the ta rget variable, y is the 
coe ffic ien t tha t indicates the responsiveness o f the policy instruments to the target 
disequilibria; while r| is the unobservable error term  (with zero mean and constant 
standard deviation) which is serially and mutually uncorrelated. Equation (2) states that 
the authorities display systematic po licy reaction to perceived disequilibria in their 
m acroeconom ic ta rge t variables.
Given the above  two equations, w e  would be  able to obtain expression for the 
'be fore-and-a fte r' and the 'w ith-versus-withouf approaches. As m entioned earlier, the 
'be fore-and-a fte r' estimator would be equal to  change  in the value of the ta rget 
variable observed during the program m e period.
In our equation, p measures the ac tua l e ffec t of the Fund-supported 
program m e on the ta rge t variable a t time i. Then the 'be fore-and-after' estimate of 
the e ffe c t of a program m e on the variable will be measured by p iji^ F.sA, jh e
estimated value will be equal to
p i^MF.BA = A y i j  i = l ,  n  (3 ) .
Equation (3) represents that any change  in a target variable is attributable 
exclusively to program m e effects.
The traditional control group or 'w ith-versus-w ithouf estimate would be given 
by a difference in ac tua l change  In the value of a ta rge t variable observed during the 
program m e period from tha t of a non-program m e country or a group of non­
program m e countries.
Based on our symbols, the estimated value of the parameter p under the 
'w ith-versus-w ithouf app roach  would be represented by p which would be
equal to
p -iMF.ww = (Ay,i) - (A  y g)N ( 4 ) i = l , ......n a n d i ? i j
N=1 N
where, N is for the non-program m e control group,
( y g)Nis the mean value of the variable for a set of non­
program m e control group countries.
Equation (4) represents that any change  in a ta rget variable is a ttributab le  to
program m e effects ne t of the developm ents in the respective variable in the non­
program m e country/countries.
ibid.. Goldstein & Montiel, p.31
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In order to overcom e the weakness of the traditional control-group approach , a 
m odified control-group approach  has been devised. "  Under the latter, outcom es are 
derived net of observable non-programme influences. This can be estim ated through 
a ccom m oda tion  of an adjustment fac to r for any differences in indigenous 
m acroeconom ic policy betw een program m e and non-programme countries. ’ 2 
However, the m odified control-group estimator ca nn o t remove the bias from sample 
selection resulting from differences betw een program m e and non-program m e 
countries.
Subsequently, there has been further deve lopm ent within the 'with-versus- 
w ith o u f approach. This involved an extension of the meaning of the 'with-versus- 
w ith o u f situation under which the e ffic iency of Fund-supported program m e has been 
com pared  with that o f situations when the governm ent of an adjusting country 
changed  its policies w ithout any influence from the Fund. The latter could be obta ined 
through simulation of behavioural patterns of ta rgeted  variables under a lternative 
policies. A close examination would ind icate  tha t this is in line with the suggestion (b) of 
Williamson.
The above extension m ay be ca lled a 'comparison-of-simulations' approach  
under which a structural m odel is generally used to perform simulation experiments to 
derive effects of various sets of adjustment policies. This was, thus, a m ove from 
outcom e-based m ethod to a m odel-based m ethod. The most important feature of this 
a pp roach  is its ability to simultaneously cap tu re  the relations am ong major 
m acroeconom ic variables, examine these interactions, and more importantly, to 
analyse the effects of po licy changes on all these variables rather than simply 
examining the overall outcomes from policy changes. Besides, the app roach  is not 
a ffe c te d  by com pletion status of the programmes.
" Following Khan, M.S., we call it a 'Generalised Evaluation Estimator’.
O P .  cit.. Khan, M.S. (1009). p. 204.
*2 O P .  cit.. Goldstein and Montiel (1986), p. 323.
>2 ibid. p. 322.
'•* 5ee. p. (^1) of this chapter.
This was first used by Khan, M.S. and M.D. Knight.
See. Khan, M.S. and M.D. Knight (1981): 'Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries: A Formal 
Framework'. IMF Staff Papers .^ Washington, vol. 28. pp. 1-53.
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There are, however, p ractica l problems involved in the 'com parison-of- 
simulations' approach. The most im portant ones are the problems of 'Lucas critique ' 
and variations in outcomes of a given policy when implem ented within two different 
ambiences.
The preceding discussion emphasises that no single availab le estimation 
m ethod is superior to another in approximating the 'counterfactua ls ’ . Given this, the 
cho ice  of any m ethod would defin itely be influenced by the aim and the constraints 
circumscribing the study, and last but not the least, by the judgm ent of the researchers. 
Section Two: C ho ice  o f M e th o d o lo g y  fo r the  Indian Case Study.
In this section, we discuss in deta il the m ethodologies that have been chosen 
for the purpose of evaluation of India's Stand-By programme experiences during early 
1990s. We have chosen the follow ing tw o alternative approaches, the 'be fore-and- 
a fte r’ and the 'actual-versus-target' approaches.
As noted in the preced ing section, to com pare  programme effectiveness either
(i) w ith w ha t would have occurred in the absence of the programme and /o r (ii) with 
the effectiveness of alternative sets of policies, would have been the most a ttractive  
test. In practice, given the characteristics of the Indian economy, either of these 
counterfactual tests would not be easy to  perform. In the former case, the difficulty 
mainly results from the problem  of choosing an appropriate com parab le  control group 
econom y/econom ies, while in the latter case, the difficulty follows from judgm enta l 
bias follow ing choice  of a lternative sets of policies.
The aim of our present study is to evaluate  the outcomes of the Indian 
stabilisation programme im plem ented during 1991-93 rather than the design and 
effectiveness of the program m e. We have, therefore, chosen two ou tcom e based 
approaches. Our choice for tw o tests also follows the general practice  observed in 
several case studies. Some of the studies, however, have used all of the availab le 
approaches. Besides, for assessment of the effects of stabilisation programmes, based 
on actua l program m e outcomes, it is essential to separate the program m e effects from
" The critique dwells on the fact that parameters in econometric models may not remain invariant to 
changes in the policy regime. Hence, It would be incorrect to treat such parameters as fixed across 
policy simulations.
See. Lucas (1976) and Sargent (1982), pp. 388-89.
Outcomes of a  programme may be different if implemented under the support of international 
financial institutions from that when implemented outside.
the degree  of Im plementation. We wish to a tte m p t the latter with the help of 'a c tu a l- 
versus-target' approach. Subsequently, we would a tte m p t to examine w hether there 
were any significant departures (in either direction) in the observed behaviour of 
im portant m acroeconom ic variables vis-à-vis their respective historical records, or the 
relative change  in observed behaviour is only marginal. For this, we would use the 
'be fo re-and-a fte r' approach.
S pecifica tion  o f Tests,
Let us now  discuss in deta il the modalities of the 'actual-versus-target' and the 'be fore- 
and-a fte r' tests chosen to be carried out.
The 'actual-versus-target' approach involves comparison of observed values'of 
primary ta rge t and interm ediate variables vis-à-vis some benchmark. We define the 
latter as changes in identified variables deem ed feasible (as agreed upon) by the Fund 
and the adjusting country subject to the constraints of restoration of m acroeconom ic 
stability. For our purpose, the former would be the perform ance criteria as outlined in 
the M em oranda (by the Governm ent of India) a t the time of negotiation for a Stand-By 
fac ility  w ith the Fund, 's For the purpose of 'actual-versus-target' evaluation, w e have 
covered  the period 1990-95.
Given the above, we would examine the relative behaviour of the follow ing. 
The ta rgeted  variable would comprise the policy instruments. The policy instrument that 
has been used to ensure m acroeconom ic stability in the Indian stabilisation program m e 
is changes in net dom estic assets of the central bank. Ceilings on net dom estic assets 
and further on its com ponent, net centra l bank cred it to union government (i.e., central) 
have thus been em ployed as implem entation criteria. Accordingly, the observed levels 
of these tw o variables relative to their respective ceilings would be used to appraise the 
nature of com p liance  with the program m e policies.
In addition, we w ould also examine the relative movements in (a) overall 
borrowing requirements of the central government, and (b) net international reserve 
position. 20
See. Government of Indio (1991): Memorandum o f Economic Policies fro 1991-92 & 1992-93. For 
subsequent revision, see. Government of Indio (1992); Revised Memorandum o f Economic Policies for 
1992-93.
A limitation on overall borrowing requirement by the central government ossocioted with o ceiling on 
the net central bonk credit to the central government had been used as a means of controlling the size 
of the fiscal deficit.
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The extent of com p liance  w ith the program m e policies would influence certain 
key objective  (m acroeconom ic) variables. Consequently, a Stand-By program m e 
includes indicative targets for these latter variables. An 'actual-versus-target' estimation 
would, thereby, involve an examination of those indicative targets vis-à-vis the 
corresponding observed behaviour. For our present purpose, we would also a tte m p t an 
exam ination of the observed behaviour of certain objective  m acro variables, vis-à-vis 
their respective ind ica ted  values. These variables would comprise (a) real GDP growth 
rate, (b) rate of growth of inflation, (c) m oney supply growth, (d)external current 
a ccou n t as a ratio of GDP, and various measures of (e) budget defic it as a ratio of GDP, 
and  (f) official reserve position, as emphasised in the two Memoranda.
We define the 'before-an-after' test as change in values of primary target 
variables after the initiation of the stabilisation program m e vis-à-vis the corresponding 
values before the im plem entation of the program m e. To test the im pact of the Stand-By 
program m e, based on the 'be fore-and-a fte r' approach, we would a tte m p t the 
follow ing. (1) A comparison of the behaviour of the Indian econom y after the initiation 
o f the program m e with tha t of its own historical record. This would give us a measure of 
changes in these ta rgeted  variables before and after the im plem entation of the 
program m e. Besides, we would also a ttem p t (2) a comparison of the perform ance of 
the Indian econom y with that of developing economies (as represented by econom ic 
indicators for all developing countries). This is not strictly a ' before-and-after' test. 
Neither it is a 'w ith-versus-withouf test, even though, if properly controlled, it would 
have yielded a 'w ith-versus-withouf result. However, our intention for a ttem pting  the 
la tter type of analysis is broadly to isolate the variations in performance of the Indian 
econom y during the program m e period, i.e., 1991-93, due mainly on a ccou n t of 
changes in the external environment and those tha t followed subsequent to the 
im plem entation of the program m e. 21 This would help us to ascertain how did India fare
As mentioned elsewhere, a stipulated minimum level of net international reserves assumes significance 
within the framework of the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
-' in reality, an accurate identification of these effects would be difficult to arrive at as (a) both the 
factors, i.e., changes in external environment and implementation of stabilisation programme would 
interact upon each other, and |b) the effects of any change in external environment would vary across 
countries. However, we would be able to obtain a broad idea about their independent effects.
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vis-à-vis its own tiistorical behaviour broadly under the influence of the stabilisation 
program m e. The 'be fore-and-a fte r' analysis would cover the time period 1980-93.
Based on the aforesaid specification, w e  would a ttem pt an exam ination of the 
behaviour of certain m acroeconom ic variables, both final and intermediate. The former 
m ay be broadly grouped under (a) external sector indicators comprising various 
measures of external sector viability, such as current account ba lance, resource 
ba lance, basic balance, and overall ba lance  o f India's balance of paym ents (each 
expressed as a ratio of GDP), and (b) dom estic econom ic indicators comprising (i) the 
rate of growth of real GDP, (ii) the rate of growth of inflation, and (iii) the trend in various 
measures of central governm ent budge t de fic it as a ratio of GDP.
The im portant interm ediate variables, as m entioned earlier, would comprise the 
follow ing (a) changes in net domestic assets of the central bank (i.e., the Reserve Bank 
of India), (b) net central bank cred it to the centra l government, and (c) changes in 
international reserve position.
Fund-supported m acroeconom ic adjustment mechanism does influence 
certain other key m acro variables. These are generally not directly ta rgeted. Direct 
m anipulation of these latter are neither deem ed feasible nor desirable. These broadly 
include absorption, investment, m oney supply growth, and export and import growth, 
w hich influence primary ta rge t variables. Hence, an assessment of the im p ac t of 
stabilisation program m e would essentially involve an examination of the trend in 
behaviour of the latter group of interm ediate variables. For our present purpose, we 
would consider the following, changes in (i) agg rega te  absorption, and (ii) fixed 
investment (each expressed as a ratio of GDP), (iii) growth in m oney supply and
(iv)value and volume growth in merchandise exports and imports.
Section Three: Data Sources.
This section provides a deta iled  description of the sources which have been used to 
com pile  data  for the purpose of empirical analysis in this dissertation. The nature of da ta  
requirem ent limits any scope for resorting to primary sources of data collection.
Available data  sources, used, m ay be broadly classified into the follow ing:
(i)national sources, and (ii) international sources.
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In the present dissertation, data  published by the international agencies have 
been used mainly to  com pare  the m acroeconom ic perform ance of India vis-à-vis the 
developing countries chosen a t random.
For the purpose of the main empirical analysis, data  published by the national 
sources have been used. We discuss below  these da ta  sources.
For using the (a) 'be fore-and-after', and the (b) 'actual-versus-target' 
approaches, w e  would  require the following information about the Indian econom y.
I. Data on dom estic econom ic  performance, and II. Data on external econom ic 
perform ance.
I. Data on dom estic econom ic  performance.
These would comprise (a) data  on real econom ic perform ance, both 
m acroeconom ic and sectoral, (b) data  on financial indicators, and (c) da ta  on 
budgetary operations.
Data on real econom ic performance comprise (i) real econom y "da ta ;
(ii)agricultural p roduction da ta ; and (ii) industrial production data.
In respect of m acroeconom ic data, our source of information would be Central 
Statistical Organisation (CSG). The latter would provide information on real GDP, and 
overall and sector-wise composition of fixed investment. International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of the Fund also publishes these data . However, we would use CSC da ta  as it is 
also the source of information for the IFS data. For details on overall and sectoral 
composition of consumption, w e  have used IFS, as this is the only source which publishes 
relevant data  on consumption.
Regarding agricultural production data , our sources of information are
(i) D irectorate of Economics & Statistics, Department of Agricultural & Cooperatives, and
(ii) Ministry of Food^ Of the Governm ent of India. They publish annual data . Besides, we 
have used da ta  published by various relevant Ministries for information on critica l inputs. 
While our source of information for different aspects of industrial production is CSO 
(Industrial Statistical Wing) w hich publishes data  annually in its publication, .Annual 
Survey of Industries.
Data on financia l indicators comprise (i) money and banking data ; (ii) inflation 
da ta ; and (iii) da ta  on adm inistered prices.
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For m oney and banking data , w e have used information published by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Being the apex m onetary institution. It collects, maintains, 
and publishes da ta  on banking variables, while maintains and publishes da ta  on 
m onetary variables. In respect of inflation data, w e  would need data  on WPi and GDP 
deflator. For the former, our only source of information is the Office of the Economic 
Adviser, Ministry of Industry which collects, compiles and publishes data  on WPI, both 
agg rega te  and desegregate; while for the latter our source of information is CSO.
For critical input price da ta  and agricultural production price data , our sources 
o f information are various Ministries.
In respect of da ta  on budgetary operations, w e would require da ta  on a macro 
le v e l regarding central governm ent budgetary operations. These are published by the 
Ministry of Finance, Governm ent of India on an annual basis.
II. Data on External Economic Performance,
Regarding external econom ic performance, we would require information on 
the following: (a) data  on balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves, and 
exchange rate of the rupee, (b) data  on merchandise trade, and (c) data  on external 
deb t.
The RBI is the only source of information in respect of the balance of payments 
and foreign exchange reserves. In respect of the former, the RBI gathers information 
from various primary sources, systematically compiles and subsequently publish these 
da ta , on a quarterly basis, both at an aggrega ted  and a t a desegregated level. 
Besides, the RBI is also the only source of information on foreign exchange reserves 
position. It publishes da ta  on an aggrega ted  level, and also in terms of composition of 
these reserves.
Regarding the exchange rate of the rupee, the RBI is the only source of 
information which publishes the nominal exchange rate of the rupee on a daily basis as 
well as on different levels of aggregation. However, in respect of the nominal e ffective  
exchange rate ( NEER ) and the real effective exchange rate { REER ) of the rupee, the 
Ministry of Finance is the only source of published information, even though the RBI also 
ca lcu lates these. The Ministry of Finance calculates these NEER and REER on a 5- and 10- 
country export w eight basis.
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In respect of da ta  on merchandise trade, there are two sources of information; 
(a) the RBI, and (b) the Director General of Com m ercial Intelligence and Services 
(DGCI&S). Despite recording the same transactions, we could observe a d ifference in 
the amounts reported by these two sources, especially in respect of exports. This mainly 
follows differences in (a) primary da ta  recording process, (b) coverage of non-customs 
d a ta  by the RBI, and (c) the rupee value conversion method. Even though the DGCI&S 
does not cover some of the transactions, w e would use it as our source mainly due to its 
more p ractica l m ethod of data  collection and its m ethod of conversion accord ing  to 
va lue date . Besides, DGCI&S is the only source of information for trade indices.
The sources publishing external deb t statistics a t the national level are;
(a)D epartm ent of Economic Affairs { DEA ), Ministry of Finance, Governm ent of India, 
and (b) the RBI.
Debt statistics relating to external aid, both bilateral and multilateral, da ta  on 
external aid on non-government accounts, and grants data  are m aintained and 
published by the Aid Accounts and Audit Division (AAB) of the DEA. These statistics are 
also published by the RBI. However, as the DEA is the primary source of information, this 
would  be the source of our da ta  on external assistance.
Transactions relating to the IMF are m aintained by the RBI. Besides it also 
publishes these information a t the aggregate  level and this would be our source of 
information. Details about external com m ercial borrowings, a t the agg rega ted  level, 
are published by the RBI alone, even though the External Commercial Borrowings 
Division of the Ministry of Finance also maintains accounts relating to these borrowings.
Besides, deb t statistics relating to banking, other debts, and other short term 
debts are m aintained and published by the RBI only.
For da ta  on econom ic indicators for developing countries, we have used the 
IFS, excep t for (a) final consumption expenditures by function and sector, and (b) gross 
fixed cap ita l formation by kind of activities and sector. For the latter, we have used the 
United Nations Publication, National Accounts Statistics; Main Aggregates and de ta iled  
tables.
The limitations of our data  set briefly are the following. (1) data  for the Indian 
econom ic  perform ance have been co llected  from national sources, while the sources 
for the developing countries are publications by international agencies. Accordingly,
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w e would antic ipa te  some discrepancies due to differences in concepts and 
com plica tion  procedures. (2) Besides, data  for broad money growth (M2) for the 
developing countries are w eighted  average composites. Data for India are, however, 
simple percentage change  of M3. While data  for rate of inflation for the deve loping 
countries are ca lcu la ted  as percentage changes of geom etric averages of consumer 
price indices for individual countries w eighted by U.S. dollar value of their respective 
GDPs over three preced ing years. Data for India, on the other hand, are simple 
percentage changes in wholesale price indices.
Section Four: Limitations.
In this section w e  discuss in detail the limitations of the study w hich arise from 
the choice of the particular methodologies. It m ay be m entioned here tha t these 
limitations are in addition to those described in the concluding chapter.
As m entioned in section one, no single available estimation m ethod is superior 
to another in approximating the 'counte rfactua l'. Given this, our cho ice  has been 
influenced by the aim and the constraints of the present study as a lready discussed in 
section two. Let us now  concentra te  on the limitations emanating from our particular 
choice.
Overall, our approaches are based on partial equilibrium and com parative- 
static analysis. Besides, there are other limitations arising from specific approaches. We 
begin with the 'actual-versus-target' approach. Firstly, this estimation m ethod would 
only measure the extent of adherence to the targets agreed upon by the Indian 
authority and the Fund. Hence, these are not to ^treated as estimates of the 
counterfactuals. This estimation is not a measure of how India's m acroeconom ic 
perform ance was Influenced by the Fund-supported stabilisation program m e. Secondly, 
an important limitation of the 'actual-versus-target' estimation is tha t the basis of 
assessment, i.e., the benchmark. Is conditional upon (a) the app licab ility  and /or 
e ffic iency of the financia l programming m ethod in the Indian context and
(b)negotiators' judgm ent. This would render inadequacy and subjectivity to  our findings.
The im portant m ethodo log ica l shortcomings that are an tic ipa ted  to arise from 
this 'be fore-and-after' estimation may broadly be discussed as under. Firstly, our 
estimation of the 'counterfactua ls ' is dependent on the situation prevailing before  the 
programme. The latter is a facto r generally compelling the authorities of a country to
lo z
o p t for Fund-supported stabilisation programmes. Hence, such a situation m ay not be a 
representative of w ha t could have happened in the absence of the program m e. 
Secondly, w e  have implicitly assumed that the m acroeconom ic outcom es subsequent 
to the im plem entation of the programmes are only the independent effects of the 
program m e and tha t non-programme determinants of these outcomes are either 
unchanged or insignificant. Hence, our estimates of the program m e effects are biased. 
Thirdly, our estimation would also be unsystematic over the time period as w e  have 
assumed aw ay the existence of the specific non-programm e influences of any given 
year on the estimated program m e effects for tha t particular year.
We have a ttem p ted  to  make a correction for the influence of the external non­
program m e factors, through comparison of India's econom ic perform ance with the 
deve loping countries' during the programme period and then obtaining a 'be fo re-and- 
a fter' estimation. However, that only gives us a rough estimate of the external non­
program m e influences. We have not a ttem pted  to m ake any judgm enta l corrections 
for dom estic non-programm e determinants.
In addition to the above m ethodologica l limitations, one im portant ca vea t 
concerns the da ta  coverage. This relates to the analysis involving comparison of India’s 
perform ance vis-à-vis tha t of the developing economies. Data relating to all developing 
countries, in our analysis, also include data  for those countries which have con trac ted  
stabilisation program m e with the Fund and are undergoing the same simultaneously 
with India. There are tw enty such countries (appendix£ /. However, excep t for Brazil, rest 
are very insignificant in terms of their contribution to da ta  relating to all deve loping 
countries. Hence, we have not a ttem pted  to net out da ta  pertaining to those countries 
in order to obta in accurate  details relating to the perform ance of developing countries 
not undergoing any programme. To that extent our result is restrictive.
Section Five: C ho ice  o f Period for the Indian Case Study.
This section deals briefly with the choice  of period under study. The period 
chosen are: (a) a period of five years from 1991 to 1995 for the 'actual-versus-target' 
estimation, and (b) a period of fourteen years from 1980 through 1993, further subdivided 
into first and second halves of the decade  of 1980s, for the 'be fore-and-a fte r' 
estimation. The choice  follows the intentions underlying the use of the particular 
approaches.
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As m entioned in section two, the 'actual-versus-target' app roach  has been 
resorted to for the determ ination of the level o f com p liance  with the program m e 
policies. Our chosen period of study would thus cover the program m e period, i.e., 1991- 
93. However, we have extended our period of analysis over Iwo subsequent years, i.e., 
1994 and 1995. We are interested in the latter in order to examine the durability of the 
specific measures adop ted  by the Indian authority. 22
For 'be fore-and-a fte r' comparison purpose, w e have chosen the 1980s, and 
then divided the whole d eca de  into two sub-periods, (i) the first half of 1980s, i.e., 1980- 
85, and (ii) the second half of 1980, i.e., 1986-90; for co llecting required historical 
information.
This is mainly following changes in behaviour of certain m acroeconom ic 
variables. There has been a change in the econom ic policy stance since the end of the 
d e ca d e  of 1970s, and especially since 1978-79, The aforesaid change  in econom ic 
policy stance implied (a) changes in the co nd uc t of monetary policy, especia lly since 
1985, accom pan ied  by financia l deregulation; (b) a gradual liberalisation in external 
sector po licy mainly through (i) import-substitution policy, (ii) an acce le ra tion  in exports,
(iii) perm itting higher levels of borrowing consistent w ith deb t service ratio, and (iv) a 
gradual liberalisation in the exchange rate regime; (c) flexibility in industrial and foreign 
investment policy through (i) easing of restriction on private enterprises, (ii)liberalisation 
of licensing and im portation of cap ita l goods and other inputs, and (iii) relaxation in the 
rules governing foreign partic ipation in the dom estic critical sectors, especia lly in 
dom estic oil exploration and developm ent; and (d) reorientation o f the fiscal practices, 
especially through restructuring loss-making public enterprises partly w ith the help of 
realistic administered pricing policies. Subsequent to  this, though there has not been 
any perceptib le  change in the overall Indian econom ic structure, we cou ld  notice  a 
definite change  in some m acroeconom ic variables/indicators vis-à-vis their behaviour in 
the earlier decades. For our present purposes, the im portant ones am ong the dom estic
-  Durability involves question of permanence or temporariness of the specific measures adopted for 
restoration of macroeconomic balances. The concept assumes importance if the programme's 
objective is a permanent improvement In the economy. However, evidences indicate that many 
countries in their effort to comply with performance criteria excessively rely on certain macroeconomic 
ceilings. This often leads to the neglect of the durability of specific measures adopted.
Based on idea developed by V. Tanzi in his article 'Fiscal Policy, Growth and Stabilization 
Programs', Finance & Development. June 1987, p. 16.
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C hapte r 4: Stabilisation Program me Perform ance:
An 'A ctual-versus-Target' Assessment.
In this chapter, the results of our investigation on the extent of com p liance  with the 
nego tia te d  program m e measures undertaken by the Indian authorities in the early 1990s will 
be  presented. As m entioned elsewhere, the Governm ent of India initiated stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programmes in July 1991. ’ There were encouraging m acroeconom ic 
deve lopm ents subsequent to the initiation of these programmes. Restoration of 
m acroeconom ic  stability was satisfactory. Developments in the relative estimates of gross 
fiscal d e fic it and on the price front were encouraging, especially during the first year of the 
stabilisation program m e period.
The m acroeconom ic prospects of the Indian economy, subsequent to the 
com p le tion  of the stabilisation program m e appear good, with real output currently growing 
a t above  5 per cent. There are, however, problems w hich continue to a fflic t the Indian 
econom y. For example, there has been a deterioration in the relative estimates of gross 
fiscal d e fic it and in inflation. 2 The balance of payments situation has been pro jected to 
remain critica l despite value growth of exports a t 20 per cent per annum (approx.). Supply 
of essential infrastructure is an tic ipa ted  to remain a critica l constraint. Besides, there has 
been a visible slackening in implem entation of structural adjustment policies.
as m entioned earlier, the objective of the chap te r is to determine the extent of the 
im plem entation of the program m e policies. This will be a ttem p ted  through an examination 
of the ac tua l ach ievem ent of certain objective variables vis-à-vis the corresponding 
perform ance criteria as negotia ted  with the Fund. In addition, an a ttem p t will also be 
m ade  to determ ine the com patib ility  of these perform ance criteria to the targeted 
perform ance in respect of certain im portant macro variables.
The chapter has been organised in the following way. In section one, an outline of 
the perform ance criteria negotia ted  between the Fund and the Indian authorities will be 
presented. Subsequently, the assumed conditions underlying the agreem ent on the 
perform ance criteria will be discussed in this section; while in section two fultillment of the 
perform ance criteria will be analysed. An assessment of the m acroeconom ic perform ance
' As mentioned earlier, this was subsequently supported by the International Monetary Fund.
- 'The Central Government deficit continues to be high and this is reflected in continuing inflationary 
pressures'.
See. Government of India: Economic Survey, 1994-95, ,p. 1.
will be  a ttem p ted  in section three. In this only the ta rge ted  m acroeconom ic indicators will 
be considered. In section four, factors actua lly  underlying the performance, as discussed in 
section tw o above, will be examined. The objective  is to ascertain if there was any 
d ive rgence  betw een factors actua lly  underlying fulfillment of the performance criteria and 
those assumed during the negotiation. Subsequently, the implications of the measures 
a d o p te d  for m acroeconom ic behaviour will be examined. Finally, in section five, main 
findings of the chapter will be summarised.
Section One: An Outline of the  Perform ance Criteria.
The Indian authorities extended their com m itm ent to the pursuance of the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes through observance of some 
stabilisation proposals identified as the perform ance criteria.  ^ These latter proposals are 
in tended to ensure that desired progress in program m e implementation is achieved. 
Fulfillment of these criteria and the consequent success of the programmes rest on certain 
specific conditions assumed by the negotiators. In this section, we discuss about the 
perform ance criteria outlined in India's Letter of Intent to  the Fund. Subsequently, w e would 
discuss the assumptions underlying the negotia tion of these performance criteria.
The above m entioned proposals conta ined both expenditure-reducing and 
expenditure-switching policies. While reduction of fiscal defic it was the principal 
com ponen t of the former; devaluation of the Indian currency was the principal com ponen t 
of the latter. Accordingly, details on dom estic and financial policies were laid down for the 
years 1991-92 and 1992-93.
Performance criteria for the Indian stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
comprised both open- and closed-ended targets. Of these, targets for the dom estic sector 
were set as ceilings, while those for the external sector were set as floors. The former 
comprised
- These are o limited number of indicators the satisfaction of which will govern the country's continuing 
access to the Fund credit.
'  it is a country’s ability to abide by the performance criteria that determines its continuing
access to successive installments of an agreed credit (unless new understandings can be reached) whereas 
failures to carry out other elements of the programme carry no similar sanction.'
See. Killick (ed.) 1984, Quest for Economic StabHsfation, p. 191.
These stabilisation proposals are also essential for any financial commitment from the World Bank 
under its Structural Adjustment Facilities, Sectoral Adjustment Facilities, and other such adjustment facilities.
See. Government of India: Memorandum for Economic Policies for 1991-92 and 1992-93, and Revised 
Memorandum o f Economic Policies for 1992-93.
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(1 ) restrictions on reserve m oney growtti, ne t dom estic assets,  ^ by ttie centra l bank, 
along with a sub-ceiling on the central bank cred it to the central government. There were 
separate ceilings  ^ for net banking sector cred it to general government.  ^vve consider these 
latter ceilings informally suggestive limits.
(2) Restriction on public sector operations through limit on its overall borrowing 
requirement. This has been suggested despite explicit ceilings on letter's borrowing from 
abroad  as well as from the domestic banking sector.
Performance criteria pertaining to the external sector comprised
(1 ) m aintenance of a minimum level of (net) foreign or international o fficial reserves. 
This implied a minimum ba lance  of payments perform ance requirement, especially, the 
level of overall ba lance  of the ba lance of payments position.
(2) Scale of new non-aid flows, as laid down in the Memorandum. These were the 
m inimum levels for further accum ulation of com m ercia l debt. There was, however, no 
explic it mention about the corresponding restriction for the year 1991-92 as India's access to 
the international cap ita l markets was significantly reduced. Inflow of external resources in 
India during 1991-92 mainly took the form of exceptional financing.
The deta iled  tramework for the behaviour of targeted policy variables, as 
m entioned in India's Letter of Intent to the Fund, comprised specific targets for the quarters 
ending O ctober and Decem ber 1991; March, June, September, and Decem ber 1992; and 
M arch 1993.
The ceilings for the year 1991-92 did not imply an absolute decline  ^ in net domestic 
assets, and in central government's overall borrowing requirements relative to the actual 
values for the base period. I.e., end-July 1991, and also the preceding quarter excep t for the 
follow ing exception. The ta rget for the central bank cred it to the central government, for 
the quarter ending March 1992, envisaged an absolute decline in the targeted ceiling vis-à- 
vis tha t for the preceding quarter, and also the actua l value for the base period. The ceilings 
for the year 1991-92, however, did imply a deceleration in the rate of growth of the net
 ^The stock of net domestic assets of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) comprises RBI credit to the government 
and RBI claims on others, the latter consists of claims on banks and commercial sector, less other items (net). 
Other items comprise government currency liabilities and (net) non-monetary liabilities of RBI.
•■■These ceilings were, however, indicative targets for bank credit to general government.
' General government comprises the central government, the states, and Union Territories.
" These levels, both ceilings as well as floors, are not de-seasonalised and hence a projection of absolute 
increase accommodates variations due to seasonality factors also. A projected de-seasonalised value may 
not imply an absolute increase and consequently would imply a further compression in rate of growth.
dom estic assets as well as the rate of growth of the central bank cred it to the central 
governm ent. Simultaneously, net banking sector cred it to  the general governm ent also 
im plied a continued deceleration in the respective rate of growth.
The corresponding ceilings for the year 1992-93 broadly showed similar trends as in
1991-92 both in absolute values and in the rate of growth relative to end-March 1992 and 
the preceding quarter. Exceptions in this respect were absolute increases for the overall 
borrowing requirement of the central governm ent for the quarter ending June 1992, net 
banking sector credit to the general government for the quarter ending M arch 1993, and 
net dom estic cred it creation for the quarter ending September 1992. Increases in the 
absolute level supported the corresponding increase in the relative growth o f these latter 
variables.
Targeted minimum levels for the net official international reserves a t constant 
exchange rate, ’  however, implied a steady build-up during the two years, 1991-92 and
1992-93, except for a decline during the quarters ending December 1991 and M arch 1992; 
and constant growth during the quarters ending September and December, 1992. At 
prevailing exchange rate these targeted minimum levels would have implied an increase in 
value. Outstanding level for short-term external deb t was projected to decline marginally by 
the quarter ending June 1992, relative to the actua l level for quarter ending March 1992, 
and, thereafter, to remain constant a t end-June 1992 level. As mentioned above, there was 
no explicit mention about the provisions for inflows of new  non-concessional borrov/ing 
during 1991-92. However, explanatory note to the (net) official international reserves laid 
dow n the viable borrowing range for gross external resource inflows for the quarters ending 
O ctober and December, 1991, and March 1992. These resource inflows comprised (a) gross 
com m ercia l borrowing by or guaranteed by the public sector, (b) flows under the Issue of 
NRI bonds, (c) short-term deb t of the State Bank o f India, and (d) exceptional financing. 
Accordingly, it may be conc luded  that there were negotiations betw een the indian 
authority and the Fund on fresh accum ulation of external debt. Net accum ulations of these 
Inflows were targeted to remain constant in absolute terms during 1992-93.
As discussed elsewhere, the stabilisation effort incorporated a tw o-pronged 
strategy, restraint on aggrega te  dem and and adjustment of the relative price structure. For -
Valued at end-June 1991 exchange rate.
the former, controlled growth of the reserve m oney was negotia ted as the core 
interm ediate target. Correspondingly, the appropriate  policy instrument was ta rge ted  to be 
changes in the net domestic asset of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The cho ice  was also 
reinforced by the urgent need to arrest and subsequently build up a precarious foreign 
exchange reserves position in the early 1990s.
The stabilisation effort was expected  to improve external balance by an am ount 
equal to changes in the reserve m oney stock over and above the change in the stock of 
the net domestic assets of the RBI, and restore price stability by sterilising changes in the net 
foreign assets through corresponding reverse changes in net domestic assets. The underlying 
arguments were, (I) changes in the liabilities of the RBI are equal to changes in the net 
dom estic assets and the net foreign assets ot the RBI; and (2) total money supply and the 
reserve money are related to each other through a multiplicative com ponent, i.e., m oney 
multiplier. ”
As has been examined in chapter two, large fiscal deficits had been the most 
im portant factor underlying both the internal and the external imbalances throughout the 
1980s, and especially during the latter half of it, in India. It has also been observed that 
changes in public sector spending simultaneously influence fiscal deficit, on the one hand, 
and absorption and hence aggrega te  dem and, on the other. Correspondingly, the 
negotiators envisaged change in the fiscal stimulus as the key variable in adjusting current 
a cco u n t balance, and the level of agg rega te  dem and. The size of fiscal defic it had been 
used as the key indicator for the purpose. 12 Restraint on fiscal deficits had been a ttem p ted  
from financing side. The envisaged association betw een the reserve m oney growth and 
fiscal position of the government has been established using (a) a llocation o f the net 
dom estic assets of the RBI among its components, and (b) association be tw een the 
governm ent budgetary position and the public sector's overall borrowing requirement, on
10 Liabilifies of the RBI are considered to comprise the reserve money or the high-powered money.
11 Money multiplier is o function of the ratio of currency deposits, and the ratio of commercial bank reserves 
to deposits. It is, therefore, partly determined by the public's preference and partly by the central bank 
policies, such as changes in the reserve requirements or the discount rate, that affect the reserve positions of 
banks.
12 Traditionally, the size of fiscal deficit is frequently used as the indicator of fiscal stimulus to aggregate 
demand. The underlying reason is the observed correspondence between changes in the size of the public 
sector deficit and the magnitude of the public sector's stimulus to aggregate demand.
See. I.M.F. (1987): 'Theoretical Aspects of the Design of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs',Occoj/b/7a/ 
Paper No. 55, pp. 26-27.
• ' In the latter relationship, overall borrowing requirement of the public sector, instead of official foreign 
borrowing, has been used. The reason being the fact that certain controlled, or captive nonbank financing 
sources provide a substantial portion of resources to the Indian government.
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the one hand, and the growth of net RBI credit to the central government, on the other. The 
underlying implicit arguments are, (I) changes in RBI's net domestic assets are the sum of 
changes in RBI's cred it to the government, and RBI claims on others; and (2) changes in 
governm ent defic it are the sum of changes in its borrowing from the RBI, and  its other 
borrowings. The latter comprises borrowing from the banking system (net of the RBI), foreign 
borrowing, and dom estic non-bank borrowing.
Based on the above, the negotiators agreed to restrain pub lic sector deficits 
through imposition of ceilings on both the am ount of the net RBI cred it to the centra l 
government, and on the am ount of the overall borrowing requirement o f the central 
government. This was envisaged to yield an e ffective  restraint on the growth of the fiscal 
de fic it in India during im plem entation of the programmes. The latter ceiling was also 
reinforced by the non-availability of restraint on foreign borrowing’ '* as a controlling device  
consequent upon the urgent need to build up official foreign exchange reserves under the 
stabilisation effort.
Another im portant rationale for controlling the growth of the reserve m oney was 
restoration of price stability. This correspondingly rendered endogeneity to inflation within 
the stabilisation framework. Given this, controlled growth of the reserve m oney was 
envisaged to sterilise the inflationary Im pact of po licy instruments resorted to restore 
external balance.
Restoration of external ba lance  had also been a ttem pted  through relative price 
adjustment, i.e., devaluation of the Indian currency. The underlying policy instrument for the 
purpose was m aintenance of a ta rget real exchange rate of the Indian rupee. The latter 
was ensured by the RBI through monitoring perform ance of the (net) international offic ia l 
reserves. Accordingly, the quarterly perform ance criteria for minimal im provem ent or build 
up of the (net) international offic ia l reserves were laid down in the program m e provisions. 
There were projections for the net addition to the RBI's net foreign assets fo llow ing fulfillment 
o f these perform ance criteria. The m onetary im pact of this accum ulation of the ne t foreign 
assets was envisaged to be  neutralised through corresponding com pensatory opposite 
variation in net domestic assets.
Since oil foreign borrowings are virtually guaranteed by the government, increase in total foreign 
indebtedness means increase in government indebtedness.
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The negotiators also implicitly assumed that inflationary situation in India w ould  be 
deve loped  through both the dem and and the cost push factors. The former would  em erge 
through the excess build up of m oney balances follow ing excessive increase in m oney 
supply, which becom es the exchange rate adjustments and prevalence of the rigidities, 
such as trade barriers, e tc., and (b) the introduction of upward adjustments in the charges 
for the services o f various pub lic  utilities. The former would cause dom estic prices to 
increase more than the rates o f increase in exchange rates and international prices of 
traded  goods. Given this, it was envisaged tha t there w ould  be scope for pro longed periods 
of inflationary situation which would consequently crea te  a possible trade o ff betw een 
restoration of external and internal balances and ensuring price stability. It was, therefore, 
agreed tha t this inflationary e ffe c t could be m itigated by limiting the expansion of reserve 
money. Accordingly, ta rgeted  expansion in the reserve m oney was negotia ted  as an 
in term edia te  policy instrument to ensures price stability.
Besides controlling the rate of expansion o f the reserve money, it was envisaged 
tha t the objectives of stabilisation effort would be fac ilita ted  through the fulfillment of the 
minimum perform ance requirem ent for fresh accum ula tion of non-aid external pub lic debt. 
Accordingly, threshold limits w ere incorporated as floors/minimum levels of fresh flows. As 
discussed earlier, these limits were laid down implicitly for the year 1991-92; while they were 
explicitly incorporated within the program m e provision for the year 1992-93. The imposition 
of these limits was also reinforced by the severe scarcity of external financing fo llow ing the 
external econom ic crisis of early 1990s when India had to op t for rescheduling her external 
short-term deb t stock. The program m e provisions also incorporated guidelines on the 
am ount of non-concessional borrowings and respective limits on the maturity composition 
of the net accum ula tion of the above external deb t. These threshold limits on the net 
resource inflows may be treated as the am ount of obta inab le  (net) non-concessional 
external resources. The latter were envisaged required, by the negotiators, for adjustm ent of 
im balances in the econom y during the program m e period.
There were also provisions for the minimum perform ance requirement for (net) 
international official reserves build up. Minimum perform ance requirement for (net) 
international official reserves, within the stabilisation framework also implied a stipulation
For the first time in independent India’s history, the authorities opted for rescheduling external debt stock.
regarding minimum requirements for external current a ccou n t perform ance. Im provem ent 
in the latter was a ttem p ted  through relative price adjustments, especia lly through 
exchange rate devaluation in early 1990s. The underlying policy instrument for the purpose 
was a ta rge t real exchange rate of the Indian Rupee. The RBI was thus defend ing  a real 
exchange rate ta rge t through monitoring perform ance of (net) international o fficial 
reserves. A quarterly perform ance ta rge t for the latter was accord ingly used as a m onitor for 
ensuring appropriateness of necessary relative price adjustment, i.e., exchange rate 
adjustment.
Assumptions underlying nego tia tion  on Perform ance Criteria,
Projected success in satisfying these criteria was based on three crucia l assumptions 
by the Indian authorities as well as the Fund.
(I) First, it was envisaged tha t e ffective  restraint on aggrega te  dem and could be 
exercised through reduction of fiscal deficit. Accordingly, relative estimate of gross fiscal 
de fic it of the central governm ent was assumed to decline. Targeted adjustm ent in gross 
fiscal de fic it was pro jected to be 1.93 per cen t of GDP.
Governm ent borrowing from the RBI was envisaged with emphasis on a decline in 
this dependence . Accordingly, the rate of growth of net central bank cred it to the central 
governm ent was ta rgeted  to grow  only marginally by the end of the first and second 
quarters following end of March 1992. During 1992-93, the com parab le  rote of growth was 
ta rge ted  to be marginally higher for the quarter ending June 1992, and thereafter a relative 
decline  for the rest of the period.
Accordingly, a deta iled plan of fiscal policy was laid down. This mainly included a 
tw o-pronged policy comprising an increase in governm ent revenue and a decline in 
governm ent expenditure during the program m e period. Increases in governm ent revenue 
was p lanned through imposition of add itiona l tax measures, both d irect and indirect, 
intensification of existing tax measures, as well as generation of add itiona l non-tax revenue 
from the p lanned divestment of shares of a number of public sector enterprises to the 
m utual funds. Besides, add itiona l revenue was also expected  to be generated  from a 
contribution by the Oil Coordination C om m ittee from its surplus accounts follow ing upward
'*■ Exchange rate of the Indian Rupee was devalued by about 18-19 per cent in two-stage adjustments in July 
1991. Subsequently, it was envisaged that the appropriate relevant measure would focus on more frequent 
adjustment of the Rupee. As discussed in section five of chapter 2, this relative price adjustment measure was 
supplemented by trade liberalisation measures.
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adjustm ent of domestic prices of petroleum. It was pro jected  that revenue w ou ld  increase 
by over I percentage point o f GDP, an am ount of Rs. 6,156.55 crore, in 1991-92 vis-à-vis 1990- 
91. Of this increase, the share of (a) additionally imposed and intensified existing tax 
measures would accoun t for 0.47 per cen t of GDP, i.e., Rs. 3,078.28 crore, (b) d ivestm ent of 
shares of public sector enterprises would accoun t for 0.4 per cent of GDP and am ounted to 
Rs. 2,462.62 crore, and (c) surplus from Oil Coordination Committee to a c c o u n t for the 
remainder with an estimated contribution of Rs. 800 crore.
Reduction in public spending was pro jected following lower expenditure on 
subsidies, moderation in de fence  spending, decline in central government net transfer to 
the public sector, most no tab ly to the central public sector enterprises, and restraint on 
other current and cap ita l spending. Total expenditures and net lending were ta rge ted  to 
decline by about 1 percen tage  point of GDP. Component-wise, (a) lower expenditures on 
major subsidy payments were estimated to result in savings of resources, besides savings 
from (b) reduction in budgetary support to central public enterprises, and (c) other restraints, 
on current and cap ita l expenditures. Upward adjustments in prices of public sector output 
were also expected to conta in  current expenditure.
For the year 1992-93, the same trend of projections were m ade for reductions in 
gross fiscal defic it of the centra l governm ent as in 1991-92.
(2) The second assumption related to foreign resource inflow on an increased scale, 
vis-à-vis the previous year.
Normal external resource flow  was expected  to deteriorate substantially during 
1991-92 mainly because of the curta ilm ent in India's access to international ca p ita l markets 
and outflow  of non-resident deposits and short-term capita l. The reserve build up for the 
year 1991-92 was thus assumed to be accom plished through inflow of exceptional financing 
mainly from drawings under the various Fund facilities, and additional financing  from 
multilateral and bilateral sources. ”  Besides exceptional financing, the negotiators also
An example of current spending cut is to effect the reduction through budgetary provision for the 
departmental undertakings. At the level of departments, no additional budgetary provision had been 
projected in order to meet inflation indexation In respect of the salaries of public sector enterprises' 
employees. Any such increase was projected to be financed from savings on the undertakings' own other 
expenditures.
' • Especially, CCFF drawing, and purchases under the Stand-By arrangement.
Multilateral and bilateral sources, such as financing from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
as well as additional and quick disbursing support from the Asian Development Bank and other bilateral 
donors.
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envisaged gradual revival o f inflow under NRI bonds follow ing introduction o f tw o  new 
schemes, 20 (j)fhe India D evelopm ent Bonds launched by the State Bank of India for non­
resident Indians and their overseas corporate  bodies, (OCBs) and (ii) The Remittances In 
Foreign Exchange (Immunities) Scheme, during the second half of 1991-92.
However, for the year 1992-93, the ta rget for inflow from exceptional financing was 
set a t a lower target^ -  ' vis-à-vis tha t for 1991-92, as a result of an increase of a bou t 57 
per cent, 21 in cap ita l a cco u n t mainly following a m oderate  reversal of previous year's net 
outflow  of non-resident deposits, increased borrowing from issues of NRI Bonds, some 
increase in normal aid disbursements, and a reversal in net short-term flows.
(3) The third crucial assumption related to m onetary authority's ca p a c ity  to sterilise 
foreign resource inflow in excess of targeted/desired scale. The stabilisation proposals 
envisaged an inflow of foreign resources both for building up official foreign exchange 
reserves and also for supplem enting foreign resource requirements. However, there was 
im plic it restriction on fresh accum ula tion  of foreign indebtedness. This was evident in the 
program m e provision of com pensatory adjustment in official foreign exchange reserves 
position by specified am ount over and above the ta rgeted  scale of foreign resources. Any 
such adjustment has an e ffe c t o f unantic ipatedly increasing the monetary base of an 
econom y. Thus any increase In net foreign assets of the RBI would lead to an increased 
m oney supply, if the former is not sterilised. This would ultimately generate price instability 
given tha t inflation has been considered as an endogenous variable within the Indian 
stabilisation proposals as discussed earlier. Accordingly, the program m e provision 
incorporated required corresponding adjustment of net domestic assets of the RBI. This was 
assumed to sterilise the im p ac t of increased net foreign assets on the Indian m onetary base. 
The assumption was crucia l for realisation of controlled growth of reserve m oney during 
im plem entation of the programmes in the early 1990s.
Section Two: Fulfillment o f th e  Perform ance Criteria.
2 0  stale Bank of India launched its India Development Bonds on October 1, 1991. These bonds have a five- 
year maturity period and are denominated in US dollars and Pound Sterling. The dollar bonds carry an 
interest rate of 9.5 per cent and the sterling bonds 13.25 per cent. They ore freely transferable among 
NRIs/OCBs as also among Indian residents who receive them as gifts from the former. These bonds are also 
free from income, wealth, and gift taxes in India. While, under The Remittances in Foreign Exchange 
(Immunities) Scheme, the sources of funds, purpose and the nature of remittances would not be subject to 
scrutiny under the exchange control regulations and Direct Tax Laws. However, any income received by the 
person on the remitted amount would be subject to income tax.
See. Government of India: Economic Survey, 1991-92, Part II, p. 77.
The improvement though appear significant was in fact, due to a lower base for the preceding year.
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In this section, w e discuss status on ach ievem ent of the perform ance criteria as 
nego tia ted  w ith the Bretton Woods Institutions. This would be based on assessment of actua l 
perform ance in respect of certa in policy instruments relative to the envisaged perform ance. 
Our discussion would begin with an assessment of relative perform ance of m onetary 
variables fo llow ed by tha t of borrowing indicators. Tables 4.2.1 (a). 4.2.1 (b), and 4.2.2(a). 
4.2.2(b) provide details on ta rgeted  and actua l perform ance of in respect of the monetary 
and borrowing indicators, respectively.
We begin with an initial observation that the experience was one w ith mixed
success.
Tables 4.2.1 fa) and 4.2.1(b) p resent the ta rgeted and the actua l perform ance in 
respect o f the m onetary variables, both domestic as well as external, for 1991-92 and 1992- 
93.
Ceilings for net domestic assets 22 (NDA) of the RBI were fulfilled by a large margin in 
1991-92. Of the sources contributing to this achievem ent, net bank cred it to governm ent 
expanded a t a much lower pace, by 12.9 per cent, in 1991-92 relative to 19.7 per cen t in
1990-91. This decline was more noticeab le  in net RBI cred it to the central government. In 
terms of year-end figures also, the latter was lower in 1991-92 vis-à-vis 1990-91.
Fulfillment of the corresponding perform ance criterion in 1992-93 was, however, 
m uch less pronounced. This occurred along with . a much pronounced expansion in net 
dom estic assets of the RBI, and a decline, for the second consecutive years, in the growth in 
net bank cred it to the centra l government. This m oderate perform ance mainly fo llowed an 
expansion of claims on com m ercia l and cooperative  banks. This expansion in claims was as 
m uch as 93.7 per cen t relative to -49.0 per cent in 1991-92. The latter increased following 
increased RBI accom m oda tion  of banks for reviving industry and agriculture, reduction in 
statutory liquidity ratio, and w ithdrawal of incremental cash reserve ratio.
Im provem ent in perform ance could also be noticed  in net RBI cred it to the central 
governm ent during the program m e period. The latter, which is traditionally regarded as the 
most im portant source of growth of m oney supply in India, declined considerably. Expansion
“  The stock of net domestic assets of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) comprises RBI credit to the government 
and RBI claims on others, the latter comprising banks and commercial sector, less other items (net). The latter 
item comprises government currency liabilities and (net) non-monetary liabilities of RBI.
of net RBI cred it to  the centre was 6.3 per ce n t in 1991-92, which subsequently declined 
further to 4.6 per cen t in 1992-93.
However, similar trend, as in net dom estic asset of the RBI, could not be witnessed in 
respect of ceilings 23 for bank cred it to general governm ent during the program m e period. 
For 1991-92. actua l perform ance exceeded the ta rge t overall expansion by 2.1 per cent, 
while for 1992-93, violation was to the extent of 4.4 per cent. During the second year, 
however, ceiling could be fulfilled during first quarter by a large margin. Thereafter, actua l 
perform ance continued to fall short, a t an increasing pace , of the targeted expansion.
Following im plem entation of the stand-by and structural adjustment programmes, 
the econom y witnessed an increase in its foreign exchange reserve position a t the end of 
the first year. Quarterly perform ance criteria, for net official international reserve, were 
fulfilled by a large margin during 1991-92, which, however, could not be m et during 1992-93. 
A ctua l accum ulation continued to fall short of the ta rge ted  level, a t a steadily deteriorating 
pace , during first three quarters. The trend, however, reversed during last quarter. For year- 
end actua l level, shortfall was a bou t 83 per cen t vis-à-vis targeted level.
Based on measures relative to months of imports, level of accum ulation, as a t end- 
M arch 1992, was equal to abou t 6 months of imports vis-à-vis about 3 months of imports as 
a t corresponding preceding da te . C om parab le  accum ula tion during 1992-93 was slightly 
lower a t 5.80 months of imports. When a lloca ted  into its components, reserve position would 
appea r as under.
As at end-M arch (Amount in US $ Million)
Items 1991 1992 1993
1) Foreign Currency Assets 2236 5631 6434
2) SDR Holdings 102 90 18
3) Gold® 3496 3499 3380
T ota l 5834 222Q 9832
g): Gold has been valued at SDR 35 per troy ounce till October 16, 1990, 
and close to international market price thereafter.
Component-wise, accum ula tion  of foreign currency assets increased by 151.8 per 
ce n t as a t end-March 1992 relative to end-M arch 1991 level, while SDR holdings 
deteriorated by -11.8 per cent, and gold holdings improved by 0.09 per cent. Corresponding
These ceilings were, however, specification of indicative target for bank credit to general government.
ratios for end-M arch 1993 were 14.26 per cent, -80.0 per cent, and -3.40 per cent, 
respectively.
The trend, as discussed above, is entirely in consistence with outcom e of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions-supported programmes. It is c la im ed, by the proponents of these 
programmes, that follow ing the initiation of stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes, an econom y would experience stable Im provem ent in its foreign exchange 
reserves position. 2-» The latter follows an inflow of foreign resources into a program m e 
im plem enting econom y. Given this, a further exam ination of nature of im provem ent in 
India's foreign exchange reserve position would, however, reveal a different situation.
Tables 4.2.2(a) and 4.2.2(b) present targeted and actua l borrowing perform ance, 
both  internal and external, including external deb t build-up during 1991-92 through 1992-93.
Specific ceilings were set for expansion of overall borrowing liabilities, comprising 
internal and external liabilities, of the central governm ent during three quarters o f 1991-92 
and also during 1992-93. Actua l overall borrowing da ta  ind icate the non-fulfillment by the 
centra l government, of the ta rge t for corresponding quarterly targets. The former was 
m oderately higher, by abou t 4.5 per cent, than w hat was targeted as a t end-M arch 1992. 
Same trend could be witnessed in respect of actua l perform ance by end-M arch 1993. The 
perform ance, however, worsened during the latter period, when the former fell short of the 
latter by 20 per cent.
For new com m ercia l d e b t accum ulation, both medium- and long-term maturity, as 
well as for outstanding short-term debt, quarterly floors were outlined for 1992-93 only.
Actua l perform ance on short-term deb t outstanding was considerably satisfactory 
when it was higher by abou t 70 per cen t over the ta rgeted  expansion. The former a t US $ 
3,382 million, was much higher than that targeted, US $ 2,000 million, for the quarter ending 
M arch 1993.
We do not have com parab le  data  for actua l performance of new gross non­
com m ercia l flows. Hence, w e  are not in a position to  com m ent about respective actua l 
perform ance vis-à-vis targets or nature of relevant program m e implem entation. However, 
da ta  derived from outstanding 25 information, ind icate  that targets for non-concessional
This Is due to the catalytic effect.
-- Outstanding comprises inflow which already took place before programme was initiated and yet to be 
paid back. This provides with a rough Indication of net inflow.
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d e b t accum ula tion  cou ld  not be fulfilled by a considerably large margin. Actual 
perform ance was lower by 57 per cen t relative to ta rge ted  inflow.
The fo llow ing presents status of im plem entation of the stabilisation measures.
Stabilisation Measures
I. M one ta ry  Targets
(1} N et Dom estic Assets o f 
the  RBI
{2} N et ce n tra l bank c re d it 
to  the  ce n tra l
(3) N et bank c re d it to  the  
genera l G overnm ent
(4) N et o ffic ia l in te rna tiona l 
reserves
II. Borrowing Targets
(1) O vera ll borrow ing  
requ irem en t o f the  o f
the
ce n tra l gov t.
(2) External d e b t a ccu m u la  
tion
(a) N ew  non-concessiona l 
m ed ium -and  long-te rm  
d e b t
(b) Short-term d e b t 
ou ts tand ing
Target fu lfilled or no t 
Yes 
Yes 
No
Fulfilled during 1991-92, but 
fell short of during 1992-93.
No
By w h a t m arg in . 
Substantially large margin. 
Substantially large margin. 
M oderately large margin. 
Substantially large margin.
M oderately large margin.
Yes
No
Substantially large margin. 
Substantially large margin.
The above  analysis confirms our initial observation tha t the experience in respect of
the degree  of im plem entation of the programmes is one with mixed success.
Section Three: M a c ro e c o n o m ic  Perform ance: Discussion on the 
Targeted  versus Observed Behaviour.
In this section, w e a tte m p t an assessment of actua l m acroeconom ic perform ance
vis-à-vis respective targets. The latter are outlined in programme provisions for key
m acroeconom ic  objectives for the period 1991-92 and 1992-93. Subsequently, w e  would
discuss these perform ance during 1993-94 through 1994-95.
Given the observed behaviour of policy instruments, as discussed in section two
th eabove, the ob jec tive  of this section is to examine available evidence on ^extent of 
association be tw een program m e implem entation and perform ance of ta rge t variables.
Our initial observation is tha t m acroeconom ic perform ance in the early 1990s 
ind ica te  no clear cu t ou tcom e  regarding association betw een degree of program m e 
im plem entation and the results achieved. Our conclusions, in this chapter, are based on 
relative perform ance of ob jective  variables, both final and interm ediate. Relevant 
information is summarised in Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. This would be fo llowed by a discussion 
on major features of the observed outcom e.
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Actua l m acroeconom ic outcomes in 1991-92 and 1992-93 m ay be discussed along 
tw o  broad lines, (a) variables which were in line w ith both  years' ta rgeted performance, 
and  (b) variables which fell short of respective ta rge ted  outcom e.
The former comprise relative estimates of gross fiscal defic it and external current 
a cco u n t deficit, rate of growth of reserve money, and rate of accum ula tion of official 
foreign exchange reserve. Of these, rate of accum ula tion  of official foreign exchange 
reserve registered a percentage growth tha t far exceeded  corresponding targets for 1991- 
92 and 1992-93. The relevant program m e targets were, however, the thresholds for 
conce rned  variable. Accordingly, an inverse m ovem ent would not have ind icated  a 
positive perform ance.
The latter comprise rate of growth of output (real) and inflation; rate of m onetary 
expansion, especially broad m oney and 5-weekly average of reserve money; and relative 
measures of overall public sector deficit, and gross o ffic ia l reserves. 2?
The p ace  of monetary expansion, especially M3, in 1991-92, was considerably 
higher. It increased by 18.5 per cent vis-à-vis 15.1 per ce n t in the preceding year. This 
expansion was considerably higher than the desired expansion of 13 per cen t and despite 
fulfillm ent of targets for net domestic assets o f the RBI.
All com ponents of M3 experienced relatively higher pace  of expansion in 1991-92. 
The most striking being the case of dem and deposits, w hich increased by 32.7 per cent vis- 
à-vis 14.7 per cen t in 1990-91. Net foreign exchange assets of the banking sector 28 also 
registered sizable expansion, 105.4 per cen t in 1991-92 vis-à-vis a reduction by 68.8 per cen t 
during 1990-91.
Broad m oney expansion was an ou tcom e of growth of domestic primary liquidity. 
This resulted partly from the persistence of high fortnightly levels of net RBI cred it to the 
centra l governm ent during 1991-92. (Table 4.3.21. This high level of average monetised 
d e fic it had significant im pac t on growth of liquidity. 2? This also led to an acce le ra ted  pace
Refers to end-period. However, inflation target was fulfilled during 1992-93.
Relative to months of imports. Gross Includes SDR holdings and gold, valued at SDR 35 per ounce.
Excluding revaluation of gold.
Net government credit from the centrai bank increases liquidity of commercial banks in some degree 
except in the limiting case where there is no rise in bank deposits at ail. Hence, net government credit from 
the central bank results in equal increase in private sector bank deposits and currency in circulation token 
together. To the extent that bank deposits rise, banking liquidity is increased because rise in deposits is 
matched by an equal rise in banks' cash reserves. The deposits are created by transfers of money from the 
central bank.
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of 5-weekly average of reserve m oney growth. Domestic primary liquidity also fo llowed a 
reduced  expansion in net non-m onetary liabilities of the RBI. im portant facto r
contributing to the latter had been the exchange loss incurred by the RBI due to 
w ithd raw al/renew a l of FCNR deposits.
Broad m oney expansion during 1992-93 was, however, lower relative to increase in
1991-92. Component-w ise, there were lower than envisaged increases in net RBI cred it to 
the centre  and modest accretion in net foreign exchange assets of the RBI. Net foreign 
exchange assets of the banking sector also declined during most of the year. Subsequent to 
revaluations of these assets in March 1993, However, 'o ther deposits' registered 
considerable volume growth on reporting Fridays during first three quarters. This followed 
deposits by financia l institutions of their surplus fund follow ing strict enforcem ent of ban on 
ready forward transactions in securities. This phenomenon, however, m oderated in the last 
quarter of the year after Repo auctions in government securities were introduced.
Actua l accum ulations of gross official reserves, in terms of months of imports, were 
substantially lower than the target. Considering earlier interpretation, actua l gross reserves 
fell far short of the targeted level.
In the following, actua l perform ance of the Indian econom y during post- 
Stabilisation period has also been reviewed. The purpose is to have a broad idea about 
underlying com m itm ent towards m acroeconom ic m anagem ent following significant 
deterioration in econom ic perform ance in 1980s. ^2
The econom y perform ed satisfactorily in respect of all the variables, excep t for gross 
fiscal d e fic it and rate of inflation, despite relaxation of controls, i.e., perform ance criteria 
during 1993-94 and 1994-95. Real output growth rate improved marginally in 1992-93 and
1993-94, after a considerable fall in 1991-92, and subsequently reached its 1990-91 3^ level in
1994-95.
Expansion of non-monetary liabilities has a contractionary impact on money supply.
At market rates, following the unification of exchange rates.
Alternatively, the improvement in economic performance, during the programme period could follow the 
imposition of mandatory performance criteria. Violation of the latter during the programme period 
customarily results In suspension of borrowing country's accessibility to Fund's Stand-By facility. Financial 
assistance under the latter was required by the Indian authority to avert a failure to honour external debt 
commitment.
'■* Which was 5.4 per cent.
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However, as m entioned above, this satisfactory performance was accom pan ied  by 
failure in conta in ing relative measure of gross fiscal de fic it and the inflationary trend. There 
was perceptib le  deterioration in relevant perform ance during the above two years.
In terms of containing inflationary trend, econom ic perform ance was not 
satisfactory. Inflationary pressure was accen tua ted  by (a) broad m oney (M3) growth, and
(b) exchange rate adjustments in early July 1991. The latter was expected to lead to an 
increase in im port costs thus contributing to cost escalation in import-intensive industries. 
However, due to shortage of adequate  information, w e are not in a position to discuss the 
im p ac t of rise in import price on inflationary situation in India.
As discussed earlier, M3 grew a t a rate substantially above its desired growth path 
and also a t a rate higher than real output growth. Accordingly, the ratio of m oney supply to 
GDP registered an increasing trend. This growth/trend in M3 exerted significant influence on 
inflationary situation a la quantity theory effect. Simultaneously, price situation also 
registered a similar trend, thus confirming the observation that in the Indian context, there 
exists a stable relationship betw een the overall price level and systematic variation in 
m oney supply relative to output growth. This is evident from the table below.
(in %, unless ofherwise stated)
Period WPI Real GDP M3 M3/Rea! GDPlin
ratio)
1990-91 10.3 5.4 15.3 1.3
1991-92 13.7 0.9 19.4 1.5
1992-93 10.5 4.0 14.2 1.7
The surge in inflationary situation was, however, m oderated during the latter phase 
of the stabilisation effort, even though the ta rge t for the rate of growth of inflation was not 
fulfilled in 1992-93. A number of factors contributed in moderation of the inflationary 
situation. Am ong these, the im portant ones were the moderation of m oney supply, (i.e., 
slower growth in M3), and improvement in overall supply position. The latter was 
strengthened through a relatively better agricultural production and import of foodgrains 
and other allied products, and a considerably improved performance in the industrial 
sector.
M acroeconom ic perform ance under stabilisation effort has the follow ing main 
features.
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(1) Im provem ent in current account position was ach ieved  with no increase in import 
controls and notwithstanding a rise in oil import bill, and an unantic ipated foodgrains 
imports.
(2) M onetary expansions during 1991-92 were characterised by a striking accelera tion in 
liquid ity growth. Main components were, large accre tion  to foreign exchange assets of the 
banking sector; persistence of high fortnightly levels of net RBI cred it to the central 
governm ent during 1991-92; and reduced expansion in net non-monetary liabilities of the 
RBI.
Foreign exchange assets of the banking sector accum ula ted  a t an acce lera ted  
p a c e  in sharp contrast to a massive loss of such assets in 1990-91.
(3) Scheduled com m ercia l banks' operations during the year 1991-92 were characterised 
by (a) a phenom enal increase in aggregate deposits, especially dem and deposits, and (b) 
a no ticeab ly  low  growth of overall bank credit.
(4) Inflationary perform ance during 1991-92 further accen tua ted . As m entioned earlier, 
despite the fulfillment of net domestic assets by large margin, as well as a considerable 
decline  in gross fiscal deficits, targets relating to inflation rate were not fulfilled. This could 
be  a ttributab le  partly to certain macro-level imbalances as discussed earlier and partly to a 
num ber of sectoral developments.
Section Four: Im plications o f Stabilisation Measures for M acroe con om ic  Goals.
The discussion in sections two and three above  highlighted that the experience in 
respect of achievem ent of performance criteria was one of mixed success. Actual 
stabilisation perform ance depends upon (a) the nature of measures adop ted  by the 
program m e implementing country's authority for realisation of overall stabilisation goals; 
and (b) interaction between measures adopted  and unforeseen exogenous developments. 
Given this, the underlying nature of the Indian stabilisation experience requires further 
discussion. In this section, w e would a ttem pt a discussion on underlying implications of
‘•‘Accumulafion of net foreign exchange assets has an effect of increasing banking liquidity. This is possible 
due to the extent receipt of these assets cause a rise in bank deposits there will be an equal rise in 
commercial banks' cash reserves if foreign assets have been sold to the central bank. In the Indian context, 
commercial banks were obligated to sell any foreign exchange receipt in the centrai bank under the foreign 
exchange regulation act which was in effect until January 1993.
•‘‘This has not only a direct restrictive influence on money but, in some circumstances, may cause a 
secondary contraction in bank lending to the private sector through reduction in cash ratio.
ac tua l achievem ent of perform ance criteria tor realisation ot targeted m acroeconom ic 
stabilisation objectives.
As mentioned earlier, within the Indian stabilisation framework, internal ba lan ce  was 
sought to be achieved through agg rega te  dem and m anagem ent, especiallv, agg rega te  
pub lic  sector dem and m anagem ent. The ind icator used for the purpose was reduction in 
relative measure? of gross fiscai defic it as public sector deficits were the major source of 
internal imbalances. Stabilisation efforts considerably improved relative measures of fiscal 
deficits. (Table below).
Table; Measures of Deficits of the Central Government 
(as % of GDP)
Year Gross Fiscal Deficits Revenue Deficits
1980-85 6.26 1.11.
1985-90 8.21 2.58
1990-91 8.39 3.49
1991-92 5.90 2.64
1992-93 5.69 2.63
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Reporf, 1993-94.
Both gross fiscal deficits and revenue deficits were reduced during 1991-92 and
1992-93 vis-à-vis 1990-91. This decline was, however, more pronounced for gross fiscal 
deficits. For revenue deficits, the decline being less than one percentage point was 
marginal. Fiowever, relative to 1980s, the latter was higher. The factors underlying this 
ou tcom e were (1 ) increase in revenues, and (2) decline in non-interest expenditure.
The current receipts of the centre increased during the period under consideration, 
both in nominal value and as a ratio of GDP. (Table below). This growth was primarily due to 
an increase in non-tax revenue. Tax revenues, however, have increased only m arginally over 
the period.
m
Table: Centre's Revenue Receipts 
Items/Years As a % of GDP Annual Growth Rote
1990-91
1. Tax Revenue (net of States’ 8.1 15.1
Share}
2. Non-Tax Revenues 2.6 -6.8
3. Total Current Revenues 10.7 8.7
1991-92
1. Tax Revenues (net of States’ 8.1 11.6
share)
2. Non-Tax Revenues 2.9 19.9
3. Total Current Revenues 11.1 14.7
1992-93
1. Tax Revenue (net of States' 8.3 17.4
Share)
2. Non-Tax Revenues 3.3 30.4
3. Total Current Revenues 11.5 18.7
Source: Economic Survey, 1993-94, p. 18.
The second com ponen t which fac ilita ted  decline of fiscal deficits was non-interest
expenditure, (table below). Major elements of this decline comprised consumption
expenditure, especially defence; subsidies; and gross cap ita l formation, especia lly financial
assets, loans and equity, of the centres; and other miscellaneous expenditure.
As may be observed, grants to States rem ained constant as a proportion of GDP
and expenditure on physical assets increased only marginally. As interest payments
increased over the adjustment period, the reduction in fiscal defic it was smaller by this
am ount com pared to the primary deficit.
Table: Economic Classification of Total Expenditure of Central Government
(as % of GDP)
Items 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
1. Consumption Expd. 4.2 4.0 3.9
(a) Defence 2.9 2.6 2.5
(b) Other govt. admn. 1.3 1.3 1.4
2. Transfer Payments 
(current)
(a) Interest Payments 3.7 4.1 4.3
(b) Subsidies 2.0 1.7 1.4
(c) Grants to States & UTs 1.4 1.4 1.4
(d) Others 1.3 1.2 1.2
3. Gross Capital 
formation out of 
budgetary resources
(a) Physical Assets 1.6 1.5 1.7
(b) Financial Assets 5.0 4.2 3.8
4. Others 0.5 0.3 0.4
5. Total expenditure 19.7 18.3 18.1
Source: Economic Survey, 1993-94, p. 20.
Given this, we would a ttem p t an analysis of the budgetary developm ents under the 
following, (a) gross cap ita l formation, (b) nature of growth in non-tax revenues, and (c) 
reduction in monetised deficits. We begin w ith an observation tha t the underlying 
imbalances in fiscal practices did not undergo any perceptib le  change despite apparen t 
reduction in relative measures of fiscal deficits.
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(a) Gross C apita l Formation and Savings,
Table be low  shows that gross dissavings of fhe governm ent declined continuously
over the period 1990-91 to 1992-93. The former was, however, accom pan ied  by a decline  in
gross cap ita l formation, out of budgetary resources over the two years period of
m acroeconom ic stabilisation and adjustment. This trend of gross cap ita l fo rm ation is,
however, in conform ity with stabilisation and adjustment experiences.
Table: Capital Formation and Savings by the Central Government 
(as % of GDP)
Items 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
1. gross Capital 6.6 5.7 5.5
Formation out of
budgetary resources
(i) Gross capital 1.6 1.5 1.7
formation by the Central
govt.
|ii) Financial assistance 5.0 4.2 3.8
for capital formation in 
the rest of the economy
2. Gross savings of the -2.0 -1.3 -0.8
Central Govt.
3. Gap (1-2) 8.6 7.0 6.3
(b) Nature of Non-Tax Revenue,
Even though w e do not have accurate  details about the composition o f to ta l non­
tax revenue, the Letter of Intent provides us with information about major sources of 
im provem ent in current revenues. Major com ponent of this increase in revenues was 
substantial increase in non-tax revenues. Increase in non-tax revenues was considerably 
improved through contribution from two ad-hoc provisions, viz., (a) divestm ent of shares in 
public sector units, and (b) contribution from Oil Coordination Com m ittee (OCC) surplus. 
Contribution from the former accoun ted  for about one-fourth of tota l non tax revenues in
1991-92 and more than a-tenth in 1992-93. While contribution from the OCC was a b o u t 1 per 
cen t of non-tax revenues in 1992-93. In this dissertation w e  would not evaluate the im p ac t of 
divestment and surplus from the OCC on the central government's asset position or the 
im pact of alternative uses of these resources. Instead, w e are interested in assessing the 
im plicit size of gross fiscal deficits. W ithout these components, tota l non-tax revenue w ould 
have had a growth of 1.12 per cen t in 1991-92 and 42. 36 per cen t in 1992-93. As a per cen t 
of GDP, this would have implied a share of 1.68 per cen t and 2.10 per cen t of GDP in 1991-92 
and 1992-93, respectively. This, implied only an im provem ent of 0.19 per ce n t o f GDP over 
the two years vis-à-vis 0.70 per cen t as shown by gross improvement. Correspondingly, gross
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fiscal deficits would have equaled 7.12 per cen t in 1991-92 and 6.89 per cent, relative to 
5.90 per cen t and 5.69 per cent, respectively.
Year Total non-Tax Revenue Disinvestment Contribution from OCC
1990-91 2.60 - -
1991-92 2.90 23.07 -1.44
1992-93 3.30 11.48 0.27 (projected)
Note: (a) Total non-tax revenue is a  proportion of GDP; (b) disinvestment an d  contribution from O C C  are proportions of 
total non-tax revenues.
(c) Nature of Reductions in the Monetised Deficits,
Ratio of monetised deficits 6^ declined significantly during the period relative to 
1980s and 1990-91. (Table below).
Year
Monetised
Table; Trend in Monetised Deficits/Deficit Financing 
(as % of GDP)
1980-85 1985-90 1990-91 1991-92
2.2 2.3 2.8 0.9
1992-93 
0.8
Deficits
Source: Economic Survey. 1993-94, p. 15.
Fiowever, these are only year-end ratios. The tw o significant aspects underlying this 
reduction in government's resort to defic it financing were (a) large fluctuations in fortnightly 
level for budge t deficits, and (b) RBi accom m oda tion  through sale of dated  securities under 
repurchase agreements.
It was observed in the past tha t net RBi cred it to  the centre stayed high during the 
year only to be reduced sharply a t the year-end. The same trend was evident during the 
tw o years period. (Table below).
Table: Centre's Fortnightly Budget Deficits according to RBI Records.
(Rs. Crore)
Fiscal Year 1992-93 1991-92 1990-91
First Quarter (April/June) 8082 7337 6187
Second Quarter 13157 12137 10068
(July/September)
Third Quarter (Oct/Dec) 11835 13622 12803
Fourth Quarter 14647 14114 14554
(Jan/March)
March 31 12757 6492 1 1430
Fiscal Year Averages’ 11811 11508 10818
Coeff. of Variations 2580 5947 3201
©: This is the average  of all fortnightly figures of bu dget deficit of the central governm ent and the figures for M arch  31, 
after the closure of governm ent accounts.
Source; RBI Annual report, 1992-93, p. 37.
The fortnightly averages of budge t deficits for each  quarter deviated from the full- 
year average and especially sharply from end-M arch level. Besides, the coe ffic ien t of
"The monetised deficit is the increase in net RBI credit to the Central Government, which is the sum total of 
the net increase in fhe holdings of Treasury Bills of the RBI and its contribution to the market borrowings of the 
Government.
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variations stayed a t a tiig ti level especially for the year 1991-92. Subsequently, however, the 
latter estimate declined considerably for the year 1992-93. The im p ac t o f this large 
fluctuations could be observed in 5-weekly average for the reserve m oney and hence in 
price situations.
The other im portant aspect relates to RBI accom m odation  through sales of da ted  
securities from its portfolio under repurchase agreements as shown below.
Table: Auctions of Repos, 1992-93.
Quarters Reoo Period of One Dov Repo period of Two dovs
Third Quarter
No. of Bids Accepted 68 49
Total face Value of Bids Accepted 11325 8295
(Rs. Crore)
Fourth Quarter
No. of Bids Accepted 221 40
Total Face Value of Bids 40119 8897
Accepted (Rs. Crore)
Source: RBI Annual report, various issues.
Net RBI cred it to the centra l governm ent as shown by ratio of monetised deficits, 
does not capture  the real liquidity im pac t during 1992-93, since there took p lace  
considerable am ount of sales of governm ent securities from RBI's portfolio on Repo basis 
since December 1992. The RBI conducted  large auctions for central governm ent do ted  
securities from time to tim e with the back up of liquidity through the repurchase facility. If a 
w eighted  average of Repo transactions is considered, the expansion in net RBI cred it to the 
centre would be significantly higher to about Rs. 8634 crore, a rise of abou t 56.75 per cen t 
com pared with a decline by -1.96 per cent.
The stabilisation efforts a im ed a t restoring external sector ba lance  w hich  m eant 
achieving a ba lance of payments surplus or a t least a sustainable de fic it over the whole 
period of the program m e. This was a ttem p ted  through exchange rate adjustments. Thus, 
periodic adjustments were linked to movements in balance of payments perform ance. The 
ba lance  of payments test used was a com m itm ent to ensure that (net) o ffic ia l international 
reserves would not fall be low  agreed minimum level.
As discussed earlier, the experience regarding fulfillment of perform ance criteria for 
(net) official international reserves was a mixed one. Quarterly perform ance criteria were 
fulfilled by a large margin during first year. Relevant achievem ent during first year of the 
program m e is entirely in consistence with the emphasised outcom e of Bretton Woods 
Institutions-supported programmes. In the Indian context, however, im provem ent in (net) 
reserves position deteriora ted subsequently when perform ance criteria could not be  fulfilled
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for fhe first three quarters of the second year since the initiation of the program m e. Given 
this, a further exam ination of nature of im provem ent in India's official international reserves 
position would, however, reveal a d ifferent outcom e.
The com m itm ent to the im provem ent in the (net) official international reserves 
position was ineffective. The (net) official international reserves position could be  Improved 
by (a) a tem porary reversal in trade balance, and (b) a com bination of nom inal valuation 
change of gold  and large external borrowing. The former did not imply any lasting 
im provem ent in trade accoun t. This is evident from the following discussion w hich w ou ld  be 
subsequently fo llow ed by a discussion on the latter aspect.
The most im portant contributory facto r in ba lance  of payments im provem ent was a 
relative decline in imports during 1991-92. The latter grew  a t a relative rate of -19.4 per cent 
following (i) severe import compression measures, (ii) curtailm ent of pub lic  sector 
investment, (ill) sluggish growth in industrial production, and (Iv) a decline in value growth of 
petroleum, oil, and petroleum  products. The com parab le  growth in 1992-93 was higher by 
abou t 32 per ce n t vis-à-vis 1990-91 following a reversal in growth of im port com ponents, 
rem oval/w ithdraw al of im port compression measures, and shortfall in dom estic production 
of oil. This reversal in trend cou ld  be witnessed in use of (net) official international reserves 
excluding special factors in 1992-93. Besides, the im provem ent was not accom pa n ie d  by 
im provem ent in export perform ance. Thus, the underlying external sector im balances did 
not undergo any change  follow ing im plem entation of stabilisation proposals.
Much of the im provem ent in (net) reserves position resulted from nom inal value 
changes of gold  holdings. 7^ The latter was an ou tcom e of revaluation of go ld  holdings a t 
closer to international m arket prices. The extent of the im pact of revaluation was 85.3 per 
cen t and 87.9 per cen t of improvement, respectively, in 1991-92 and 1992-93. Excluding gold 
revaluation, foreign exchange reserves position would have implied an im provem ent o f 18.8 
per ce n t only in 1991-92. Corresponding estimation for 1992-93 would have implied a 
dece leration by -81.2 per cent.
Besides, there Is also a discernible difference in the nature of foreign resource Inflow 
in the Indian case. Im provem ent in holdings of foreign currency assets was an ou tcom e  of
•‘7 Following the practice of valuing gold either at the standard Fund practice of SDR 35 per troy ounce or at 
international market prices 
Effective form October 6, 1990.
J2.S)
the following, (i) exceptional financing, (ii) introduction of special schemes in order to 
a ttra c t inflows from non-resident Indians abroad, and (iii) provision of specia l banking 
facilities. Items (ii) and (Hi) toge ther contributed a bo u t 27 per cent, while accom m o da ting  
finance from multilateral and bilateral donors, under item  (i), contributed a bo u t 30 per cen t 
of change  In 1991-92. Corresponding proportions for 1992-93 were 128 per ce n t and 77 per 
cent, respectively. Net of these special transactions, there would have been an 
im provem ent of US $ 666 million in foreign currency assets position in 1991-92, and a decline 
a t US $ -1,711 million in 1992-93. This is presented in tab le  below.
Table: Factors affecting Movement in 
Foreign Currency Assets '
(Amount In US $)
1991-92
Items 1991-92 1992-93
I. Changes in Foreign Currency 3395 803
Assets (Gross)
II. Special Factors
(a) Exceptional Financing* 1000 826
(b) Transactions with IMF (net) 790 1063
SDR transactions affecting
Foreign Currency Assets
(c) Other Schemes 939 625
FC(BO)D 304 350
FCNRA -1611 86
NRI Bonds & Other Deposit 9 0
Indian Development Bonds 1374 189
Immunity Schemes 863 0
III. Changes in Foreign Currency 666 -1711
Assets excluding special 
factors
* Comprising aid receipts from Asian D evelopm ent Bank, World bank, a n d  various ottier bilateral donors.
FC(BO)D: Foreign Currency (Bank & Other) Deposits. FCNRA: Foreign Currency non-Resident Accounts. NRI: Non-Resident 
Indians.
Im pact of m acroeconom ic stabilisation efforts on inflow of foreign resources thus 
did not imply any stable im provem ent in the Indian context in early 1990. The salient 
features of this im provem ent in foreign resources inflows are the following, (i) Inflows which 
w ere mainly accom m oda ting , such as exceptional financing. Resources were mainly 
a ccom m o da te d , by the multilateral and bilateral donors, (a) to avoid any paym ent default, 
and (b) to help the Indian authorities to continue pursuance of stabilisation and structural 
adjustm ent programme, (ii) Inflows which are purely tem porary or only one-tim e transfers, 
such as inflows under the Immunity Scheme in 1991-93 in India. Net inflows under the latter 
was nil during 1992-93. (iii) Com m ercia l borrowings under special schemes, such as India
In terms of Section 3(1) (a) of the RBI Act, 'The Remittances in Foreign Exchange (Immunities) Scheme, 1991 ' 
was formulated by the RBI under which a one-time transfer of funds to India was permitted on a non- 
repatriable basis.
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D evelopm ent Bonds. M agnitude o f Inflows under the latter did not ind icate  restoration of 
India's cred it worthiness in international ca p ita l markets. Instead, these resources were 
rece ived from special categories of investors. Besides, these latter inflows implied an 
exorb itant deb t service obligations over a m edium -term  with (a) a very high rate of interests, 
9.5 per cen t per annum for Dollar denom ina ted  Bonds, and 13.25 per cen t per annum for 
Sterling denom inated Bonds; and (b) repatriation fac ility  on maturation, 5 years from the 
da te  o f allotm ent. Inflows under this schem e, e ffective ly  implied considerable add ition to 
existing deb t burden over a m edium -term . This is contrary to the rationale of ceiling on fresh 
accum ula tion  of non-aid resources as incorpora ted  in the Memorandum. Last bu t not the 
least are the (iv) inflows under various non-resident deposits schemes. These inflows are 
susceptible to changes in investor's expecta tion  a b o u t an econom y and availab ility of 
better opportunities elsewhere in the world. Hence, these are highly volatile. As 
substantiated by the Indian experience, these inflows could impose unexpected and 
sudden large burden on foreign exchange reserves position.
Besides the above implications, Indian stabilisation and adjustment experiences 
also highlighted mutuai con flic t in program m e provisions. The latter aspect was particularly 
ev iden t in inflation perform ance. The latter was unsatisfactorv, particularly in 1991-92, 
despite fulfillment of cred it ceilings by large margins and decline in gross fiscal deficits. This 
unsatisfactory perform ance could  be attributed to certa in sectoral developm ents besides 
m acro-level imbalances as discussed in section three.
Administered prices of certa in critica l fac to r inputs were raised as a part of 
stabilisation and structural adjustm ent programmes. These latter comprised coal, petroleum 
products, crude oil, fertilisers, electric ity, non-ferrous metals (other than aluminium). The 
underlying objective  was to curtail centra l governm ent's current consumption expenditure, 
in the form of subsidies to the pub lic  sector enterprises. As mentioned earlier, sizeable 
presence of public sector in p roduction frequently gave  rise to fiscai disequilibrium as the 
centra l governm ent in India absorbed, from the outset, ail prastatals' cap ita l losses. These 
la tter losses have been increasing over the years correspondingly raising the m agnitude of
The Stale Bank of India, a premier commercial bank, was permitted to issue India Development Bonds, 
under Section 5(1 ) (a) of the RBI Act. Originally, these Bonds wereissued in US dollar at a rate of Interest of 9.5 
per cent per annum, and subsequently also issued in Pound Sterling at the rate of 13.25 per cent per annum, 
for a  maturity period of 5 years from the date of allotment. These Bonds have full repatriation facilities for both 
interest as well as principal.
centra! governm ent subsidies. Lack of adjustment in administered prices, whose production 
are entrusted w ith pub lic  sector enterprises has been one of the im portan t factors 
underlying this latter phenom enon. Correspondingly, the prices of these adm inistered items 
were raised during the first year follow ing the initiation of the programmes i.e., 1991-92, and 
was continued in 1992-93.
These administered items are intermediate and essential inputs. Raising of these 
adm inistered prices had im pacted  both directly and indirectly upon the inflationary 
situation. Directly, such rise influenced the wholesale price indices within the same period 
w ithout any time lag. This m ay be explained by a share of administered items am ounting to 
13.61 per ce n t w e igh t in Wholesale Price Indices (WPI). including fertilisers and non-ferrous 
metals, ‘'2 the share increases to  15.93 per cent. This is presented in the tab le  below .
Variations in Wholesale Prices of selected administered items 
during 1991-92 and 1992-93.
Items
1991-92,
Weight WPI Inflation Share in inflation 
in WPI
Administered
items
15.93 12.22 12.16 13.06
1. Petroleum 
crude natural 
gas
4.27 1.91 1.87 0.31
2. Petroleum 
products
6.67 9.23 18.03 4.03
3. Coal a 27.42 3.09 3.39.
4. Electricity 2.74 13.73 7.56 3.09
5. Fertilisers 1.75 28.76 34.88 1.92
6. Non-ferrous
metals
1992-93,
0.57 9.67 7.46 0.62
Administered
items
15.93 12.41 14.06 23.02
1. Petroleum 
crude& natural 
gas
4.27 1.87 19.36 0.53
2. Petroleum 
products
6.67 18.84 1.96 15.26
3. Coal 1.26 12.72 17.91 3.10
4. Electricity 2.74 9.81 37.46 4.26
5. Fertilisers 1.75 43.97 34.88 7.98
6. Non-ferrous 
metals
0.57 5.89 7.46 0.79
Goods with administered prices and fertilisers and non-ferrous metals, on the whole, 
registered an increase in prices equal to 12.22 per cen t vis-à-vis 1990-91. However, the share 
of increase in prices of administered goods only in overall inflationary situation was about 1 0  
per ce n t o f the increase in general price level in 1991-92 and including fertilisers and non- 
ferrous metals, 13.04 per cent. C om parable figures for 1992-93 were 11.66 per cent, 12.41 per 
cent, and 23.02 per cent, respectively. Of these, fertilisers prices recorded a steep increase 
in 1991-92 due to a phased reduction in subsidies on fertilisers.
•^ ‘Wholesale Price Indices are calculated using a weighted average method, where weights are assigned to 
each commodity.
-'-fertilisers and non-ferrous metals do not constitute administered items. However, for our present purpose, 
we have included these two items as they are of considerable importance in input structure.
■'■'Wholesale Price Indices are calculated using a weighted average method, where weights are assigned to 
each commodity.
Indirectly, these administered prices transmit their im pact through cost-push effects. 
These administered items being critical intermediate inputs, any rise in their prices is not 
absorbed by the actua l/in itia l suppliers, instead these are autom atica lly transferred to  the 
users of these inputs.
While it is difficult to work out the to ta l ind irect im pact of any rise in these 
adm inistered prices, we would be able to estimate the im pact o f this increase on 
adm inistered agricultural prices. The Government of India announces each season 
procurem ent/support prices for im portant agricultural commodities taking into accoun t 
several re levant factors of which changes in input prices are significant. These agricultural 
com m odities accoun t for 13.57 per cen t in WPI w e igh tage  arrangement. Correspondingly, 
an increase in former prices would raise overall price level as could be observed in Indian 
situation during 1991-92 and 1992-93. (Table below).
Variations in Wholesale prices of selected commodities 
during the years 1991-92 and 1992-93.
Items with 
Procurement/Sup 
port Prices
1991-92.
Weight in WPi WPI Inflation Share in Inflation
1. Foodgrains (P) 7.92 24.02 -1.62 14.35
(i) Cereals |P) 6.82 26.89 -1.95 13.43
(a) Rice (P) 3.69 30.72 4.92 8.17
( b ) Wheat ( P ) 2.25 12.30 -7.03 2.18
(ii) Pulses (M) 
2.Non-Food Articles
1.09 9.41 0.51 0.91
(i) Fibres (M & S) 1.79 14.39 -20.26 2.00
(ii) Oilseeds (M) 
1992-93.
3.86 4.67 -9.57 1.47
1. Foodgrains (P) 7.92 -1.93 11.58 -2.43
(i) Cereals (P) 6.82 -2.73 7.36 -2.94
(a) Rice (P) 6.82 -2.73 7.36 -2.94
(b) Wheat (P) 3.69 -0.20 6.94 -0.12
(ii) Pulses (M)
2.Non-Food Articles
2.25 2.65 8.08 0.90
(i) Fibres (M and S) 1.79 -10.46 45.82 -2.82
(ii) Oilseeds (M)
P : Procurem ent prices.
3.86
M  : Minimum prices. S
-8.71 
; Support prices.
6.96 -4.87
The above table presents the direct im pact of increase in procurem ent/m inim um  
/support prices on WPI and subsequently in inflationary situation during 1991-92 and 1992-93.
Increases in procurem ent prices would be fo llowed by increases in issue prices of 
foodgrains released through the public distribution system in order to conta in subsidies. A 
sharp increase in procurem ent prices of cereals and the consequent rise in their issue prices
'‘•‘The commodities at present covered for the fixation of procurement/minimum support prices include, seven 
cereals, four pulses, seven oilseeds, and four cash crops.
‘The minimum support prices for khariff cereals, coarse cereals, pulses, oilseeds, and  cotton for the 1991-92 season have
b e e n  fixed based o n  the 30 per cen t increase in the prices of fertilizer this y e a r ’.
See. Economic Survey 1991-92 Part Ii Sectoral Developments, p.51.
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also set the trends for open market prices and hence for a higher p ace  o f growth in 
inflationary situation. These prices, however, do not constitute WPI, rather they are 
constituents of consumer price index (CPI). For our present purpose, we have considered 
only WPI, hence we have not d e a lt with trends in CPI during the period under consideration. 
Briefly, however, it m ay be m entioned tha t CPI also witnessed rapid growth during the 
period under consideration.
Section Five: Conclusion.
Evaluation based on the ‘actuahversus-targef approach indicates a mixed 
ou tcom e in respect of the im plem entation of the proposals. Some of the po licy variables, 
such as net domestic assets of the central bank, the requirement of maintaining a minimum 
level of foreign exchange reserves, have been fulfilled by a large margin during both the 
years under consideration. However, achievem ent in respect of the latter, as an im plicit 
ind icator of required scale o f ba lance  of payments operations, is a qualified one as has 
a lready been discussed in section four above. The policy variables in respect of which the 
targets could not be ach ieved  were (i) overall borrowing requirements of the central 
government, and (ii) ta rge t for net bank cred it to the general government. The latter, 
however, was not incorporated as a perform ance criterion. Instead, it was an ind icative  
target.
There are, also, contradictions in Indian stabilisation experiences in early 1990s. 
Despite fulfillment of im portant perform ance criteria, w e  observed in section tw o that 
m acroeconom ic perform ance was not entirely satisfactory. External sector im balances 
cou ld  be restored within a short time period. However, as in other country experiences, 
there was a trade off betw een domestic econom ic growth (as measured by growth of real 
GDP) and restoration of external sector balances.
Curtailment of rate o f growth of inflation was one of the im portant proposals. 
However, broad m oney growth could  not be restrained due to reasons beyond the scope of 
program m e provisions. Consequently, price situations could not be controlled satisfactorily, 
a t least during the first year. Besides, restoration of budgetary balance could be  ach ieved 
during the two years period through restraining aggregate  public sector dem and  and 
correspondingly reducing gross fiscal deficits.
The nature of developm ents underlying the above successes and failures, as 
a ttem p ted  in section four, sets forth a different story. First of all, following considerable
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emphasis on reduction of fiscal stimulus to aggregate  dem and through restraint on gross 
fiscal deficits, the authorities were successful in bringing the latter down within the targeted 
level. However, as revealed by our discussion in section four, this im provem ent d id  not result 
into desired nature of improvement. Especially, the structural imbalances inherent in fiscal 
practices, such as continued accelera tion in revenue deficits of the centra l government, 
decline in public savings, and covert resort to internal d e b t by central governm ent and 
corresponding increase in d e b t accum ulation continued to persist. Thus budgetary 
practices deteriorated once stabilisation programme im plem entation was over. Secondly, 
underlying large accum ula tion of (net) official international reserves is an entirely different 
situation. Structural imbalances within the external sector continued to prevail. Whatever 
ba lance  of payments im provem ent took place, it was through suppression of import 
dem and and curta ilm ent of output growth. No sustainable im provem ent in terms of export 
growth did take p lace. Besides, an agreem ent with international financial institutions, such 
as IMF and the World Bank, fa iled to produce any ca ta ly tic  e ffect. The latter d id not appea l 
as a 'seal of approval' to private cap ita l lenders. Correspondingly, (net) resource transfers in 
the form of d irect and portfolio equity and other portfolio investments did not grow  keeping 
p ace  w ith an tic ipa ted  resource transfers.
Also the stabilisation provisions conta ined measures which turned out to be mutually 
conflic ting with certain m acroeconom ic objectives. Some of the administered prices, 
especia lly of critica l facto r inputs, were raised follow ing the im plem entation of the 
program m e. The underlying objective  was to reduce budgetary deficits through reduction 
of centra l governm ent subsidies to the public sector enterprises and thus raising letter's 
perform ance. The measure had two additional effects, (a) On the one hand, it increased 
budge ta ry  provisions for supporting agricultural producers, and (b) on the other, aggravated  
the inflationary situations. Accordingly, w e observed a smaller than an tic ipa ted  reductions 
in non-deve lopm enta l expenditures, and also inflationary objective  of the stabilisation effort 
was not fulfilled a t least in the first year. Besides, the program m e provisions did not contain 
all comprehensive approach  to contain money supply. Consequently, there was broad 
m oney growth higher than provisioned.
It is, however, im portant to note that the link betw een the program m e policies and 
the consequent m acroeconom ic change is not very tight, well defined, or predictable . 
There are several other factors, as well as d irect or indirect linkages, which m ake it d ifficult
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to p red ic t the net im pac t of any multi-instrument po licy package , such as Stand-By and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes. This latter aspect has been highlighted by our discussion 
on the trends in the m acroeconom ic performance during 1991-92 and 1992-93.
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Table 4.3.2 : Fortnightly Levels of net RBI Credit 
to Central Government.
Period/Fortnight 1990-91
(Amount in Rs. crore ) 
1991-92 1992-93
1 2712 2427 3847
2 4050 3269 6522
3 4994 3962 5229
4 7058 6764 7218
5 6907 7534 7985
6 7463 9607 7192
7 7703 9168 3912
8 9883 11165 9193
9 8185 10580 8113
10 9018 10759 7872
11 6543 10303 5657
12 8209 11029 7236
13 7269 8890 5512
14 9245 10445 4723
15 10241 11866 6424
16 10438 9564 7111
17 12476 12418 9110
18 12978 13117 9549
19 15159 15830 10744
20 13029 9812 1450
21 15055 14979 8725
22 14621 13961 9065
23 15447 15305 9441
24 15107 14454 8773
25 16064 12485 4254
26 14486 10425 2262
March 31, 1746 5508 4257
C hapte r 5: Stabilisation Program m e Perform ance:
A 'B e fo re -and -A fte r' Evaluation.
In this chapter, w e present results of our a tte m p t to evaluate the stabilisation efforts 
in India. We observed in the preced ing chap ter th a t achievem ent of the stabilisation 
proposals was a mixed one. Besides, w e also discussed impacts of various measures 
im plem ented during the Stand-By and Structural Adjustment Programmes period on 
realisation of stabilisation objectives. Given this, our present effort would involve a relative 
assessment of actua l econom ic ach ievem ent during the programme period. For this, we 
would  use 'be fore-and-a fte r' test.
The chapter, accordingly, aims a t determ ining whether im plem entation of 
programmes policies has m ade any significant or m arginal contribution in m acroeconom ic 
perform ance vis-à-vis respective trend behaviour. We, therefore, would dea l with 
m agnitude  and direction of relative perform ance in respect of certain m acro variables 
chosen for the purpose.
We define the 'be fore-and-a fte r' test primarily as change in values of variables after 
initiation of a stabilisation program m e vis-à-vis corresponding values before im plem entation 
o f the program m e. These observed values w ould  be for two specific time periods within the 
' before-and-after' framework. Besides, in our 'be fore-and-a fte r' evaluation, w e  would also 
consider observed behaviour of certain selected m acroeconom ic determinants. These 
latter variables are normally not considered as primary targets during program m e 
formulation. However, within a m acroeconom ic framework, a stabilisation program m e 
w ould an tic ipa ted ly  influence these latter variables which, in turn, w ould  influence 
realisation of targeted m acroeconom ic objectives (or performance of primary targets) 
significantly. Accordingly, w e would also analyse observed behaviour o f the former. Our 
analysis would cover the period 1980-93.
The chap ter has been organised along the follow ing lines. In section one, w e  would 
exam ine the observed behaviour of certa in im portant variables. Subsequently, in section 
tw o w e would a ttem p t a decom position of trends in key elements underlying external 
current accoun t perform ance. In section three, w e  would a ttem pt a counterfactua l 
evaluation of Indian m acro stabilisation experiences in early 1990s. In this, w e would use 
experiences of developing countries as our counterfactua l argument. While section four 
concludes the chapter.
Section One: M a c ro e co n o m ic  Perform ance vis-à-vis the  respective past trend  .
In this section, w e  a tte m p t an evaluation of the m acroeconom ic perform ance vis- 
à-vis corresponding m acroeconom ic trend in the Indian econom y prior to  the 
im plem entation of stabilisation programmes. As m entioned earlier, we cover the time 
period 1980-93 which also includes the two accounting  years, 1991-92 and 1992-93 after the 
initiation of the program m e.
The cho ice  variables m ay broadly be d ivided into two: (a) external sector 
indicators, and (b) dom estic econom ic indicators. The former comprises (i) value and 
volume growth of imports and exports, (ii) changes in various relative measures of ba lance  
of payments indicators, and (iii) m ovem ent in foreign exchange reserves. While the latter 
comprises (i) general econom ic indicators, (ii) price indicators, and (iii) indicators for fiscal 
po licy practices by the centra l government.
External Econom ic Perform ance,
Relative to the respective historical record, India's external econom ic recovery in 
the first year after initiation o f stabilisation and adjustment programmes had been strongly 
positive, while tha t for the second year had been a mixed one. (Table 5 1.1).
The main ta rge t variable, ratio of current accoun t balance to GDP, recorded the 
most noticeab le  im provem ent in external econom ic performance when it declined  from a 
de fic it of 3.24 per cent in 1990-91 to  0.36 per cen t in 1991 -92. Subsequently, however, current 
a cco u n t ba lance deteriorated to a ratio of 1.82 per cen t In 1992-93.
Table: Ratio of Current Account Deficit 
(os o % of GDP)
Year Ratio
1980-85 -1.33
1985-90 +0.72
1990-91 -3.24
1991-92 -0.36
1992-93 -1.82 
Note: A positive value indicates a  surplus.
This post-programme perform ance In the first year, though was an im provem ent 
over first half of the 1980s, fa iled to  register any im provem ent in performance relative to the 
later half of the decade . (Table above). While the perform ance in the second year clearly 
indicates a deterioration relative to tha t observed during the two halves of the 1980s.
Underlying this current a ccou n t perform ance were a favourable developm ents in 
resource ba lance  during the period under consideration. The importance of the latter, in the 
context of current stabilisation effort has been underlined by the emphasis on provision of
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incentives for im provem ent of export and import perform ance through readjustment of 
existing resources and production as between tradable  and non-tradable sectors of the 
econom y. Current a ccou n t perform ance could, therefore, mostly be explained through 
developm ents in resource ba lance.
Following im plem entation of the programmes, there was a significant im provem ent 
in resource ba lance. The ratio reached a level of -1.05 per cent in 1991-92. This significant 
im provem ent in resource ba lance, supplemented by inflow of private rem ittances ’ on a 
large scale, resulted in further im provem ent in ratio of current accoun t ba lance  during 1991- 
92, as discussed earlier. The im provem ent in resource ba lance  ratio fared considerably well 
vis-à-vis corresponding ratios in the 1980s, the respective values were -2.73 per ce n t and - 
3.16 per cent.
This improved perform ance, however, could not be sustained during 1992-93. 
C om parab le  perform ance deteriorated in 1992-93. to -2.01 per cent. Despite this 
deterioration, relative to  ratios of resource balance during the first and second halves of 
1980s and with 1990-91, the former indicates an im provement in perform ance.
Expectedly, the fa c to r tha t contributed most significantly in the im provem ent in 
ta rge ted  ba lance  of payments perform ance indicator was significant decline in imports  ^
during 1991-92. Subsequent to em ergence of econom ic crisis in early 1990s, the authorities 
imposed severe import compression measures fo llowed by negative industrial sector 
growth. Even though these termer controls were phased out following initiation of the 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes,  ^ negative growth in industrial production 
fac ilita ted  an im provem ent in resource balance through continued depression in import 
dem and during 1991-92 a ided  by normal time lags in importing. However, a reversal in 
growth in im port in 1992-93 relative to 1991-92 resulted in deterioration in resource balance.
Relative to the first and second halves of 1980s as well as the year 1990-91, w e m ay 
observe a significant im provem ent in import value performance during the first year after 
the Initiation of the program m e.
I The enormous increase in the private remittances in 1991-92, despite disruption in normal economic activity 
in the Middle East and the consequent loss of sources of private remittances by the migrant Indian workers, 
was an ad-hoc spurt in transfers encouraged by prevalent political and economic uncertainty in the Gulf 
region rather than an improvement in the source of private transfer earnings.
- Value growth derived form current US dollar value of imports during the respective years.
•' All controls were withdrawn effective from February 12, 1992. Hence, the year 1991-92 virtually had 49 days 
without import controls.
‘‘ The growth rate is calculated as average for the period.
IW
Table: Import Value Growtti, 1980-93,
(in per cent)
Period Growth Rates
1980-85 9.81
1985-90 8.48
1990-91 13.5
1991-92 -19.4
1992-93 12.7
The above developments, however, did not ind ica te  any change in im port pattern 
fo llow ing im plem entation of stabilisation and adjustment programmes. The tab le  below  
instead indicates that a tem porary reversal of trend in some of the components contributed 
to the improved perform ance in 1991-92. Thus, (a) there was a sizeable decline in value 
growth of cap ita l goods as well as other non-essential imports, supplem ented by (b) a 
dece le ra tion  in growth in value of petroleum, petroleum  products, and related items of 
imports mainly following a stabilisation of the price of crude oil and petroleum products 
around their trend values rather than restraint on consumption or increase in domestic 
production  capacity . The former was a result of (i) severe import compression measures 
imposed by the Indian authorities as m entioned earlier, (ii) reduction in public sector 
consumption of cap ita l goods, (iii) sluggish growth in industrial production, and (iv) a 
substantial decline jeconom ic growth.
Table : Growth of Imports : India, 1980-81 to 1992-93.
(average *annual rate of increase)
Period Total Imports Oil Imports Capital Goods Others
Imports
1980/81-84/85 9.81 -9.33 7.72 4.54
1985/86-89/90 8.48 10.48 11.91 8.84
1990-91 13.50 6.00 10.30 0.41
1991-92 -19.40 -11.02 -27.40 -19.60
1992-93 12.70 13.70 7.00 14.60
* Rates are in per cent, current US $ price.
Our observation about trend in import was corroborated by developm ents in 1992- 
93, when there was an increase in imports. Despite continued im plem entation of 
expenditure switching and reducing measures, value of imports grew by 12.7 per cent in
1992-93 vis-à-vis 1991-92. When com pared with corresponding perform ance during the 
1980s, the perform ance in 1992-93 implied a significant deterioration. However, relative to 
the perform ance of 1990-91, the value growth of imports in 1992-93, ind icated a marginal 
im provem ent. Thus, the basic imbalances in the external sector did not improve follow ing 
im plem entation of the programmes. Thé following also supports our above observation.
We have a ttem pted  to quantify the im pact of Import savings, defined as savings 
resulting from changes in propensity to import as measured by changes in coefficients of
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various categories of imports,  ^ Our analysis is based on the assumption tha t resources for 
p roduction of domestic substitutes were drawn either out o f existing unutilised productive 
c a p a c ity  or substitution from domestic goods sector. This, therefore, implies tha t import 
rep lacem ent does not take p lace  a t the cost of actua l or potentia l export activities. *
The coeffic ient of variation of oil import coe ffic ien t was large, while tha t for cap ita l 
goods and other Imports were relatively small during the period under consideration. (Table 
below). Given this, adjustment through expenditure switching was expected  mainly from 
latter two categories of imports.
Import Coefficients during 1980-93: Indio.
Period Oil Import Capital good Imports Other Imports
1980-91 0.018 0.086 0.040
1991-92 0.021 0.076 0.039
1992-93 0.024 0.087 0.047
Coefficient of variations 0.446 0.107 0.089
of the import
coefficients, 1980-93
Our observation was supported by implied im port rep lacem ent  ^ e ffe c t under the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes of early 1990s.
1991-92 1992-93
Import replacement -1.057 -1.063
Oil 0.181 0.212
Capital goods 0.005 0.482
Other imports -1.243 -1.757
Note : Positive value means import additions.
Following adoption of expenditure switching and expenditure reducing policies, 
there was some Import replacem ent. Flowever, any positive import rep lacem ent effect, 
from oil import would not be expected  over a short-run. The table above presents positive 
values for oil import rep lacem ent e ffe c t during both the years under consideration.
Import substitution of other imports during the two years 1991-92 and 1992-93 was 
the main contributory factors. Stabilisation efforts, therefore, were d irected towards import 
rep lacem ent of items, the relative prices of which did not, in fact, contribute significantly in 
the em ergence of external econom ic crisis. The positive rep lacem ent e ffe c t from other 
imports was the result of forced savings following fall in absorption capac ity . ® C apita l
'• Import coefficients ore measured by relating the volume of imports to either volume of ( real ) fixed 
investment or (real) absorption depending upon the type of imports.
See. Bacha, E.L. (1986): 'External Shocks and Growth Prospects: The Case of Brazil, 1973-89,' World 
Development, Vol. 14, No. 8, p. 922.
' Import replacement measures the effects of a replacement of imports by domestic substitutes.
'Reduction in absorption capacity following fall in growth rate of real GDP.
goods imports adversely a ffe c ted  ratio of current a ccou n t ba lance during the tw o year 
period. Its contribution was, however, very small In 1991-92 relative to 1992-93.
Another aspect o f external sector perform ance was continued sluggish 
perform ance in respect of value growth of exports. Value of exports declined  in 1991-92. 
When com pared with the corresponding perform ance during 1980s and in 1990-91, the 
achievem ent was a disquieting one. This unsatisfactory exports perform ance was an 
ou tcom e of the influence of both domestic and external factors. Imposition o f im port 
compression measures and tigh t monetary policy, im pacting on export c red it and im port o f 
raw materials and components, general econom ic uncertainty follow ing em ergence  of 
external crisis in the beginning of 1991-92; and a slow growth in export deepening 
contributed to an overall slowdown in foreign trade activ ity during 1991-92. External factors 
related to a break-up of the erstwhile USSR, which severely disrupted India's trade  with the 
region. There, however, took p lace  a reversal of trend in value growth of exports in 1992-93. 
The growth rate considerably deteriorated vis-à-vis tha t achieved in 1990-91 and further in 
comparison to the latter half of 1980s. Relative to the early 1980s, however, the perform ance 
of 1992-93 recorded marginal improvement.
The trend in value growth during the first year of the programme was m a tched  by a 
similar perform ance in respect of the volume growth of exports. In 1992-93, the volume 
growth of exports declined further vis-à-vis 1991-92 despite an increase in share of 
m anufactured goods.
Movements in resource balance and current accoun t ba lance are no t adequa te  
indicators of trends in agg rega te  net foreign resource flows, both deb t as well as equity, in 
to the econom y. The latter is important, as it indicates the pattern of current a c c o u n t de fic it 
financing, and its consequence on foreign exchange reserves d raw dow n /accum ula tion , 
and deb t accum ulation. We have chosen basic ba lance  of the ba lance  of paym ents as an 
ind icator for our purpose.
Basic balance as a ratio of GDP improved in 1991-92 relative to  the year 1990-91. 
The indicator fared considerably well when com pared with the perform ance during 1980-85 
and 1985-90. However, com pared  to the year 1990-91, when the ratio was -2.44 per cent, 
the improvement in perform ance in 1991-92 was significantly noticeable.
Table : Financing Need and Sources of Financing: External Sector. 
Variables During the Second half of the 1980
(1985-90).
Amount (In US $ million) Share (in %)
1. Financing Need (current a /c  
deficit including Errors & Omissions 
and Repayment to IMF)
2. Financed Bv:
31,350.0
(i) External Assistance 9,093.9 29.01
(ii) Commercial Borrowings 7,524.7 24.00
(iii) Non-Resident Deposits 7,163.1 22.85
(iv) Other Capital 3,942.2 12.57
(v) Use of Reserves 3,627.2 11.57
Im provem ent in basic balance ratio in 1980s was mainly a ided by inflows under 
com m ercia l borrowings and larger accretion under non-resident deposits, such as Non- 
Resident (External) Rupee (NR(E)R) and Foreign Currency Non Resident (FCNR) deposit 
schemes, (table above). Correspondingly, the deterioration in the ratio in 1990-91 followed 
(i) erosion in accruals under the non-resident deposits a long with a significant decline ’  of 
inflows under com m ercia l borrowings. '°The same trend continued in 1991-92. Subsequently 
there was a turnaround in inflows under non-resident deposits in 1992-93, bu t the m agnitude 
was very insignificant. While, (net) inflows under com m ercia l borrowings turned into outflows 
(net) during 1992-93. Despite this, there was im provem ent in the ratio of basic ba lance  in 
1991-92 due mainly to certa in exceptional factors, (a) inflow under exceptional financing, 
and (b) inflows under special schemes launched to  encourage repatriation of non resident 
Indians' resources.
The ratio of basic balance, however, deteriorated by -0.32 per cen t in 1992-93 vis-à- 
vis 1991-92. However, the perform ance ind icated an im provem ent relative to corresponding 
ratios for the first half of the 1980s and the year 1990-91. While this implied a marginal 
deterioration in the perform ance vis-à-vis that for the period 1985-90.
Overall ba lance  as a ratio of GDP also registered a similar trend as the ratio of 
basic balance, except for the year 1992-93. The latter witnessed a marginal deterioration in 
perform ance vis-à-vis the chosen periods of the 1980s. The ratio of overall ba lance, though 
implied an improved perform ance, remained negative  throughout the period under
'■ Resource under commercial borrowings registered o drastic decline following a downgrading of India's 
credit rating. Inflows under these resources amounted to Rs. 461 crore (US $ 188.37 million) during 1991-92 and 
Rs. -1,461 crore (US $ -562.57 million) during 1992-93.
Net inflows under non-resident deposits fell from a level of about US $ 1306 million in 1989-90 to US $ 229 
million in 1990-91. Foreign Currency non-Resident deposits were particularly hit. The net inflows into these 
deposits turned negative beginning October 1990. The monthly average outflows from the FCNRA were of 
the order of US $ 67 million during the second half of 1990-91 which accelerated to more than US $ 310 million 
during the first quarter of 1991-92.
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consideration thus ind icating the possibility tha t there had been a continuous ou tflow  under 
short-term and other cap ita l (other than long-term) during the period.
The above ratios do not ind icate  the extent o f structural im balances within an 
econom y. In order to appraise the extent of such imbalances, w e have chosen foreign 
exchange reserves as a perform ance indicator. We have used the ratio of changes in 
foreign exchange reserves to the current a cco u n t ba lance  as an ind icator of the use of 
reserves for external financing requirement.
Foreign exchange resource accum ulation im proved considerably when the ratio of 
the accum ula tion of reserves to current external financing requirement rose in 1991-92. 
When com pared with the corresponding ratios for the period 1980-85, 1985-90, and 1990-91, 
the perform ance implied a significant im provem ent," . The growth in accum ula tion  
continued in 1992-93, though at a very slow rate vis-à-vis 1991-92. ' 2  Despite this, the growth 
rate in the second year after the initiation of the program m e also implied an im provem ent 
when com pared with the observed corresponding past trend. It m ay also be observed that 
the growth in nominal value of the foreign exchange reserves kept p ace  with the import 
paym ent obligations. The ratio of foreign exchange reserve position in terms of months' of 
imports witnessed considerable im provem ent after the initiation of the program m e.
Trends in d ifferent ba lance  of payments measures relative to GDP m ay be treated 
w ithin their proper perspective. This is particularly so, as a desired trend m ay be ach ieved  by 
resorting to measures which normally would not have been a ccep tab le . Or im provem ent In 
the ba lance of payments m ight have been ach ieved  through forced adjustment measures, 
which would lead to a suppression of import dem and over a short- run. But, the 
perform ance would not be a sustainable one over m edium - to long-run.
Dom estic Sector Perform ance,
Domestic growth profile was also not very impressive. In order to assess the 
dom estic econom ic perform ance we dea l w ith the follow ing three broad categories of 
econom ic variables as noted earlier: (a) general m acro indicators representing the real 
sector of the econom y; (b) price variables; and (c) ratio o f gross fiscal d e fic it as ind icator of 
fiscal operations, during the program m e period.
(a) General M acroeconom ic Indicators,
" Negative ratios imply a drawdown in resources.
'-The foctors responsible os well as the nature of improvement have been discussed in detail In chapter 4.
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The rate of growth of (real) GDP in 1991-92 witnessed the most no ticeab le  adverse 
implications of stabilisation program m e in India in the early 1990s. The year im m edia te ly  
fo llow ing initiation of the stabilisation programme, witnessed a very low  growth rate of 
(real) GDP. The latter reached as low  as 0.9 per ce n t in 1991-92. (Table 5.1.1). The Indian 
experience, during early 1990s, implies a significant trade-o ff between payments ba lance  
and econom ic growth. Following the adoption of dem and  m anagem ent policies which 
were, however, initiated selectively prior to the im plem entation of the Stand-By 
program m e, the econom y witnessed deflationary situation which led to a considerably 
larger output loss during 1991-92. Simultaneously, there was a considerable im provem ent in 
the external sector ba lance, as discussed earlier. The trade-o ff was further confirm ed by the 
trend observed during second year after initiation of the programme. During the latter 
period, while the rate of growth of (real) GDP im proved considerably vis-à-vis th a t for the 
year 1991-92. This was a ccom pa n ie d  by a significant deterioration in current a ccou n t 
b a lance  vis-à-vis tha t for the year 1991 -92.
When com pared w ith the corresponding perform ance during the two halves of the 
1980s, the growth rate of (real) GDP in 1991-92 was very negligible. C om parab le  rates of 
growth was 5.68 per cen t per annum, on an average, and 6.04 per ce n t per annum, 
respectively, during first and second halves of 1980s. Subsequently, however, the growth 
rate of (real) GDP declined in 1990-91, when it g rew  by 5.40 per cent. Despite this fail, the 
perform ance was significantly above  that achieved during the firs t^fte r the initiation of the 
program m e. The same relative trend m ay be observed for real output growth in 1992-93 
despite an im provem ent in relative perform ance.
Stabilisation experiences ind icate  tha t defla tionary output e ffec t associated with 
an im provem ent in current a ccou n t ba lance  and vice-versa., over the life of any 
stabilisation programme, follows cu t in agg rega te  consumption as well as reduction in 
investment. As in the Indian case, w e  have experienced a pronounced trade-o ff betw een 
payments ba lance  and econom ic growth during both  the years following initiation of the 
programmes, it would be appropria te  to investigate the extent to which this was due to 
reduction in investment a nd /o r cu t in consumption during the period under consideration.
As mentioned earlier, the growth rotes for the periods, 1980-85 and 1985-90, hove been derived using 
arithmetic overage of the percentage changes observed during the period under consideration.
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India ’s perform ance was most noticeab ly depressing In respect of ttie  ratio of fixed 
investment to GDP during the period under consideration. The ratio of fixed investment 
witnessed a dece leration, when it declined to a rate of 10.3 per ce n t in 1991-92, the first 
year fo llow ing the initiation of the programme. This, however, improved very marginally, to 
10.53 per ce n t in 1992-93. Relative to the first and second halves of the 1980s as well as 1990- 
91, perform ance in 1991-92 implied a significant deterioration in the relative ratio of 
investm ent after initiation of the programme. The corresponding ratios for the chosen 
com parab le  periods were 16.5 per cent, 17.68 per cent, and 20.66 per cent, respectively. 
The same m ay be observed regarding the com parative  perform ance of the ratio for the 
year 1992-93.
There was a decline in public investment in 1991-92 vis-à-vis 1990-91 (by -6.01 per 
cent) follow ing a decline (at constant prices) in investment in (a) agricultural and allied 
activities, and (b) industry. Besides, there was also decline in public investment in (a) social 
services, and (b) science and technology and environment during the first year of the 
program m e period. This trend is typ ical of stabilisation experiences as noted elsewhere.
The growth in pub lic investment during 1992-93, the second year of the programme, 
though improved relatively, it fo llowed same pattern of cu t in investment expenditure as in 
1991-92.
As noted earlier, dem and m anagem ent Is a t the core of any stabilisation 
program m e efforts. It is, therefore, expected that efforts would be d irected  towards 
compression of consumption. This, in effect, implies an expected  decline in the ratio of 
a gg rega te  consumption to GDP. However, the two-year period, after the initiation of the 
program m e, witnessed an acce lera tion  in the ratio of consumption to GDP, when the latter 
was 53.3 during 1991-92 which, subsequently. Increased to 58 In 1992-93 though the 
perform ance implied an im provem ent vis-à-vis tha t for the first and second halves of the 
1980s, when the corresponding ratios for the latter two periods were 59.72 and 56.22, 
respectively. However, com pared  with tha t for 1990-91, the former implied a deterioration in 
perform ance. The corresponding ratio for 1990-91 was 49.2. A com parative  analysis o f the 
perform ance for the year 1992-93, yielded a similar conclusion, except for the second half of 
1980s. Relative to the latter, perform ance in 1992-93 actually implied a substantial 
deterioration.
(b) Price Developments,
As discussed above, perform ance In respect of the real sectors of the Indian 
econom y was unimpressive follow ing im plem entation of the program m e. The same 
conclusion m ay be obta ined, for the first year a fter the initiation o f the program m e, in 
respect of the rate of growth of the inflationary trend. The latter, however, im proved during 
the second year of the program m e. (Table 5.1.1 ).
(c) Exchange Rate Developments,
Data for the nominal and real e ffective  exchange rates for the period 1980-85 were 
not com parab le  w ith tha t for the remaining period under consideration (as explained in the 
foo tno te  of tab le  5 1.1). Hence, w e a tte m p t only a com parative  analysis of the 
perform ance in 1991-92 and 1992-93 with tha t observed during the second half of the 
d e c a d e  of 1980s and for the year 1990-91. The observed rate of depreciation in the nominal 
e ffec tive  exchange rate o f rupee in 1991-92 was 8.01 per cent. When com pared  with the 
perform ance during the second half of the 1980s a well as in 1990-91, the perform ance in 
1991-92 ind ica ted  a deterioration in perform ance. The rupee exchange rate deteriorated 
despite  two-stage adjustment of the same vis-d-vis leading currencies in July 1991 as a part 
of Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment programmes. Subsequently, however, there was a 
considerable im provem ent in the rate of deprecia tion  in the nominal e ffective  exchange 
rate  of rupee vis-à-vis leading international currencies, when rupee deprec ia ted  by 17.91 
per cen t in 1992-93. This implied an im provem ent in perform ance vis-à-vis tha t witnessed 
during the second half of 1980s. However, in comparison with the year 1990-91, the rate of 
deprec ia tion  in 1992-93 did not imply an im provem ent. A similar trend m ay be observed in 
respect of the real e ffective  exchange rate of the rupee vis-à-vis the international 
currencies of the world.
(d) Fiscal Adjustment,
The main thrust of government's policy efforts was to correct imbalances through 
reduction of gross fiscal de fic it rather than through restructuring of resource mobilisation and 
spending practices. Accordingly, there was a decline in gross fiscal defic it as a proportion 
of GDP, from 8.3 per cen t in 1990-91 to 5.9 per ce n t in 1991-92. This was further brought down 
to 5.7 per ce n t in 1992-93. Evidently, the efforts a t correction of fiscal imbalances were not 
sustainable. This becom es clear from the sharp increase in gross fiscal de fic it 7.4 per cen t in
1993-94. The underlying forces m ay be described as government's cho ice  to maintain status
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quo In its budgetary operations. Ttius, ttie  period did not witness any effort for restructuring 
pub lic  expenditures as well as revenue raising practices.
Section Two: D ecom position  o f Current A c c o u n t B a lance  Im provem ent.
Restoration of external sector ba lance  was the most im portant ob jective  of 
stabilisation program m e of early 1990s. Besides, current account perform ance was 
significantly satisfactory during the program m e period. In order to identify the relative 
im portance of different factors which influenced external sector performance, during each 
of the two-year program m e period In India in early 1990s, we have a ttem p ted  a 
quantita tive  analysis of the relevant experiences follow ing adoption of stabilisation 
measures. The analysis has been a ttem p ted  based on an accounting framework.
The analysis assumes the following. Any change  in current a ccou n t balance, 
relative to GDP, over any given period, m ay be separated into following components; (a) 
external influences, (b) burden of d e b t accum ula tion, (c) domestic policy actions, (d) 
im p a c t of private remittances, (e) e ffec t of other payments abroad, and (f) an unexplained 
residual. External influences comprise (ij terms-of trade effects, which measure im p ac t of 
changes in price indices of exports and various categories of imports, relative to the index of 
GDP deflator, (ii) im pact of interest payments which consists of the e ffect of changes in the 
average  interest rate, and (iii) contribution of export volume growth to any change  in 
current a ccou n t ba lance, reflecting growth of world dem and relative to the growth rate of 
GDP. Domestic policy actions comprise (1) indicators of domestic recessions following 
changes in (i) rate of growth of fixed investment and (ii) rate of growth of dom estic output; 
and (2) indicators of increased tradability which measure (i) e ffect of India's export effort 
and (ii) e ffec t from import rep lacem ent by dom estic substitutes.
Estimates for variations in the relative measure of India’s current a ccoun t ba lance, 
be tw een  each  year, for the period 1991-93, and the base year 1990-91 have been 
presented in Table 5.2.1.
'■> A detailed account of the framework has been provided with in Appendix 5.1.
'•'Based on on article by M.S. Ahluwalia.
See. Ahluwalia, M.S. (1986): 'Bolance of Payments Adjustment in India, 1970-71 to 1983-84' World 
Development, Vol. 14, No. 8, pp. 937-83.
'•■• In terms of expansion of market share in world exports.
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D ecom position  analysis fo r the  year 1991-92,
Im provem ent of 13.927 percen tage  points in the ratio of current a c c o u n t defic it, in 
1991-92, was the result o f interaction of a number of factors. Items identified  in the 
decom position in tab le  5.2.1 a ccou n t for 117.67 per ce n t of the actua l change.
The most im portant fac to r contributing to im provement in relative measure of 
current a ccou n t ba lance  was clearly the terms-of-trade e ffect which had a favourable 
im p a c t o f 11.61 percen tage  points. Of these, while prices of oil import and ca p ita l goods 
im port had adverse im pac t to the extent of 0.37 percentage points, a decline of the prices 
o f other imports, (i.e., non-oil imports) had a positive im pac t of 0.68 percen tage  points. This 
im provem ent in terms-of-trode could be attributed to higher unit value realisation for export 
during 1991-92. The latter more than com pensated for adverse im pact of oil and  cap ita l 
goods price movements on India’s current a ccou n t ba lance position. The net e ffe c t of 
changes in non-oil import prices and rise in unit value of export was a favourable m ovem ent 
to  the extent of 11.98 percen tage  points.
Favourable terms-of-trade effects were strengthened by certain other im portant 
factors. The latter included (i) increase in world dem and, when it increased by 2.19 
percen tage  points, (ii) fixed investment cuts, when it grew  b y -0.15 percen tage  points, and 
(iii) export deepening, when it grew  by -2.06 percentage points, and (iv) im port savings, 
when it grew  by -1.06 percen tage  points resulting from a reduction in non-oil import 
propensities, to the extent of -1.24 percen tage  points. Improvement in export e ffort mainly 
fo llow ed growth in world dem and, which was, however, partially offset by lack o f export 
deepening, as m ay be noted in India's stagnant share a t around 0.55 per c e n t during the 
period under consideration. Reduced import propensity actually reflects im port savings from 
essential inputs, such as fertilisers, iron and steel, e tc . Import of the former was reduced 
mainly follow ing hikes in administered prices and reduction of government subsidies. The 
favourab le  im p ac t from decline in propensity to import non-oil items, however, nullified any 
adverse im pact of increase in im port propensities of both oil import as well as ca p ita l goods 
imports. Together the com bined im pac t was 0.19 percentage points. The other contributory 
fac to r in current a ccou n t im provem ent was private remittances. The latter, however.
The sum of the individual items may not accurately sum up the actual change in the deficit because the 
exercise is based on the difference equation for the current account deficit which ignores second- and third- 
order terms.
contribu ted  in a very marginal way, when it g rew  by 0.83 percentage points. These 
favourab le  impacts were, however, weakened during the year by (a) an increased burden 
o f interest payments mainly resulting from increase In interest rates as well as increase in 
d e b t stock, together they contributed to the extent of 10.67 percen tage  points; (b) 
dom estic ou tpu t contraction; and (c) im pact of other payments abroad.
D ecom position  analysis fo r the  year 1992-93,
During 1992-93, current accoun t deteriorated sharply, b y -12,430 percen tage  points, 
vis-à-vis 1991-92. The decom position, however, accounts for a significant overestimation of 
a c tua l developm ents in current accoun t position vis-à-vis 1990-91. (Table 5.2.11.
Terms-of-trade effects remained a t previous year’s level follow ing mainly an 
im provem ent in unit value realisation for export as in the preceding year, when it grew  by 
10.97 percen tage  points. This was accom pan ied  favourably by fall in prices of non-oil 
imports. However, there were offsetting impacts o f rise in prices of oil im port and cap ita l 
goods imports, which together contributed 0.83 percen tage  points during the period.
There were other significant favourable developm ents. Im pact of interest payments, 
w hich accoun ted  for -41.39 percentage points in the improvements In current accoun t 
ba lance, was the most im portant factor. Simultaneously, there was significant deterioration 
in burden of deb t accum ulation which increased to 38.77 percentage points. The former 
was an ou tcom e partly of non-availability of com m ercia l and other non-aid d e b t Inflows 
fo llow ing dow ngrading of India ’s cred it rating, and partly a result of large inflow under 
exceptiona l financing following initiation of stabilisation and structural adjustment 
program m e. Thus, overall im pac t of interest payments am ounted to -2.62 percentage 
points. W ithout the former, the current accoun t d e fic it would have deteriorated further 
during the period under consideration. There were other additional effects, such as (a) 
contribution of export perform ance, by abou t 1.57 percentage points. Following 
im provem ent in export unit value realisation and an improvem ent in world dem and. Apart 
from export expansion, (b) trade accoun t also benefited  from a slow down in import 
volum e follow ing reduction in import propensities for other imports which re flected  import 
savings. The latter contributed 1.76 percentage points. The com bined e ffe c t of terms-of 
trade changes, export volume changes, import propensity changes and interest payments 
burden was 1.50 percen tage  points during the period 1992-93.
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The above analysis implies tha t Individual effects of each of the elements 
contributing to the im provem ent or deterioration o f the current accoun t ba lance  are 
separate ly quantifiable. However, in reality, each e lem ent has other effects on the g loba l 
set up. Any a ttem p t to separately quantity contribution of each e lem ent can be 
m eaningfu l only when all supplem entary effects are taken into account. Besides, 
decom position of variations in current a ccou n t ba lance  has been a ttem pted  on the basis 
of an accounting  framework comprising certain identities. Given these, any a tte m p t a t 
interpreting causal relationships am ong various elements and observed variations in current 
a cco u n t ba lance must be a ttem p ted  with utmost caution. Despite these limitations, the 
exercise is certainly indicative of the nature of influences exerted by each individual 
com ponents in the developm ents in relative measure of India's current accou n t ba lance  
during the stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes period.
Section Three: A 'C o u n te rfa c tu a l' Analysis o f India's Stabilisation Perform ance.
We have discussed India's m acroeconom ic perform ance during stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programmes period. Subsequently, w e have a ttem pted a quantita tive 
analysis of various factors, exogenous and dom estic, underlying external sector 
perform ance. Our latter effort h ighlighted the interaction between the two sets of factors in 
influencing India’s external sector perform ance. Given this, in this section, w e would assess 
the underlying nature of India's overall econom ic perform ance during the program m e 
period. This we would approach  through a comparison of India's m acroeconom ic 
perform ance with that of a control group. For the purpose of this section, the latter 
comprises all developing countries.
We have presented da ta  on trends in selected variables for all developing countries 
'8  toge ther with com parab le  da ta  for India. ”  It is expected  that a relative assessment of 
these tw o sets of da ta  would provide us with some evidence  on India's perform ance vis-à- 
vis deve loping countries within a com m on g loba l setting. 20
'■ Data for developing countries are for calendar years, i.e., 1990, 1991, and 1992.
’ Data for all developing countries include data for India also, and hence the results tend to underestimate 
the actual difference betv\/een the performance of the Indian economy and that of the developing 
economies. However, the underestimation involved is not very significant as for each period considered, the 
share of India in developing countries’ aggregate, in respect of majority of the variables was negligible.
-- Interpretation of this kind of results, based on relative assessment needs to be attempted with utmost 
caution. It is quite likely that India's external economic situation might have been more in need of 
stabilisation efforts vis-à-vis the developing economies as a whole.
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For purpose of our analysis in this section, w e  have covered the period 1990-91 to 
1992-93, i.e., the two-year period after initiation of the Indian stabilisation and adjustm ent 
programmes and the year im m ediate ly preceding the programmes. The variables chosen 
are same as those in section one excep t for ind icator for fiscal po licy practices by 
deve loping  countries and exchange rate indicator. For the former, we have chosen only 
ratio of gross fiscal de fic it to  GDP as ind icator o f central governm ent budgetary 
transactions. While, we have not considered any relative assessment of trend in exchange 
rates in this section. Accordingly, our cho ice  variables are the following. (1) External 
econom ic  indicator, which includes (a) trade indicators, such as rate of growth ot value 
and volume of exports and imports: (b) ba lance  of payments indicators, such as current 
a c c o u n t ba lance, resource ba lance, basic balance, and overall ba lance of the ba lance  of 
payments position; and (c) foreign exchange reserves in terms of months' o f imports. (II) 
Domestic econom ic indicators comprise (a) real econom ic growth; (b) measures of 
a gg rega te  consumption and fixed investment, relative to GDP; (c) m onetary and price 
indicators, such as broad m oney growth 21 and rate of growth of inflation; 22 and (d) 
estimates of gross fiscal de fic it relative to GDP as ind icator of fiscal practices in developing 
countries.
We begin with an initial observation tha t India's overall econom ic perform ance 
during the program m e period broad ly approxim ated tha t of all developing countries. (Table 
5.3.1).
During the period under consideration, India d id not fare well in its resource ba lance 
perform ance relative to deve loping countries except for 1991-92. These ratios for India were 
well above  that for deve loping countries. During 1991-92, however, India perform ed 
significantly better, when the com parab le  ratio was -1.05 per cent vis-à-vis -2.18 per ce n t for 
deve lop ing  economies. This fo llow ed developm ents in trade account which would be 
discussed in deta il later.
A similar relative trend as in ratio of resource balance, could be observed for the 
relative ratio of current a cco u n t ba lance  during the period under consideration. The ratios
Data for broad money growth for developing countries are weighted average composites. They are 
calculated as weighted averages of percentage changes for individual countries, weighted by the average 
US dollar value of their respective GNPs over the preceding three years.
-- Data for rate of inflation for developing countries are calculated as percentage changes of weighted 
geometric averages of consumer price indices for individual countries, weighted by US dollar value of their 
respective GDPs over three preceding years.
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for India were -3.24 per cent, -0.36 per cent, and -1.82 per cent, respectively for 1990-91, 
1991-92, and 1992-93. While the com parab le  statistics for developing countries were -.051 
per cent, -2.18 per cent, and -1.61 per cent, respectively. The deterioration for developing 
countries in 1991-92 could be explained by significant slow down in trade in com m ercia l 
services relative to tha t in 1990-91, besides decline in resource balance. While, im provem ent 
in com parab le  perform ance by India mainly fo llowed considerable im provem ent in 
resource balance, especially im port perform ance. Deterioration in deve loping countries' 
current a ccoun t ba lance  was fo llow ed by an im provem ent in 1992-93. The latter was mainly 
due to better earnings from trade in com m ercial services in 1992-93, follow ing improved 
earnings from tourism and transportation services after the Gulf war, com b ined  with an 
im provem ent in resource ba lance  position. Corresponding Indian perform ance registered a 
deterioration caused by a considerable increase in rate of growth of imports.
Developments in resource ba lance  were accom pan ied  by similar trends in value 
and volume growth of exports. Growth of exports, in value terms, ,23 during 1990-93, was 
substantially lower for India relative to developing countries. Even though both witnessed 
similar trend, m agnitude of Indian perform ance fell far short of perform ance of developing 
countries. This was more pronounced during 1991-92, when value of exports for India grew 
by -1.5 per cen t as against 6.27 per cen t for the latter following an im provem ent in unit 
value realisation for India. Value of exports of the developing countries declined during 
1991-92 mainly following an appreciation of the dollar value. Instability in oil prices, and 
continued decline in non-oil com m od ity  prices. This decline was also associated with 
deterioration of growth in volume of exports for developing countries. Volume of exports for 
deve loping countries declined mainly following an unstable econom ic and political 
situations in M iddle East, despite an expansion for Asia as well as sub-Saharan Africa. The 
expansion of the Asian exports was possible following dynam ic perform ance of leading 
exporters of manufacturers and a strong growth in intra-regional trade. Relative to 
deve loping countries' export volume growth, India fared marginally worse during the 
program m e period while witnessing a similar declining trend. The rate of volum e growth for 
India was 10.98 per cen t in 1990-91 as against -0.7 per cent for the deve loping countries. 
Volume growth for the latter further deteriorated to -4.1 per cen t in 1991-92. Following the
Value growth calculated on the basis of the US dollar value of exports of the concerned country/group of 
countries.
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same trend, the rate of growth of India's export volum e also declined. Though India's rate 
o f growth remained positive a t 7.47 per cen t in 1991-92 the relative rate of deterioration was 
m arginally higher for India. As discussed in section two, this mainly followed the im pac t of 
world dem and net of export deepening. However, in 1992-93, India's exports growth was 
m arginally lower than tha t registered by developing countries.
In respect of the value growth of imports, same observation, as in value of exports, 
m ay be m ade, except for the year 1991-92. During the latter year, rate of growth of India’s 
imports improved substantially, b y -19.4 per cent, vis-à-vis 11.9 per cent of the developing 
countries' imports. India fared discouragingly in volume growth of imports during the period 
under consideration, except for the year 1991-92 when India witnessed a substantial 
im provem ent in the respective rate of growth. This im provem ent for India mainly followed 
reversal in import dem and as discussed in section one. Growth in value and volume of 
imports for all developing countries was possible mainly following rapid growth in domestic 
dem and and econom ic recovery in Latin American and East and south-east Asian countries 
despite a considerable decline in imports from M iddle East and North Africa.
In order to ascertain the pattern of financing current account ba lance  we 
a ttem p ted  to examine behavioural pattern of basic ba lance  and overall ba lance  of the 
ba lance  of payments position of the two groups.
India's perform ance in basic ba lance  was sluggish vis-à-vis that of developing 
countries during the period under consideration. Ratio of basic balance for developing 
countries, which was -0.4 per cen t in 1990-91, improved significantly (witnessing a reversal of 
trend) when it reached 2.59 per cen t in 1991-92. India also witnessed an im provem ent when 
com parab le  ratios reached 1.17 per cen t from -2.44 per cen t during the same period. 
Im provem ent in the ratio of basic balance for the former followed a nom inal rise in 
a gg re ga te  net flows of foreign d irect investment and portfolio investments in 1991 relative 
to the previous year. For 1992-93, however, there was a fall in relative estimate of basic 
b a lance  for developing countries as well as for India. However, the relative decline in 
India's basic balance ratio was higher than tha t witnessed for developing countries in 1992- 
93. This decline for developing countries, despite an improvement in resource ba lance  as 
well as current accoun t balance, m ay be a ttributed to a decline in agg rega te  net
transfers^** Into these countries despite a considerable increase in gross flows in 1992-93. The 
same trend may be observed for ratio o f overall ba lance  of the balance o f payments 
during the period under consideration.
In respect of accum ula tion of foreign exchange reserves position, in terms of 
months' of imports, India ’s perform ance was relatively better than tha t o f deve loping 
countries. The latter registered very slow growth in accum ulation of foreign exchange 
reserves. While accum ula tion by India was very rapid during the period under consideration.
Relative growth profile of the domestic sector broadly followed the similar trend as 
in external sector perform ance. Domestic econom ic performance, especially the real 
econom ic growth witnessed a deterioration for India relative to that of developing 
countries during the period under consideration.
Real GDP growth rate of 2.60 per cen t per year for India, on an average, was about 
half of that for developing countries, during the com parab le  period. O utput for developing 
countries improved marginally during 1991-92 vis-à-vis 1990-91. Underlying this marginal 
im provem ent was sharp decline in output in Central and Eastern Europe and by the adverse 
effects of the Gulf crisis on the economies of M iddle Eastern countries which considerably 
weakened the acce le ra ted  growth in output in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and 
sustained growth in econom ic activ ity in East and South-east Asia. Subsequently, there was 
a substantial im provement in the growth in developing countries in 1992-93. Overall GDP 
(real) rose, despite a modest recovery of overall GDP for the world as a whole. Developing 
country growth was led by the countries of East Asia region, and the M iddle East, when the 
latter benefited from the stimulus of post-Gulf War reconstruction efforts.
As against this, India witnessed an enormous decline in its (real) GDP growth rate in
1991-92 mainly following a decline in industrial production. However, there was a 
considerable im provement in its GDP subsequently followed by on im provement in industrial 
and agricultural output. When com pared with the com parab le  growth rate for developing 
countries, India’s growth rate was, however, be low  tha t for the former, despite an 
encouraging growth environment during 1992-93.
In respect o f the ratio of fixed investment to GDP, the same observation as for real 
GDP growth may be m ade. The only real econom ic indicator in respect of w hich India
2-1 Aggregate net transfers are o measure of cash flow supplied to a country by external creditors and are the 
sum of net resource flows less cost of servicing external liabilities.
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performed com parative ly well is the ratio of consumption to GDP. The proportion was 
considerably smaller for India vis-d-vis developing countries during the period under 
consideration. However, trend in India’s perform ance over the period was not impressive. 
While, developing countries witnessed a rise in the ratio in 1991-92 fo llowed by a decline  in
1992-93, India witnessed a continued rise in the respective ratio during the period.
Data for developing countries for broad m oney growth and rate of infla tion were 
not com parab le  with tha t for India due to differences in com pilation of respective da ta  as 
mentioned earlier. However, w e can a ttem p t a comparison of the relative ratio o f changes 
in those data  for developing countries vis-d-vis that for India. While for India b road  m oney 
witnessed a positive growth in the first year of the program m e and then declined  during the 
second year of the program m e, for developing countries, the trend was a reverse one. 
Much of the increase in broad m oney growth in developing countries could  be a ttributed 
to growth in reserve money, especially monetisation of fiscal deficits. A ccord ing ly, any 
increase/decline in broad m oney growth followed a corresponding trend in monetisation of 
fiscal deficits. As m ay be m entioned here the ratio of reserve money to broad m oney for 
developing countries was 36.3 per cen t in 1990, which declined to 33.9 per ce n t in 1991, and 
subsequently rose to 37.4 cen t in 1992. While for India, growth in broad m oney mainly 
fo llowed growth in dom estic primary liquidity rather than monetisation of fiscal deficit. 
Underlying this d ifference was the programme provisions, for Indio which were absent for 
majority of developing countries.
The same trend, as in broad m oney growth, m ay be witnessed for rote of growth of 
inflation may be observed for both the groups. For developing countries, the experience 
establishes a broad correspondence between broad money and reserve m oney growth 
and inflation; while for India w e observed a link between broad money growth and  inflation 
despite a moderation in reserve m oney growth during the period under consideration. The 
fall in inflation for deve loping countries followed a moderation in price increases in several 
countries, a sharp decline in the average rate of inflation in the Western Hemisphere. This 
happened despite a worsening in price situation in some countries because of tem porary 
rise in oil prices and strong dem and pressures following scarcity of consumer goods, such as 
in M iddle East and owing to sharp increases in m oney supply as well as hikes in adm inistered 
prices and exchange rate deprecations related to terms-of-trade shocks, as in A frica. While 
an acceleration in the rate of inflation for developing countries, in 1992-93, m ainly fo llow ed
L a
a rise in inflation in Africa, Europe and Latin America, w hich toge ther nullified dec line  in rate 
of inflation in Asia in 1992-93.
India ’s perform ance was discouraging relative to  that of deve lop ing  countries 
when com pared  in terms of m agnitude of the ratio of gross fiscal defic it to GDP despite 
im plem entation of a Fund-supported stabilisation program m e. The ratio continued to 
remain substantially high for India, during the period under consideration, vis-à-vis tha t for 
deve loping countries despite a decline in the relative estimate for India over the entire 
period. While for developing countries, the ratio after declin ing m arginally in 1991-92, 
s tagnated a t the 1990-91 level. This decline in 1991-92, for developing countries, however, 
was not accom pan ied  by any drastic decline in fixed investment. While Indian experience 
suggested a considerable decline in fixed investment during the period. The explanation 
could be tha t the latter was achieved either through c u t in non-productive spending 
and /o r there was a marked improvement in the scale of private investment. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.
The preceding discussion highlighted a broad correspondence be tw een  India's 
m acroeconom ic perform ance and that of all developing countries which corroborates our 
initial observation. Underlying this similarity, we m ay also observe a d ifference in 
contributory factors. For developing counties, external sector perform ance was mainly 
influenced by factors exogenous to their economies, such as Gulf War, developm ents in 
dollar exchange rate, deterioration in their terms-of-trade. While for India, corresponding 
perform ance was mainly an outcom e of deliberate dom estic policy actions despite the 
fa c t tha t the latter were actions in response to exogenous econom ic developm ents, such 
as. Gulf Was, terms-of-trade deterioration, and considerable fall in trad© following 
disintegration of erstwhile east-European Communist block.
We m ay also notice  difference in factors underlying the growth of m oney supply 
and acce lera tion  in inflation. While, for developing countries, fiscal policy p ractices were 
responsible for growth in broad money and hence in deterioration in price situation, for 
India the relevant factors were growth in domestic primary liquidity, rise in administered 
prices, exchange rate devaluations. Besides, decline in fixed investment also points to the 
d ifference in approach to restricting budgetary deficits.
Section Four: Conclusion,
We hove applied two different approaches in analysing macroeconom ic im pact of the 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. They are (a) a relative assessment of the actual 
behaviour of the economy, and (b) a comparison of actual with the desired pattern of 
macroeconom ic behaviour. The purpose is two-fold. While through the former, w e have 
a ttem pted to evaluate the im pact of the stabilisation efforts, through the latter, w e  have 
a ttem pted to assess the implementation of the programmes.
The lessons that emerge from our analysis, broadly, are the following. Besides, usual 
associated econom ic costs, the Stand-By and Structural Adjustment Programmes implemented 
in India in early 1990s yielded mixed m acroeconom ic outcome.
As is evident from chapter 4, stabilisation efforts were broadly successful in terms of 
fulfilment of the programme provisions. Despite this, our analysis based on before-and-after test, 
highlighted rather poor achievements in majority of the targeted m acroeconom ic variables. 
Performance in respect of certain variables fulfilled the objective of the programme, while in 
respect of certain others, the objective of the programme could not be fulfilled. Among the 
former, we may group the following: government's control of relative estimate of gross fiscal 
deficit, developments in current account as a percentage of GDP, and accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. Flowever, the most discernible contradictory result appears in respect of 
attaining targeted results in (i) inflation and (ii) money supply, despite fulfilment of the policy 
variable, i.e., restriction of net domestic assets of the central bank. Besides, the programme failed 
to achieve improvement in certain important underlying variables which are major determinants 
of sustainability of growth of any economy, such as fixed investment.
Our a ttem pt in section two to quantify domestic and exogenous influences on external 
sector performance highlighted that changes in India's observed external sector performance 
during the programme period was an outcome of interaction of both domestic responses to 
implementation of the stabilisation and adjustment programmes and exogenous developments. 
The former include mainly import replacement efforts, while the latter include terms-of-trade 
effects, especially from higher export unit value realisation: growth in world dem and for Indian 
exports. Flowever, the nature of influences does not suggest any sustainable improvement in 
external sector performance. Our observation is corroborated by (a) nature of improvement in 
certain variables, such as (net) official international reserves, gross fiscal deficits o f the central
Us
government; and (b) developments in the Indian econom y subsequent to two-year stabilisation 
programme period (as discussed in section five of chapter 2 ).
We have also a ttem pted to evaluate India's econom ic performance relative to 
developing economies during the programme period. Our a ttem pt highlighted a broad 
correspondence in trends of econom ic developments in India and in developing countries. 
Given this similarity, we observed a relatively poor performance by India in^majority of chosen 
m acroeconom ic variables. One significant aspect highlighted by our a ttem pt is the difference in 
underlying factors resulting in particular m acroeconom ic behaviour, both external sector and 
domestic econom ic variables, especially, budgetary transactions, money supply growth, and 
inflationary situations for the two groups.
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A ppend ix  5.1: D ecom position  of Current A c c o u n t D e f ic it .
The decom position of the current a cco u n t deficit, D, m ay be written as a function
of value of imports, exports, net fac to r payments, and remittances. Thus,
D = [ M ’o Pjo +  M ’k Pk +  M 'ino  Pjno] - [X* Px] + [r NF] - [R ]......................... (1 ).
where, M ’o = oil imports in constant prices,
M *k  = cap ita l goods imports in constant prices,
Mjno = all other imports in constant prices,
Pjo, Pk, and Pjno are the corresponding prices, 
r = the rate of return on ne t foreign debt,
NF = the stock of foreign assets, and 
R = the value of rem ittance inflows.
The above equation can  be further expanded as follows,
D = [Jyo.Z* Pjo +  Jvk I* Pk +  Jyno Z* Pjno] - [{X '/W } Px W'] - [R] + [r NF] ............... (2).
where, Jyo = M 'o /Z *
Jyk ~  M  k /l  ,
Jyno — M  jno/Z , and 
Z’ = is GDP a t constant prices.
Dividing both sides by Z = Z’ Py, where Z is GDP in current prices and Py is the GDP
defla tor, and then differentiating, the change in the current defic it can be written as the
sum of the following terms,
A D  = [Jyk I7Z‘] A [P k /P y ] + Jyo A [P jo /P y] + Jyno A [Pjno/Py] - X'/Z" A [P x /P y ]
- [Px WVPy z*] A[X7W j Export effort
- [Px X7Py W*] A[W7Z*] World dem and
+ [Pjo/Py] AJyo Import propensity (oil)
+ [I’ Pjk/Z Py] A  Jyk Import Propensity (capita l goods)
+ [Pjno/Py] AJyno Import propensity (other imports)
- A[R/Z’ Py] Remittance e ffec t
+ [NF/Z' Py] Ar Interest rate e ffec t
+ r A[NF/Z’ Py] D ebt accum ulation e ffe c t
+ [Jyk P jk/Py] A[17Z'] Domestic dem and e ffec t
Source: Ahluwalia, M.S. (1986), World Development, vol. 14, No.B, pp. 937-62.
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APPENDIX 5.IL
List of Countries having Stand-By Arrangements w ith the Fund during the period 
April 1, 1991 to April 30, 1992.
Name of Countries Date of arrangements.
(1) Barbados
(2) Brazil
(3) Bulgaria
(4) Cameroon
(5) Costa Rica
(6) Cote d'Ivoire
(7) Czechoslovakia
(8) Dominican Republic
(9) Ecuador
(10) Egypt
(11) El Salvador
(12) Gabon
(13) India
(14) Jamaica
(15) Jordan
(16) Mongolia
(17) Morocco
(18) Nicaragua
(19) Panama
(20) Papua New Guinea
(21) Philippines
Source : I.M.F. Annual Report, 1993.
February 7, 1992 
January 29,1992 
April 17,1992 
December 20,1991 
April 8,1991 
September 20,1991 
April 3, 1992 
August 28, 1991 
December 11, 1991 
May 17, 1991 
January 6, 1992 
September 30, 1991 
O ctober 31,1991 
June 28, 1991 
February 26, 1992 
O ctober 4, 1991 
January 31, 1991 
September 18, 1991 
February 24, 1992 
July 31, 1991 
February 20, 1991
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C ha p te r 6 : Conclusion,
In this dissertation, w e exam ined the m acroeconom ic im pact of the stabilisation 
and structural adjustment programmes initiated by the Indian authorities in , . early 1990s. 
The duration of the Stabilisation Programme, under the support of the Fund, was from 
November 1991 through to June 1993. White, im plem entation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme has still been going on.
We summarise our findings in this chapter. We begin with a discussion on major 
findings of our effort. This would then be fo llow ed by specific observations. Policy 
recom m endations em anating from the latter discussion would then follow. Subsequently, 
we would discuss about the limitations of the dissertation.
G enera l Observations.
The stabilisation and adjustm ent process tha t began in India in July 1991 has not yet 
been com ple ted, nor has enough tim e gone by since the key policies were im plem ented 
to assess their full implications. However, a number of tentative lessons m ay be drawn 
based on our a ttem p t to (i) ascertain the extent o f implem entation of the perform ance 
criteria, and (ii) evaluate the 'counte rfactua ls ' based on the 'before-and-after' estimator. 
Such an effort would be useful to summarise the evidence and its interpretation, as well as 
to identify features of the Indian experience which differentiate it from earlier adjustment 
efforts as laid down in deta il in chap ter one.
Throughout the d eca de  of . 1980s, a laxity in fiscal policy practices had led to
overheating of the Indian econom y. The government's increasing resort to de fic it financing 
and borrowings, both internal and external, fuelled inflationary situations and, toge ther with 
a rigid real exchange rate policy, rapidly eroded India's international competitiveness. The 
situation cam e to a standstill fo llow ing the outbreak of the Gulf War and breakdown of 
India ’s trade with erstwhile east European Communist countries. Consequent upon this, the 
Indian authorities introduced an adjustment program m e, which was supported by a Stand­
by arrangem ent with the Fund (O ctober 1991 to June 1993), and Structural Adjustment and 
Sectoral Adjustment Loans from the World Bank. As discussed elsewhere, major elements of 
the program m e were a substantial devaluations of the Indian rupee, restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies, supplem ented by adjustm ent of administered prices, particularly of
energy, substantial deregulation of industrial and foreign investment policies, and removal 
of trade barriers. The focus of the adjustment program m e was to achieve price stability, 
restore external and internal ba lance, and further reduce reliance on foreign borrowing. This 
reorientation of econom ic policy practices represented a significant departure from India's 
practices during the post-independence period and especially in the 1980s. The deviation 
was more visible in respect of fiscal po licy practices as the latter depended  on substantial 
recourse to inflationary finance and external borrowing during the 1980s. The financia l 
policies im plem ented consisted of strict financia l discipline, which sharply reduced  the 
public sector de fic it and the rate of monetary expansion, and a flexible exchange rate 
policy.
We have applied two different approaches in analysing m acroeconomic im pact of the 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. They are (a) a relative assessment of the actual 
behaviour of the economy, and (b) a comparison of actual with the desired pattern of 
m acroeconom ic behaviour. The purpose is two fold. While through the former, we have 
a ttem pted to evaluate the im pact of the stabilisation efforts, through the latter, we have 
a ttem pted to assess the implementation of the programmes.
The lessons that emerge from our analysis, broadly, are the following. Besides, usual 
associated econom ic costs, the Stand-By and Structural Adjustment Programmes implemented 
in India in . early 1990s yielded mixed m acroeconom ic outcome.
As is evident from chapter 4, evaluation based on the ‘actual-versus-target’ 
app roach  indicates a mixed ou tcom e in the first tw o years since the im plem entation of the 
programmes. Some of the policy variables, have been fulfilled by a large margin during the 
period under consideration, while in respect of certain others, such as (i) overall borrowing 
requirements of the centra l government, and (ii) ta rge t for net bank cred it to the general 
government, the targets could not be adhered to.
There are also contradictions in the Indian reforms experiences in ' early 1990s. 
Despite fulfilment of im portant perform ance criteria, we observed tha t m acroeconom ic 
perform ance was not entirely satisfactory. External sector imbalances could  be restored 
within a short time period. However, as in other country experiences, there was a trade off 
betw een dom estic econom ic growth and restoration of external sector balances when 
simultaneously a decline in econom ic growth could be witnessed. These trends were
accom pan ied  by unsatisfactory regulation o f price situations, a t least during the first year 
since the initiation of the programmes. Besides, restoration of budgetary ba lance  could be 
ach ieved during the stabilisation program m e period through restraining a gg rega te  public 
sector dem and and correspondingly reducing gross fiscal deficits.
Nature of developm ents underlying the above successes and failures, however, sets 
forth a different story. First of all, following considerable emphasis on reduction of fiscal 
stimulus to  aggrega te  dem and through restraint on gross fiscal deficits, the authorities were 
successful in bringing the latter down within the desired level. However, this im provem ent 
did not result into expected  improvement. Especially, the structural imbalances inherent in 
fiscal practices, continued to persist. Correspondingly, budgetary practices deteriorated 
once stabilisation program m e implem entation was over. Secondly, underlying the large 
accum ula tion of (net) o fficial international reserves was an entirely d ifferent situation. 
Structural imbalances within the external sector continued to prevail. Whatever ba lance  of 
payments im provem ent took p lace, it was through suppression of import dem and and 
curta ilm ent of output growth. No sustainable im provem ent in terms of export growth did 
take p lace. Besides, an agreem ent with international financial institutions, such as IMF and 
the World Bank, failed to produce any ca ta ly tic  e ffect. The latter did not appea l as a ‘seal 
of approva l' to private cap ita l lenders. Correspondingly, (net) resource transfers in the form 
of d irect and portfolio equity and other portfolio investments did not grow keeping pace  
with an tic ipa ted  resource transfers.
Given the above observations regarding stabilisation programme implementation, our 
analysis based on the 'before-and-after' test, highlighted rather poor achievements in respect of 
majority of the targeted macroeconom ic variables. While performance in respect of certain 
variables fulfilled the objective of the programme, while in respect of certain others, the 
objective of the programme could not be fulfilled. Besides, the programme failed to achieve 
improvement in certain important underlying variables which are major determinants of 
sustainability of growth of any economy, such as fixed investment.
We have also attem pted to evaluate India's economic performance relative to the 
developing economies during the programme period. Our attempt highlighted a broad 
correspondence in trends of econom ic developments in India and in developing countries. 
Given this similarity, we observed a relatively poor performance by India in majority of chosen
m acroeconom ic variables. One significant aspect highlighted by our a ttem pt is the difference in 
underlying factors resulting in particular macroeconomic behaviour, both external sector and 
domestic econom ic variables, especially, budgetary transactions, money supply growth, and 
inflationary situations for the two groups.
It is, however, im portant to note that the link between program m e policies and 
consequent m acroeconom ic change is not very tight, well defined, or p red ictab le . There 
are several other factors, as well as d irect or indirect linkages, which make it d ifficu lt to 
p red ic t the net im pact of a multi-instrument policy package, such as Stand-By and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes. This latter aspect has been highlighted by our discussion 
on the trends in m acroeconom ic performance following the im plem entation during the 
program m e period in the early 1990s.
S pecific  Observations.
Viewed in the context of the preliminary evidence, the Indian experience, in general, 
corroborates the principal lessons derived from earlier stabilisation and adjustment experiences 
as discussed in chapter 1. Broadly, these may be described as: (1) adoption of restrictive 
dem and management, mainly through fiscal restraint; (2 ) maintenance of a targeted level of 
real exchange rate; and (3) introduction of trade and industrial policy liberalisation followed by 
tax and foreign investment practices reforms.
Apart from the experience in common with the experience accum ulated elsewhere, 
the Indian experience provides for some specific lessons as well. Our discussion in chapter 2 
suggested that the acceleration of real GDP growth rate during " - 1980s was caused, among 
other factors, by a stimulation of aggregate demand through fiscal deficit. A stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programme was, therefore, necessary to cope up with the econom ic 
problems in 1991. The most significant adjustment was required in the case of exchange rate and 
trade flows without which it would not have been possible to sustain the growTh rate of output 
and investment in the economy. Although adjustment of the rupee accelerated the inflation 
rate, the alternative of keeping the currency overvalued would have been worse. However, it 
appears that the stabilisation could have been achieved with somewhat lower rate of 
devaluation of the rupee exchange rate. Nature of reduction in fiscal deficit also calls for an 
improvement in policy design. It appears that the adjustment programme could have been 
better designed to prevent fall of public investment and real output groNArfh rate. Had the burden
of fiscal adjustment fallen more on government consumption than on investment the inflation 
and the balance of payment objectives could have been achieved with a higher real income 
growth. Besides, external assistance to support the Indian programme provided by the 
multilateral organisations ensured a minimum level of resource inputs for pursuing a market- 
oriented adjustment programme. However, this multilateral institutions' involvement failed to 
generate a catalytic effect. This is evident from an increasing resort to medium-term commercial 
borrowing and a relatively small inflow of equity finance.
Policy Implications.
Stabilisation and adjustment experience suggests that there are trade-offs between 
growth and inflation on the one hand and growth and balance of payments on the other. Our 
effort, however, indicates that the stabilisation programme in the Indian context improved 
balance of payments and inflationary situation a t the cost of lower growth of output. The real 
solution to the problem, therefore, lies in accelerating the growth rate through structural reforms. 
The underlying reason is that the acceleration of real GDP would depend crucially on the 
improvement in the productivity of capital. This is also crucial to face any unforeseen exogenous 
disturbance such as bad weather, which could adversely influence the price and foreign 
exchange rate expectations. Thus, unless there is a significant improvement in the productivity of 
capita l and fiscal balance, the economy could once again be destabilised by any unforeseen 
exigencies as in the early 1990s The succes^of the adjustment programme, therefore, depend 
crucially on the improvement in fiscal balance and the productivity of capital.
Lim itations o f the  Dissertation.
Our effort has the following limitations.
Firstly, w e have a ttem p ted  only an evaluation of the m acroeconom ic im p ac t of 
stabilisation programme. However, India was simultaneously implem enting a structural 
adjustm ent program m e also. Accordingly, the results could not be a ttribu ted  to 
m acroeconom ic stabilisation alone.
Secondly, the analysis is based on static im pact only. However, static im p ac t m ay be 
different from dynam ic im pact. A program m e m ay have an initial adverse im p ac t fo llowed 
by a success later, or initial success fo llowed by an adverse delayed reaction. It may, 
therefore, be necessary to evaluate the im pact of any programme both under static and 
dynam ic conditions.
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Thirdly, a stabilisation and structural adjustment package , as in the Indian context, is a multi­
instruments policy package. Such a policy package  m ay lead to d ifferent ou tcom e given 
d ifferent combinations of the constituents. It is, therefore, essential to study the im pac t of 
each e lem ent individually. This have not been a ttem p ted  in our effort. We have a ttem p ted  
only an overall evaluation of the programmes. Underlying this overall perform ance, 
perform ance of each  individual e lem ent m ay portray different picture. This aspect could 
not be highlighted in our present effort.
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